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ABSTRACT
FROM “THE PROJECTS” TO HOUSES:
PHYSICAL REDEVELOPMENT, POVERTY DECONCENTRATION, AND RESIDENT
SELF-SUFFICIENCY IMPACTS ON PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS AT HOPE VI
DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY
Michael Brown

Since 1992, public housing authorities (PHAs) throughout the United States have been building
public housing rental and owner-occupied housing in place of demolished or rehabilitated
distressed public housing and simultaneously attempting to deconcentrate poverty and improve
self-sufficiency among the affected residents. The distressed housing is usually dilapidated,
poorly designed, poorly constructed, poorly maintained, and poorly managed; the residents are
very poor, are in constant fear of crime and violence, and have little hope. Previous attempts to
address these problems have been piecemeal and often inadequate.
Based on recommendations by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public
Housing in 1992, the U.S. Congress launched the HOPE VI program to remedy severely
distressed conditions in public housing to make the developments physically desirable and
economically viable to both middle and lower income households. HOPE VI went a step further
than previous reform initiatives by providing human services to residents to help them transition
from dependence on welfare and other government aid programs to economic self-sufficiency.
Administered by HUD and targeting the worst affected developments, HOPE VI cash
grants to housing authorities facilitate redevelopment of the distressed properties. Typically,
PHAs build new replacement housing only but some sites have both rehabilitated and new
housing. To eliminate the extreme poverty at distressed sites, PHA relocate most of the residents
to other public housing sites and presumably, to better housing and to low-poverty neighborhoods
in the private market. The residents receive supportive services to help them increase employment

and income, achieve housing and economic self-sufficiency, and to reduce dependency on
government assistance.
In this dissertation, I explored the physical improvements, poverty deconcentration, and
self-sufficiency improvements undertaken through the HOPE VI program at three distressed
public housing developments in Camden, New Jersey. The Housing Authority of the City of
Camden has completed redevelopment at McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres and currently
redeveloping Roosevelt Manor. Different redevelopment strategies were used at the three sites:
partial demolition, site and building redesign, rehabilitation, and construction of new housing at
McGuire Gardens and complete demolition, site and building redesign, and construction of new
housing at Baldwin‘s Run and Roosevelt Manor. Utilizing information from several sources, I
examined redevelopment impacts on current public housing residents at the new HOPE VI sites.
The primarily data sources were a survey of HOPE VI public housing householders at the two
completed sites through face-to-face interviews, interviews with HOPE VI officials, analysis of
HOPE VI administrative data, HUD data sets, census data, and the HOPE VI site redevelopment
plans. Study findings show major physical transformations and substantially reduced
concentrations of poverty at all three sites but negligible improvements in self-sufficiency
outcomes among residents.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Research Background

Across the nation, public housing authorities (PHAs) are building housing developments with
public housing and homeownership housing to replace distressed public housing developments
and attempting to deconcentrate poverty and improve resident self-sufficiency. The displaced
residents relocate to other public housing and to private housing and some of receive supportive
services to empower them towards greater economic well-being and less dependence on
government. At redeveloped sites, private management replaces PHA management. The driving
force behind this physical and human redevelopment exercise in America‘s problem-plagued
public housing system is the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
administered Homeownership and Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE) VI
program. Through multi-million grants to PHAs, HOPE VI funds relocation, site and building
improvements, and resident services that promote resident‘s economic and social well-being.
Camden is one of 132 cities with failing public housing developments that received
HOPE VI grants and carried out substantial improvements in living conditions at the most
problems developments. Since receiving a 1994 HOPE VI grant, the Housing Authority of the
City of Camden (HACC) has pursued an aggressive redevelopment program that to date has
reconfigured and rehabilitated one development and replaced two other developments with new
―New Urbanism‖ type mixed-income and mixed-tenure housing communities. The developments
have fewer units and are less dense, and in the cases of the mixed developments have both public
housing and homeownership housing. The impacts on the developments, surrounding areas, and
on residents have been substantial. This study explores these impacts.
After reviewing the Final Report and Recommendations of the National Commission on
Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH), which cited alarmingly poor living conditions in
1
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six percent of the nation‘s public housing, in late 1992, the U.S. Congress authorized the urban
redevelopment program called HOPE VI to provide funding to address the problems that the
Commission raised. The Commission reported that due to severe physical deterioration, extreme
poverty, unbearable social and economic distress among residents, crime, and violence, at least
86,000 public housing units required immediate intervention. The problems resulted from years
of neglect, maintenance backlog, segregation, poor design and construction, ineffective
management, segregation and isolation, and an unsupportive policy environment. The U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Department launched the HOPE VI program in 1993 and
began awarding HOPE VI implementation (now revitalization) grants that year to PHAs to
rebuild their worst properties. In the first two funding cycles, 13 PHAs among 64 in the 40 most
populous cities and the 24 PHAs HUD considered ―troubled‖ received implementation grants.
Even though in the 1949 U.S. Housing Act Congress pledged ―a decent home and
suitable living environment for every American family,‖ the main purpose of the public housing
program is to assist families with severe housing needs to find safe and decent housing. However,
as the NCSDPH reported, public housing is frequently anything but safe, decent, or in suitable
living environments. At some sites, living conditions were so distressing for so long prior to
HOPE VI, that hopelessness prevailed (Denson 2004). Public housing did not begin that way
however; it was set up to eliminate ―slum‖ conditions in ―blighted‖ communities but over time
some developments deteriorated to the level of the conditions they were to eliminate. Where
public housing exists, some observers now see warehouses for the poor (Popkin, Levy and Buron
2009, Turbov and Piper 2005, Rongerude 2007). There are several reasons for the decline
including location in disadvantageous areas, underfunding, and bad policies in addition to those
already mentioned (Schill and Wachter 1995). HOPE VI grants fund rehabilitation, demolition,
new construction, resident services, and relocation expenses. By 2009, PHAs had demolished
well over 100,000 distressed housing units (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
2010) and relocated most of the residents to private housing and other public housing.
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HOPE VI grants also fund activities to improve the economic and social well-being of
resident to improve housing and economic self-sufficiency and to reduce welfare dependency. It
is an attempt to correct years of substandard public housing and the damage to residents and
surrounding communities (Turner, Popkin and Rawlings 2008). By December 2009, HOPE VI
grants had contributed to improving or set to improve living conditions at 254 of the worst public
housing redevelopments. HOPE VI activities affect population characteristics, public safety,
management, residents‘ lives, and neighborhoods communities in one way or another but
outcomes vary from site to site. Policy expectations include improvements to sites and buildings,
improvements in resident economic self-sufficiency, neighborhood improvements, and greatly
reduced poverty. This study explores impacts on residents at three sites in Camden, New Jersey.

1.2

Previous Research

In previous studies, researchers noted that HOPE VI has given residents new hope that public
housing as they know it will end, that their distressed living condition will improve, and their
lives will be transformed from isolation, poverty, despair, and hopelessness and that they will
become more self-sufficiency (Elliot, Gotham and Milligan 2004). But, as the NCSDPH Final
Report alluded and former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros stressed, ―… it was not enough to
eliminate the most distressed public housing buildings—we needed to dramatically reorient the
workings of public housing as a system‖ (Cisneros 2009, p. 6). Studies have explored different
goals in HOPE VI, including neighborhood impacts, physical design, income mixing, and
relocation outcomes for voucher holders. In 1996, Abt Associates did a baseline assessment and
the Urban Institute has done several HOPE VI studies for HUD that assessed the program‘s
impacts. Studies that examined physical redevelopment, poverty deconcentration, and resident
self-sufficiency reported that HOPE VI has reduced poverty concentrations onsite and in
surrounding neighborhoods, transformed the physical environments but has not produced
meaningful improvements in self-sufficiency at redeveloped sites.
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1.3

Research Objectives and Significance of Study

This study investigated HOPE VI‘s impacts on public housing residents at the three HOPE VI
sites in Camden, New Jersey. The areas of focus are physical improvement, poverty
deconcentration, and self-sufficiency. Camden suffers from severe economic, social and physical
distress in much the same way distressed public housing does. The research explored site and
resident characteristics before and after redevelopment to identify significant changes using
quantitative and qualitative data from: interviewing tenants in a tenant survey to understand
impacts from residents‘ perspectives, archival records, the housing authority administrative
records, census reports, HUD‘s Resident Characteristics Reports, and interviews with HOPE VI
officials and residents. Fifty-seven HOPE VI public housing tenants from McGuire Gardens and
Baldwin‘s Run responded to questions about site improvements, housing quality, and selfsufficiency services. The survey was done at the first two sites only because re-occupancy had not
yet began at the third site due to implementation setbacks. Resident Characteristics Reports from
HUD‘s Multi-Family Tenant Characteristics System provided outcome data to compare with
interview data. The overall study results are limited by incomplete or lack of in-depth information
about original households before relocation and about self-sufficiency programs implemented.
The study is most relevant to public housing policy. The findings may help to identify
program shortcomings and areas of policy interventions and help to identify and prioritize future
research. Of the 160 public housing developments nationwide that received revitalization grants
in the first 10 years, only 15, including one in this study, completed redevelopment within 10
years. Two of the three sites in this study have been operating for three and six years. The
research highlights differences resulting from different implementation strategies for each project.
Most other studies addressed one project or compared outcomes at sites in different jurisdictions,
not within the same HA. The results may inform future policy decisions as well.
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1.4

HOPE VI Program: Background and Evolution

HOPE VI has been the main vehicle driving HUD‘s efforts to redress decades of physical and
social deterioration in public housing by redeveloping the most distressed or obsolete sites. It is
the latest program in HUD‘s ―Homeownership and Opportunities for People Everywhere‖ 1 series
that began in 1990.2 Following the NCSDPH final report, Congress authorized the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to create an urban redevelopment demonstration program to
rebuild severely distressed public housing (Cisneros 2009). HOPE VI seeks to eliminate ―unfit‖
living conditions in severely distressed public housing and improve residents‘ lives. The main
components of the program are physical redevelopment, which includes rehabilitation and
demolition of existing units and construction of new units), poverty deconcentration, community
and self-sufficiency services, management and policy reforms (Popkin, et al. 2002). The
QHWRA noted that the main objectives were to:


revitalize sites on which distressed public housing projects are located and contribute to
improving the surrounding neighborhood(s);



provide housing that avoids or decreases the concentration of low income families;



improve the living environment for residents of severely distressed public housing
projects through demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration, and replacement of whole
developments or portions thereof; and



build sustainable communities.

After the mid-1990s changes, HUD website noted that the amended objectives were to:

1



change the physical shape of public housing through site redesign, rehabilitation and/or
demolition, and replacement with new mixed-income housing



lessen concentrations of poverty by encouraging greater income mixing among residents
and encouraging working families to move into public and market-rate housing in the
new developments

The study uses HUD‘s definition for HOPE VI, ―Homeownership and Opportunities for People Everywhere‖ not
―Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere‖ as many researchers frequently do.
2
HOPE I (HOPE for Public and Indian Housing Homeownership) provided planning and implementation grants to
tenant groups for ownership of public or Indian housing. HOPE II (Homeownership for Multi-family Units) financed
homeownership in multi-family projects. HOPE III (HOPE for Homeownership of single-family Homes) financed
homeownership of Federal, State, and local non-public housing to first-time low-income families, HOPE IV (HOPE for
the elderly) financed homeownership for seniors, and HOPE V is the Youth Build program.
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establish supportive services to help public housing residents get and keep jobs and
become more self-sufficient and less dependent on public assistance, and



build partnerships with public, private, and non-profit parties to leverage resources to
plan and implement improvements at distressed public housing.

It is important that HOPE VI residents transition from dependency to self-sufficiency and towards
that goal, the program provides supportive services to original and new residents to facilitate their
transition to work and out of assisted housing. To a great degree, HOPE VI‘s success therefore
rests on the effectiveness of the services residents receive (Goetz 2010).
In the first few years, HOPE VI grants were up to $50 million to public housing
authorities for demolition, rehabilitation and/or new construction, and support services to
residents (Abt Associates, et al. 1996). In most instances since the late 1990s, HAs replaced entire
developments with new developments. HOPE VI developments are physically different from the
original developments. Unlike the original sites, HOPE VI sites usually have single-family public
housing and non-public housing units. Some HOPE VI sites that have only public housing are
grant recipients from the first four funding cycles. Those sites have mostly rehabilitated units.
Physically, HOPE VI developments provide residents substantially improved living
conditions and lower levels of poverty but there are concerns about the large percentage of
original residents whom the program displaces, about relocation outcomes for original residents,
and about the availability of services to help original residents improve their economic and social
well-being. Some original tenants receive vouchers to move to private housing in non-poor
neighborhoods but they do not always end up in better housing or better neighborhoods. In fact,
even families that moved to less poor neighborhoods still struggle to sustain themselves (Crowley
2010, Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Some relocated residents move to better housing but some
move to worse or equally poor housing and neighborhoods. Popkin, Levy and Buron (2009) noted
that residents with complex problems and the most serious housing needs are among those who
end up in equally poor or worse housing and neighborhoods conditions. Only about 24 percent
moved back after redevelopment (Crowley 2010).
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A large number of demolished units are not replaced and this makes relocation more
challenging. According to National Low Income Housing Commission President, Sheila
Crowley, HOPE VI demolitions dislocated 78,000 families because the program was ―more about
the real estate than it was about the people‖ (Crowley 2009, p. 230). Some researchers noted that
HOPE VI was most effective at replacing distressed developments with mixed-income
developments. They also criticized the program for the large number of original tenants who are
not allowed to return after redevelopment, for the many residents whose whereabouts are
unknown, and for its poor record in helping residents to become self-sufficient (Popkin 2010,
Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009).
Despite these criticisms, the program received positive feedback for creating welldesigned homes and removing entrenched poverty at distressed sites but critics decried the poor
self-sufficiency and relocation outcomes (Popkin 2009, Goetz 2004). Some observers see HOPE
VI as the most comprehensive attempt to date to correct systemic problems in public housing and
a vital tool to deconcentrate poverty. For example, HUD Secretary, Shaun Donovan (2009) said
HOPE VI was one of America‘s best ever weapons to fight concentrated poverty. 3 At a HOPE VI
seminar at the Urban Institute in 20094, Vice President at the Brookings Institution and former
Chief of Staff at HUD during HOPE VI‘s formative years, Bruce Katz stated:
It‘s generally considered … to be one of the most successful urban regeneration
initiatives in the past half century. In little more than 15 years, this program tore down;
more importantly, redeveloped hundreds of the most distressed public housing projects in
the country; projects at the time that were essentially warehouses for the very poor and in
the process, increased opportunities in dozens of distressed urban neighborhoods that
prior to this effort, were characterized by lawlessness and decline.

3

Comments made at a seminar entitled ―From Despair to Hope: Two HUD Secretaries on Urban Revitalization and
Opportunity‖ at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, July 2009.
4
Katz gave the opening remarks at the release seminar of the new Brookings Institution book From Despair to Hope:
HOPE VI and the New Promise of Public Housing in America's Cities at the Brookings Institution on July 14, 2009.
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Low income housing advocates charge that HOPE VI has failed the families that the
program was set up to assist. The Center for Community Change (2003) and National Housing
Law Project (2002) charged HOPE VI with gentrifies poor neighborhoods and therefore reducing
the already inadequate stock of low-income housing. They also likened the displacement of
residents to the displacement of poor residents from their homes by urban renewal projects in the
1950s and 1960s. Harvard Law Review (2003) described HOPE VI as a massive experiment to
transform public housing to mixed-income housing. The program was supposed to expire after 10
years but in that time, 15 of the 160 funded projects were completed.
1.4.1

Role of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing

The basis for creating the HOPE VI program was the recommendations of the National
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. For about 18 months, this congressionally
appointed Commission investigated and documented public housing problems and innovative
ways local authorities used to address problems and formulated a National Action Plan to
alleviate conditions that lead to distress (NCSDPH 1992). The Commission made site visits;
studied successfully revitalized schemes; and interviewed residents, PHA staff and officials, and
housing industry professionals and documented its findings and recommendations in a Final
Report in 1992. The report noted that the majority of public housing units were physically sound
except for about 86,000 units that were ―severely distressed‖5 and not fit for human habitation.
These sites had severely deteriorated units, and residents lived in such extreme social and
economic deprivation, fear of violence, and greatly diminished hope that required more than the
traditional bricks and mortar remedy. Most of the problems concern residents, not the dwellings.
―Severely distressed‖ therefore refers to both physical and social distress. The commission found:



5

Severe physical deterioration that endangered residents‘ health and safety

The NCSDPH defined four criteria for ―severely distressed‖ conditions to exist: (1) development requires work to
correct original design deficiencies, (2) contributes to public or private disinvestments; (3) residents are primarily
unemployed, low-income families with children who depend on public assistance; and (4) suffers from high crime rates
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A high proportion of developments in depressed communities



High levels of crimes and fear of crime that prevented residents from moving about the
developments and neighborhoods



Concentrated poverty and despair, joblessness, and limited employment opportunities



Isolation from mainstream public and commercial services



Residents needed extra support to function effectively outside public housing



Low educational achievement among residents



High levels of physical and mental health problems among residents, and



Interventions to address distressed conditions were often inadequate and late

The National Action Plan proposed addressed the physical environment, residents‘ social
and economic needs, neighborhood conditions, management, and housing policy (U.S.
Government Accountability Office 2003, Moshette 2007, Popkin, Katz, et al. 2004, NCSDPH
1992). In this plan, the Commission emphasized that physical redevelopment alone would not
suffice and recommended that residents‘ needs be given as much attention as physical
redevelopment to enable residents to become economically secure (NCSDPH 1992). The
proposed 10-year recommended public-private investment to eliminate physical and
socioeconomic distress, reduce dependency, and improve management. In October 1992, the US
Congress authorized the urban redevelopment demonstration program called HOPE VI to fund
innovative ways to revitalize the worst public housing.
1.4.2

Redevelopment Grants and Grantees

From 1993 to 2009, HUD awarded nearly $6.55 billion in 620 HOPE VI grants in 132 cities (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009). The purpose of these awards was to
facilitate comprehensive investments in public housing sites, buildings, and people. As Table 1.1
shows, 254 awards were revitalization grants that accounted for $6.1 billion or nearly 94 percent.
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From the remaining $450 million, $395.32 million went to 287 demolition-only grants, 35
planning grants, 45 neighborhood network grants, and 24 main street grants. Revitalization grants
cover demolition, rehabilitation, new construction, land acquisition, relocation, and other
supportive services. HUD awarded demolition-only grants from 1996 to 2003 only for PHAs to
demolish dilapidated buildings and fund relocation of residents. The 287 demolition grants, which
accounted for 46 percent of the 620 grants and six percent of the funds, funded the demolition of
56,755 units in 127 housing authorities. On several occasions, these grants preceded revitalization
grants. Overall, the 254 revitalization grants and 287 demolition grants funded total demolition of
more than 100,000 units but replacing 51 percent. This has reduced the overall number of lowincome units (McCarty 2005). The 35 Planning grants HUD awarded from 1993-1995 funded
technical assistance in relation to revitalization and demolition plans, while the 45 Neighborhood
Network grants from 2002-2003 funded computer facilities for residents. Since 2005, HOPE VI
has also awarded 24 Main Street grants ranging from a few thousand dollars to $1 million to
municipalities with less than 50,000 residents to build affordable housing.
For the first three years of the program, only PHAs in the 40 most populous cities and
PHAs cited on HUD‘s list of ―troubled housing authorities‖ on March 31, 1992 were eligible for
HOPE VI grants (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 1997, Abt Associates, et al.
1996). Camden qualified as one of the 24 cities with troubled housing authorities. Fiscal years
1993-1995 awards ranged from 16 million to $50 million and at least 80 percent of each
revitalization grant had to be spent on improving the physical environment. After 1995, the grants
became smaller. HUD assesses applications on potential impact, need, PHA capability, quality of
the proposed community and social services, and involvement of resident and service agencies
(Abt Associates, et al. 1996). Before disbursing grant funds, HUD approves all revitalization
plans and budgets and the revitalization plans must detail the community and supportive services
proposed and participation of residents and local social service agencies. Accepted plans become
project blueprints (Abt Associates, et al. 1996).
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Table 1.1 HOPE VI Funding, 1993-2008
Revitalization

Year

Amount ($)
1993
1994
1995

299,000,000
752,674,507
485,850,863a

Grants
6
20
13

Demolition
Planning
Amount ($) Grants Amount ($) Grants

No award

1,000,000
2,725,472
11,026,609

2
6
27

14,752,081

35

Total
Amount ($)

Grants

300,000,000
755,399,979
496,877,472

8
26
40

1996
1997
1998

403,463,070
497,355,108
531,565,222

20
23
28

69,571,850
955,000
57,084,319

22
4
50

473,036,958
498,312,132
564,084,319

42
27
78

1999
2000
2001

571,287,001
513,805,464
491,774,238

21
18
16

40,738,389
49,994,436
74,964,992

32
26
43

612,027,442
563,799,900
566,741,290

53
44
59

Neighborhood
Network
2002

494,267,265

28

42,379,319

41

5,000,000

25

536,651,584

94

2003

433,016,652

24

59,634,870

69

4,967,500

20

497,621,138

113

2004

126,884,932

7

$9,967,500

45

126,884,932

7

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

156,895,528
71,900,000
88,855,000
97,246,691
113,600,000

8
4
5
6
6

156,895,528
71,902,010
88,857,012
97,246,691
113,600,000

8
4
5
6
6

Total $6,129,441,541

254

$6,544,489,297

620

No award

$395,323,175

287

Source: HUD 2007, HOPE VI Program Authority and Funding History
URL: http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf
Note:

a

Includes eight first round Revitalization grants totaling $349,999,018, five second round
revitalization grants totaling $103,257,000 and $32.9 in Amendment funds & $5 million for Campus
of Learners projects.

After 2003, annual HOPE VI appropriations dropped precipitously (Table 1.1) as the
George Bush administration attempted to eliminate the program claiming it was too costly and
that the goal to eliminate 100,000 distressed units had been met. When the administration
requested no HOPE VI funding in 2004 and 2005, Congress appropriated the meager sums of
$150 million for 2004 and $144 million for 2005 (McCarty 2005) and in 2007, reauthorized
HOPE VI for another seven years (Sard and Staub 2008).
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1.4.3

Policy and Program Evolution

The HOPE VI program started out primarily to provide grant funds to PHSs to rehabilitate
distressed developments and to support resident empowerment initiatives. Since the mid-1990s
however, the program has evolved into a market-based model promoting mixed public/private
financing and building mixed-income developments in place of distressed developments. New
policies and regulations introduced in the latter half of the 1990s changed HOPE VI priorities and
project financing and impacted population and design characteristics at HOPE VI developments.
In this evolution, the focus shifted from rehabilitation to demolition and new housing in mixedincome developments, and from community development to resident self-sufficiency. Poverty
deconcentration became the central focus as well as HUD made several important changes to
counteract threats by the Republican-led Congress that came to power in 1994 to abolish HUD
and the HOPE VI program. Probably the most fundamental change HUD made was to link
distressed public housing explicitly to concentrated poverty (Zhang 2004). The NCSDPH had
already done so in its final report in stating that the overconcentration of poor households was a
major contributor to the social problems in distressed public housing. For many years, researchers
debated the role poverty plays in the problems of distressed developments but now HUD directly
connects distressed public housing to concentrated poverty. Recent scholarship has also attributed
social problems in distressed public housing to their extreme concentrations of poor families.
With this change, HOPE VI began to address concentrated poverty in public housing and its high
socioeconomic costs more directly. With poverty deconcentration as the organizing framework,
HOPE VI strategies shifted from rehabilitation to demolition and new construction, public-private
financing, and mixing public housing and non-public housing in the same development for the
first time (Zhang 2004). These changes fundamentally changed the way the federal government
provides public housing services to needy families (Goetz 2002) as well.
HUD Secretary Cisneros formalized the new public-private partnership when he signed
an agreement with the Congress for New Urbanism (CNU) in 1996 to adopt New Urbanism
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design principles as the preferred design paradigm in HOPE VI (Bohls 2000). HUD also
introduced a ―mixed financing‖ model, which changed the financing arrangements for HOPE VI
projects from public funding to public and private financing. The change gave private investors
decision-making powers in HOPE VI projects but also allowed HAs to use HOPE VI grants to
leverage more redevelopment funding from private and other public sources. Mixed financing is
now a requirement for HOPE VI grants, particularly because revitalization grants got
progressively smaller. Virtually all HOPE VI funded projects since 1996 emphasize mixedincome housing, reported Morris & Lewis (2003). HUD implemented the mixed-finance rule to
encourage the development of mixed-income communities, to expand redevelopment
opportunities, and to encourage private investment (Clark 2002, Popkin, Harris, et al. 2002).
Mixed-financing has become so popular that from 1996 to 2002, HOPE VI grant recipients
leveraged nearly $2 for every HOPE VI dollar received (U.S. Government Accountability Office
2002). This GAO study also noted that more than 50 percent of all leveraged funds came from
public sources such as HUD, state and local governments, instead of private sources. All HOPE
VI developments that utilized mixed-financing are mixed-income developments. Because mixedfinancing is now a requirement for HOPE VI revitalization grants, mixed-income housing is also
standard in HOPE VI developments. In the HOPE VI context, mixed-income housing refers to
developments that integrate owner-occupied units (homeownership), Low Income Housing Tax
Credit (LIHTC) funded units, and public housing units in one development. Because
homeownership units usually do not have eligibility limits, HAs may not use HOPE VI funds to
construct owner-occupied units. In limited cases, HAs use public funds to build homeownership
units. In such cases, the units are ―affordable‖ homeownership housing‖ not ―market rate‖
housing and have eligibility restrictions.
Congress also repealed the ―one-for-one‖ replacement rule in 1995 after HAs complained
that it limited their ability to redevelop distressed sites. This rule had mandated HAs to replace
each public housing unit demolished with another hard unit (Cisneros 2009). No longer restricted
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by the one-for-one rule, HAs have built fewer units than they demolished and have replaced many
public housing units with homeownership units, which reduced the housing stock that is
affordable to low-income families while private investors reap substantial financial rewards.
Table 1.2 Housing Policy Changes Impacting HOPE VI Program
Policy

Explanation

In 1988, Congress implemented the one-for-one
replacement rule to ensure that each public housing unit
One-for-One removed is replaced with another hard unit to avoid
Replacement reducing public housing units.
Congress lifted the rule in a 1995 Rescission Bill. The
Rule
change took effect in March 1996.
Federal
admission
preferences:
Repealed

Households involuntarily displaced, households in
substandard housing, households paying more than 50
percent of income for rent, Repeal of federal preference
in public housing
The 1937 Housing Act restricts public housing to
households earning below 80 percent of the Area
Median Family Income (HAMFI) and 75 percent must
have income below 50 percent of HAMFI.

Mixed Income
Strategies Two strategies used to mix income. One uses preference
rules to diversify household incomes, combined with
ceiling rents and work preference policies. The other
strategy mixes market rate housing with public housing
units.

MixedFinancing
(Leveraged
HOPE VI)

Impact on HOPE VI
 No impact on HOPE VI
demolition and disposition
requests submitted before the
Rescission Bill.
 Reduce unit density
 Reduced the overall number of
public housing units
Locally-bases admission
preferences
It broadened the range of
household incomes but kept large
proportions of original residents
out of HOPE VI developments.
Has not been shown to have
positive influences on social
networking among public
housing residents.

Mixed financing combines HOPE VI and other
investments such as LIHTC, HOME, CDBG, or private
funds to redevelop HOPE VI sites.
It allowed public housing
authorities to develop mix new
HUD began to promote mixed-financing to stretch public and private housing in
HOPE VI dollars, especially at sites with 500 units. It mixed-income settings.
became a reality when HUD ruled that private entities
could own public housing units if they operate them as
public housing.

Source: A Historical and Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI, Volume 1 Cross-site Report (1996)

To avoid separating public housing units from non-public housing units at redeveloped
sites, HUD requires the public housing units to be interspersed with homeownership and tax
credit units. All units in a mixed-income development should also be of the same standard and
have the same amenities so that public and non-public units are visually indistinguishable from
the outside. This policy does not appear to be strongly enforced however because the public
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housing and private units at the completed mixed income site and other HOPE VI sites visited in
other cities are neither well-integrated nor visually indistinguishable. Given these changes, HOPE
VI developments operate with different rules from traditional public housing because PHAs now
have greater leverage to set operating terms.
1.4.4

Planning and Design

HUD‘s agreement with the Congress for the New Urbanism in 1996 made New Urbanism design
principles the preferred planning and design paradigm in HOPE VI. The CNU entered the public
housing arena after intensive lobbying for inner-city design opportunities in response to criticisms
that the movement focused too much of it activities on middle-class suburban developments. It
found a willing partner in HUD Secretary and a New Urbanism advocate, Henry Cisneros, who
signed the agreement for HUD. Some analysts view HOPE VI sites as urban laboratories for New
Urbanism (Bohls 2000) as a result. At HUD‘S urging and to the exclusion of other planning and
design guidelines, housing authorities routinely plan their HOPE VI redevelopment projects using
New Urbanism design principles. By adopting this one design philosophy, HUD and housing
authorities are continuing the previous practice of using a single design philosophy, such as the
use of modernist architecture in 1930-1960s public housing developments, to design HOPE VI
developments. By excluding other design ideas, HOPE VI limits design innovation to only those
that fit this one design philosophy and therefore stifles local design innovation.
According to the New Urbanism Charter, New Urbanism emphasizes higher-density,
pedestrian-friendly, transit accessible developments; low-rise single-family housing instead of
apartments; and a diverse range of housing types to accommodate diverse populations. Site visits
and reviewing reports of HOPE VI developments in several cities indicate that they usually
exhibit several New Urbanism features. They often use architectural styles from the surrounding
areas. In addition, traditional public housing often features multi-family in high-rise buildings but
HOPE VI developments typically feature single-family townhouses style units, semi-detached,
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and detached forms in at much lower densities than before. Single-family housing eliminates
shared interior space, which some analysts believe contributed to crime and physical deterioration
in public housing (Newman 1980). In addition, in contrast to the original developments, HOPE
VI developments emphasize through streets that are contiguous with local neighborhood streets to
connect the development to the community.
Architecturally, HOPE VI sites look markedly different from their predecessors. At
distressed developments, the amount of land used for housing and infrastructure tended to be low
but it is very high at HOPE VI sites. Poor land utilization left developments with large
uncontrolled and indefensible outdoor space that scholars said fostered illicit drug activities and
other crimes (Newman 1980, Newman 1996). HOPE VI encourages much higher land utilization
to counteract the unintended negative consequences. Using single-family housing instead of
multi-family housing increases site utilization and applying Defensible Space principles minimize
public space but set clear distinctions between public and private areas. For example, at
Baldwin‘s Run in Camden, site utilization is 75 percent compared to 20 percent at Westfield
Acres, which it replaced (HACC 2000). HOPE VI developments typically have fewer total units
and fewer public units than the original developments (U.S. Government Accountability Office
2003, Goetz 2004, Pitcoff 1999) as a way to reduce density and concentrated poverty and to
attract families that are more affluent.
According to the HUD website, in the first 15 years, HOPE VI grants provided financing
to redevelop more than 75,000 distressed public housing units (U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development 2010). Some of these units were renovated and some were demolished and
replaced but not all demolished units were replaced. HUD reports that its principal intention is to
break up pockets of extreme human deprivation in public housing communities and to replace
dilapidated housing units. According to HUD website data, by 2009 HOPE VI had committed
$6.5 billion in grants (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009). As of
September 30, 2009, HAs had completed redevelopment of 107 sites while redevelopment was in
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progress at another 141 sites. At the same time, of the 94,367 public housing units demolished,
80,130 were replaced and 78,347 were occupied while 72,718 households were relocated
(Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009).
In a departure from the past, HOPE VI projects include community and supportive
services to give residents the assistance they need such as childcare, counseling, and job training
and placement. HUD allows housing authorities to use up to 20 percent of each revitalization
grant for community and supportive services, relocation, and self-sufficiency programs
(American Planning Association 2003, U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003).
1.4.5

Role of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA)

From the first HOPE VI award in 1993 until 1999, HOPE VI operated primarily through annual
congressional appropriations and grant agreements between HUD and HOPE VI grantees.
Congressional appropriations included numerous evolving statutes, laws, regulations, legal
opinions, and implementation strategies that HUD incorporated into annual Notices of Funding
Availability (NOFA). HUD used NOFAs to announce the availability of grant funds, application
requirements, selection processes, rule changes, and new HOPE VI provisions (U.S. Government
Accountability Office 2003). Past NOFAs announce: a) removal of preferential access to public
housing for very poor families; b) repeal of the public housing one-for-one replacement rule; c)
repeal of federal preferences for public housing, adoption of mixed-income and mixed financing
rules; and easing HUD determined admission rules to HOPE VI sites (Duffy 2005, Salama 1999,
Zhang 2004). NOFAs and grant agreements also provide guidance for residents‘ involvement in
the HOPE VI redevelopment process. For example, in fiscal year 2002 NOFA, HUD included
guidelines for residents and communities to participate in planning, implementing, and managing
redevelopment plans (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002). HOPE VI
grant agreements outline the activities, schedules, and documents that HUD requires from
grantees.
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The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA) authorized the
HOPE VI program for the first time in Section 502, which amended Section 24 of the U.S.
Housing Act of 1937. The QHWRA enacts into law many reform provisions in earlier HUD and
Congressional bills to revitalize distressed public housing. The Act also introduced several major
changes to the public housing program to promote work, end dependency, and move poor
residents out of high poverty neighborhoods. PHAs are required to reduce the concentration of
extremely low incomes families in public housing; promote housing and economic selfsufficiency; decrease dependency on public assistance; help families transition out of public
housing. It also authorized adoption of mix-financing and replacement of distressed public
housing with mixed income housing in the latter haft of the 1990s (Lewis and Sinha 2007).
1.4.6

Impact

HOPE VI‘s success depends largely on its effectiveness in improving residents‘ lives.
Revitalization at distressed sites has been slow but dramatic (Solomon 2005). Some
neighborhoods near grant sites experienced increased economic activity and some have not.
Similarly, many families moved away and improved their living situation but many have not had
that benefit. Relocation has also reduced concentrated poverty considerably at most sites but the
incentives towards self-sufficiency and transioning from public housing so far produced few
positive results in terms of employment and income (Boston 2005, Popkin, Levy and Buron
2009). Consequently, affordable housing advocates have expressed concerns about gentrification,
loss of permanent affordable housing, and displacement of vulnerable families and individuals
(Keating 2000; National Housing Law Project 2002; Zhang 2004; Pitcoff 1999). Keating (2000)
likened HOPE VI to the discredited urban renewal program of the 1950s and 1960s. He claimed
that like urban renewal, HOPE VI uses federal money to get private redevelopment into so-called
―blighted‖ neighborhoods at the expense of poor, vulnerable families. Observers have also
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likened HOPE VI to urban renewal because the program forces residents to move without
ensuring they have better replacement housing (National Housing Law Project, et al. 2002).
Collins et al.‘s (2005) evaluation of HOPE VI projects in Boston questions the HOPE VI
strategy of relocation and replacement of original tenants to encourage self-sufficiency because
relocated residents were among the most disadvantaged, most did not received HOPE VI
services, and because displacement and income mixing negatively affected residents‘ sense of
community. Based on HOPE VI outcomes in Chicago, Kingsley et al. (2003) reported that since
many of the displaced residents ended up in other distressed communities near the original sites
not much deconcentration had taken place. The Government Accountability Office (2003), the
Center for Community Change (2003), and the National Housing Law Project (2002) lamented
the reduction in public housing units and the small percentages of original residents who returned
after redevelopment. Despite the criticisms, on its website, HUD claims that HOPE VI has
succeeded in deconcentrating poverty and empowering residents towards self-sufficiency.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2003) noted that in the first 10 years, about
50 percent of 49,000 relocated residents were moved to other public housing while 31 percent
received housing vouchers to move to private housing to deconcentrate poverty. The remaining
20 percent included about six percent who were evicted and 14 percent who left public housing
voluntarily. Using program data through March 2000, Kingsley, Johnson and Pettit (2003)
reported similar relocation statistics as the GAO. The program does not guarantee original
residents automatic right to return. Instead, HUD requires HAs to work with residents to establish
the return criteria and requires HAS to assist residents to satisfy the return criteria during the
redevelopment period (GAO 2003). The strict selection policies and the small proportions of
returnees to redeveloped properties have drawn heavy criticism from several sources (Center for
Community Change 2003, National Housing Law Project, et al. 2002). In theory, each housing
authority sets its own return criteria but in reality, the implemented criteria are very similar across
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PHAs while the return rates varied from 10 percent at some sites to 100 percent at a few sites
(U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003, Sard and Staub 2008).
Residents also receive supportive services such as education, skills training and job
preparation to equip them with tools to make them function more effectively in the labor market
and in business in order to improve their economic and social well-being and to help them
transition from welfare to work. Combining physical redevelopment with economic selfsufficiency services makes HOPE VI a unique public housing program.
Since HOPE VI attempts to transform the physical and social environment and address
the negative effects of concentrated poverty (Goetz 2004), redevelopment projects combine
rehabilitation, demolition, and new construction with relocation and income mixing to
accomplish is goals (Oakley and Burchfield 2009). At first, the main goal was to demolish or
rehabilitate 86,000 distressed dwellings but that target was increased to 100,000 units. Resident
self-sufficiency did not play a substantial role during the first three years. By the end of 2002,
HUD had approved funding to demolish 140,000 units (McCarty 2005), which far exceeded even
the revised target of 100,000 units. (Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009, Sard and
Staub 2008, McCarty 2005). PHAs planned to develop 111,000 HOPE VI units to replace the
demolished units but only between 49,000 and 53,000 of the replaced units were to be public
housing. That means PHAs plan are to replace less than 40 percent of the demolished units.
To offset the loss of public housing units, HUD awards tenant-based housing vouchers
but the number of such vouchers awarded have ben fewer than the number of units lost (Sard and
Staub 2008). Additionally, HUD has not developed the necessary outcome-oriented goals and
measures to improve residents‘ economic status. Results in this area have been disappointing.
Critics describe the program as effective at replacing distressed public housing with new mixedincome housing but label it ―ineffective‖ when it comes to helping families achieve selfsufficiency (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003, National Housing Law Project, et al.
2002). The researchers concluded HOPE VI has failed the public housing residents that it should
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have assisted. Given these criticisms, HOPE VI recipients need to balance physical
redevelopment needs with residents‘ socioeconomic needs.
Public housing has historically embraced one design paradigm then changes it for another
a few decades later. As Franck (1994) explained, we HOPE VI replaces modernist-type public
housing designs for New Urbanist designs, we should not forget that the public housing models
that rejected as outdated and problematic were fine achievements when first introduced.

1.5

HOPE VI in Camden

The Housing Authority of the City of Camden‘s long-term goal is to modernize all public housing
in the city and the agency has aggressively sought HOPE VI and other funding to achieve that
goal. To date, the housing authority has received three HOPE VI grants and housing officials
anticipate receiving another grant in 2010 to demolish and build a new Branch Village
development. The grants have been pivotal to the complete rehabilitation of one development,
and demolition and rebuilding of two other developments. The first two projects are complete but
construction is still in progress at the third site.
1.5.1

McGuire Gardens

Opened in 1954 to house 368 families in east Camden but plagued with violence, illicit drugs, and
physical deterioration since the 1970s, the HACC renovated the development after just 40 years,
using a 1994 $42,000,000 HOPE VI revitalization grant. In 2003, a completely redesigned
McGuire Gardens reopened with 178 rehabilitated and 75 new units but remains 100-percent
public housing and is the only site with both rehabilitated and new housing. Redevelopment was
completed in 2003.
1.5.2

Westfield Acres

For 64 years, Westfield Acres housed public housing residents in east Camden but was afflicted
with physical decay, crime and poverty in recent decades before the HACC demolished all 514
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apartments using a $3 million HOPE VI demolition grant to make way for a new development.
Today, 78 public housing units and 119 affordable owner-occupied units occupy the site. A
separate section has a 74-unit facility for seniors. The HACC built this new mixed-income
development after receiving a $35 million revitalization grant from the HOOPE VI program. The
HA also built 300 units in three off-site properties. This development is completed.
1.5.3

Roosevelt Manor

Using the $20 million HOPE VI grant in 2004 as catalyst, the HACC is currently building a new
development at the original site and more than 400 other units at Chelton Terrace and other
offsite locations in the neighborhood. The original site is projected to get a mix-income, mixedtenured development consisting of 86 affordable homeownership units and at least 144 LIHTC
and public housing rental units. This is the most complex and most costly of the three HOPE VI
projects to-date. The projected cost is $120,000,000. It is the most complex of the three HOPE VI
projects because it involves two developments, Roosevelt Manor and Chelton Terrace, and
neighborhood-wide improvements to parks and a new neighborhood library.

CHAPTER 2
FEDERAL PUBLIC HOUSING: A POLICY REVIEW

The federal government began providing low-rent housing to eligible families on a large scale in
1934 then expanded it into a national public housing program in 1937. By the time the public
housing act was enacted, more than 25,000 families already lived in government owned, low-rent
housing developments. Today there are about three million public housing residents in 13,000
housing developments. Much has changed since the contentious congressional debates
surrounding the first public housing bill in 1937. Design, financing, and construction methods
have changed but ideology remains a strong feature in public housing design. Physical design as a
means of social control remains a strong part of public housing ideology.

2.1

Public Housing Today

Through HUD, the federal government operates several different subsidized housing programs,
including public housing (Schwartz 2006). In 2007, the public housing program consisted of
3,153 public housing authorities (PHAs), 13,000 housing developments, 1.2 million housing
units, and about three million residents (Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009).
Between 1995 and 2007, the program lost about 140,000 units primarily because of demolitions
under the HOPE VI program (Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009).
Public housing developments and public housing agencies vary in size from very small to
very large but most of them are small (Table 2.2). About 77 percent of the 13,000 developments
have fewer than 100 units and about 88 percent of PHAs control less than 500 units each.
Collectively, PHAs that have less than 500 units account for 29 percent of all public housing units
(Table 2.1) and PHAs that have more than 5,000 units (large PHAs) account for about 34 percent
of the public housing units. The majority of severely distressed developments are run by large
PHAs (Schwartz 2006).
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Table 2.1 U.S. Public Housing Developments by Number and Percentage of Units
Project Particulars
Number of projects
Percentage of projects
Total units
Percent of total units

Public Housing Units
1-10
11-25
26-50
51-100 101-249
872
2,349
3,608
3,125
2,127
7%
18%
28%
24%
17%
6,014 44,333
141,802
241,236 331,652
0.5
3.8
12.2
20.7
28.5

250-500
576
4%
194,855
16.7%

501+
201
2%
205,080
17.6%

Source: Council of Large Public Housing Authorities website (August 23, 2010)
http://www.clpha.org/facts_about_public_housing.

Table 2.2 U.S. Public Housing Units based on PHA Size
PHA Category
Very Small
Small
Medium
Large
Very Large
Extremely Large

PHA Size
(no. of units)
1-500
501-1,500
1,501-3,000
5,001-7,501
7,501-15,000
> 15,000
Totals

Number of
Agencies
2,772
271
86
12
8
4
3,153

Percent of
Agencies
87.9
8.6
2.7
0.4
0.3
0.1
100

Number of
PH Units
353,965
221,138
218,021
71,350
79,995
259,667
1,204,136

Percent of
Units
29.4
18.4
18.1
5.9
6.6
21.6
100

Source: Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, 2006

About 60 percent of U.S. public housing developments are in cities and most of them are
in poor neighborhoods. Another 19 percent are in suburbs and 21 percent are in rural areas. More
than 33 percent are in heavily poor or heavily minority census tracts but only 7.5 percent are in
census tracts with less than 10 percent poverty. Further analysis reveals that 37 percent of public
housing units are in census tracts where poverty exceeds 40 percent and more than 50 percent are
in neighborhoods where the population is majority African-American. Such a large share of
public housing developments in either high poverty neighborhoods or neighborhoods with
predominantly non-Caucasian populations shows that public housing serves mostly poor people.
This reality is consistent with the program‘s mission to serve families with low incomes whom
the private housing market does not serve.
In 2007, median household income in public housing nationwide averaged approximately
$11,295, which was just 29 percent of median income for the entire United States (Council of
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Large Public Housing Authorities 2009). Critics complain about the high proportion of public
housing residents who depend on welfare but statistics indicate that roughly half (49 percent) of
the non-elderly, non-disabled tenants had wages and salaries as their primary source of income.
About 32 percent of public housing households (330,000 households) are elderly and about 31
percent (320,000 households) are disabled and most of them depend heavily on social security,
pensions, and disability income. When the analysis includes these residents, social security,
pensions, and disability income, not welfare, become the main source of income for 55 percent of
all public housing tenants (Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009). Caucasians
accounted for about 51 percent of the public housing population in 2010 and African-Americans
account for about 46 percent. About 23 percent were Hispanic. These statistics are important to
understanding the nature of the socioeconomic problems confronting distressed public housing.

2.2

Public Housing Program Begins

When the public housing program began in 1937, the federal government had already constructed
several low-rent housing developments for low-income families. Before then, the federal
government played a limited role in housing the poor. Its role was limited mainly to
implementing policies and programs to improve living conditions and population and
environmental health. Opposition by policymakers and private housing market stakeholders to
any direct government provision of low cost housing to needy families derailed previous
government attempts to help the poor. Serious changes probably began after Jacob Riis published
How the Other Half Lives in 1890, which highlighted the very unsanitary living conditions in
New York City tenements. In response, the government implemented several measures to
promote public health and safety in housing. Not satisfied, housing reform advocates demanded
measures other than building codes and tenement housing reforms in order to eliminate slum
conditions and improve housing for the poor. The first federal government built housing resulted
from the private market failures that precipitated the Great Depression in the 1920s and 1930s
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and the accompanying severe economic dislocations that shifted the political climate more
favorably towards a government-run housing program. Such a program began in 1934 but its was
primarily set up to help revive the collapsed housing industry, provide jobs, and clear slums. To
do this, Congress enacted the National Housing Act of 1934 and created the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) to insure private loans to builders and homebuyers as a way to stimulate
housing construction (von Hoffman 2000). This initiative was one piece of the large infrastructure
program that the Roosevelt administration implemented soon after assuming office in 1934 to
stimulate economic growth (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997, von Hoffman 1996). By 1937, the
Public Works Administration had built 58 housing developments and about 25,000 low-rent units
around the country for low-income working families (Lusignan 2002). The units were intended as
temporary shelter to eligible families since the idea of a permanent government-run housing
program was unacceptable to many policy-makers (Hirsch 2008). Three years later, amidst
intense opposition, public housing became a reality when Congress enacted the United States
Housing Act of 1937. The previous program eventually folded into this new program.
Passage of the new legislation, which is also known as the Wagner-Stegall Act was not
without problems. Despite the obvious benefits, extreme and sustained opposition in Congress
and from the National Association of Real Estate Board (NAREB), the National Association of
Home Builders (NAHB), the Mortgage Bankers Association, and others in the building and real
estate sectors weakened the legislation that lawmakers passed (Bauman 1994, Schwartz 2006,
von Hoffman 1996). To get the required votes to pass the legislation, supporters in Congress
agreed to include several extra provisions to protect the interests of the real estate and private
home-building stakeholders from competition from public housing. One provision mandated the
removal of at least one unit of so-called ‗slum‘ housing from the local housing supply for each
public housing unit constructed to prevent a net increase in housing supply locally. Another
provision ensured that public housing went strictly to poor working families. This provision set
maximum income limits for eligible families. The limits were set very low to make sure that only
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families who could not afford private housing qualified and assured critics that public housing
would not directly affect the demand for housing in the private market. Continuing the
precedence set in 1934, the legislation also tied the construction of public housing to job creation,
economic expansion, and slum clearance in blighted neighborhoods. The program was not
primarily intended to provide low-rent program for low income families (Schwartz 2006).
Consequently, from the start, housing itself has never been the central focus of the public housing
program (Marcuse 1994). Starting with the first program that began in 1934 and continued under
the 1937 U.S. Housing Act that launched the public housing program, Congress tied governmentrun housing programs to slum clearance and neighborhood improvement. That policy has not
changed even under HOPE VI. Many of the problems that plagued public housing over the years
are directly attributable to the ideology, compromises, and the lack of focus on housing for lowincome families starting with the original public housing legislation. Since then, the numerous
amendments made to address issues and concerns and strengthen the program made it more
complex and more difficult to administer.
Inadequate oversight and funding from HUD and ineffective PHA leadership made it
difficult for housing authorities to provide safe and decent housing. Relentless opposition from
the private housing industry also thwarted important policy initiatives such that they often
resulted in contradictions and unintended consequences. One example is the 25 percent rent cap
that was meant to keep public housing affordable for families with real needs but ended up
concentrating extremely poor families. Interestingly, the house building industry that opposed
public housing from the beginning supports the mixed financing rule in the HOPE VI program
but only because private developers receives substantial financial benefits.
The 1937 U.S. Housing Act also established the current public housing structure whereby
local public housing authorities operated public housing under state law while the federal
government, through the United States Housing Authority, provided funding, administrative and
policy oversight. This system came about because federal courts ruled that the federal
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government did not have the legal authority to directly build public housing or acquire property
by eminent domain for that purpose. Consequently, while the United States Housing Authority
(USHA), which Congress established through the 1937 Housing Act, retained administrative
responsibilities for public housing, municipalities set up PHAs as independent bodies to develop,
own, and operate public housing locally (von Hoffman 2000).
Giving direct responsibility for developing and operating public housing to PHAs
appeased the opposition but it resulted in serious siting problems. Instead of strengthening the
program, this arrangement weakened it and contributed to some of the intractable problems that
affected public housing. One problem was that municipal authorities‘ had the final say regarding
the location of public housing projects. Municipalities, not HAs, also decided if the locality
accepted public housing and suburban towns routinely refused. The over-concentration of public
housing in central cities is a direct result since cities had the blighted neighborhoods that were
targeted for redevelopment and the slum residents that needed housing assistance. Municipalities
that built public housing also had to contend with community opposition, which forced housing
authorities to build projects in areas of least resistance--poor inner-city communities.
Additionally, until Congress outlawed racial segregation in housing markets in 1968, most public
housing developments were racially segregated. There were more ―whites only‖ projects and they
were built in more desirable locations than the slums where ―blacks only‖ projects were built
(Schwartz 2006). Chapter 3 discusses the consequences of these decisions on public housing.

2.3

Design and Construction

The public housing program had been around for only 55 years when Congress authorized the
HOPE VI program in late 1992 but it had already experienced two major shifts in design and
three changes in design paradigm (Franck 1994, Franck and Mostoller 1995, Wynter 2005). Each
stage reflected different design values and ideologies concerning public housing. The
developments that were built during the 1930s and early 1940s had mostly walk-up buildings
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arranged around closed or semi-enclosed courts. Introduction of modernist architecture began a
transition to much larger developments on superblocks without through streets and having either
low-rise or high-rise buildings or both low-rise and high-rise buildings. Since the 1980s, and
particularly since HOPE VI, there has been a major shift from high-rises and large-scale
developments to smaller-scale, low-rise, low-density properties with private outdoor space on
sites with through streets (Franck 1994, Franck and Mostoller 1995). The common feature in all
the design phases is the dominant role of one design paradigm.
2.3.1

The 1930s and 1940s

The early designs emphasized the temporary nature of public housing and avoidance of
competition with housing from private builders regarding quality and appearance. Although
envisioned as transitional housing, the early designs attempted to provide ―good housing‖ to the
residents who were mostly families experiencing temporary economic difficulties during the
Great Depression and war veterans and their families (Wynter 2005). Reinforcing their temporary
status and minimized costs, developers used simple designs and skimped on construction material
(Wynter 2005, Schwartz 2006). That meant using non-durable building materials and internal
systems and outfitted units only with items essential for temporary shelter.
Pre-WWII public housing plans attempted to provide ―good housing‖ and ―wholesome
living‖ environments for residents with the assumption that good housing would improve
neighborhood conditions and residents‘ behavior (Wynter 2005). Good housing and wholesome
living meant creating developments with ample space for air, sunlight, gardens, and play areas for
children, but no through traffic. Some developments were built near to stores, social and civic
facilities, and public transportation (Wynter 2005). The developments were mostly low-rise walkup buildings in the form of garden apartments and row houses around enclosed or semi-enclosed
courts and aligned to streets (Franck and Mostoller 1995). Apartment buildings were next to
streets and most apartments faced interior courtyards. Some developments were built in
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superblocks or large parcels of land assembled for slum upgrading purposes. On these assembled
parcels, local streets often dead-end at the developments. The intention was to give each project a
distinct identity and to separate it from the surroundings. Developments built in the 1940s began
the transition to open-courts. After 1945, public housing designs transitioned from semi-enclosed
courts to an open space design. The open space designs were an attempt to maximize air and
sunlight and the housing built was considered to be a major improvement over the neighborhood
housing replaced (Franck 1994, Franck and Mostoller 1995).
World War II interrupted the construction of public housing in 1942 as the United States
government shifted its focus to housing for the expanded military. At that time, 370 developments
were already completed or under construction (Lusignan 2002) but work halted at most
unfinished sites. During the war, about 1,500 public housing units and 625,000 temporary
military units were completed (Lusignan 2002, Thompson 2006). This shift to military housing
created a backlog in the rest of the society, which escalated into a housing crisis when thousands
of military personnel returned after the war. In response, the federal government converted a large
number of temporary military housing units to public housing units (Lusignan 2002). Analysts
believe this temporary fix created numerous problems later because these temporary buildings
had short life spans.
2.3.2

The Urban Renewal Years: 1949 to 1973

The Housing Act of 1949 reauthorized public housing and expanded the program by 810,000
units. The goal was to build these units over the next six years but it took 20 years. Other major
goals included eliminating urban blight through slum clearance and providing decent housing to
every American family (von Hoffman 2000). This legislation continued the trend of loading
baggage onto public housing by marrying it to slum clearance, which, by default, restricted the
housing to the poorest people and to disadvantaged urban communities. The Act also capped
construction costs and eligibility income and limited the rent that tenants paid to 20 percent of a
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comparable private unit in the same area as the public unit. Public housing construction was so
tightly bound to slum clearance that at least one ―slum housing‖ unit had to be demolished for
each public housing unit built. These limitations were due to opposition from people with vested
interests in the status quo and from people who ideologically opposed public assistance to the
poor (von Hoffman 2000).
When work to complete the 810,000 housing units lagged well below the required rate,
Congress expanded the slum clearance provision in the 1949 legislation and included it in the
U.S. Housing Act of 1954. That legislation vastly expanded slum clearance to create a separate
program called ―urban renewal‖ to clear ―slums‖ and accelerate public housing construction. The
urban renewal program (Title 1) was slum clearance on a grand scale. The program authorized $1
billion in loans to help cities acquire and tear down ―blighted‖ properties and use the land for
public housing and other purposes. However, numerous racial and other controversies
surrounding urban renewal retarded the construction of public housing units. With widespread
opposition to urban renewal, sustained opposition to public housing, and poor management of the
redevelopment process, two decades passed before the 810,000 public housing units were
completed in 1969 (Bauman 1994). Several aspects of the public housing program rejected in the
HOPE VI program were implemented through the 1949 and 1954 housing legislations.
Under urban renewal, public housing design and construction changed to large-scale
developments in superblocks of either high-rise buildings in cities or low-rise buildings on wide
expanses of land. In many cities, smaller sized walk-up buildings and semi-enclosed courts gave
way to large and widely spaced apartment blocks on sites characterized by openness and low
utilization of land for buildings. The low land utilization was to convey the highly valued idea of
―openness‖ (Franck 1994). These features highlighted the dominance of the modernist
architecture movement during this era, in the same way New Urbanism dominates HOPE VI
designs today. High-rise public housing became extremely popular in cities because it allowed the
city authorities to build more units and therefore accommodate more tenants. In developing these
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high-rise buildings, social planning was clearly deficient because site and building layouts were
not conducive to meeting residents‘ needs, communal living, or the openness of the site that was
intended (Franck 1994). The buildings were particularly not conducive to the needs of families
with children. The consequences became apparent very quickly at some sites such as the massive
Pruitt Igoe development in Saint Louis. This development was so problematic to operate that it
lasted merely two decades. Whether high-rise or low-rise, modernist developments typically were
built on superblocks and therefore were very conspicuous in their neighborhoods because they
looked different from surrounding properties in design and scale.
Externally, the buildings all look the same. Many low-rise developments looked like
military barracks or had other institutional appearances. Despite the open design, the
developments were inward looking and detached from their surroundings. Unlike many
developments that were built in the 1930s with communal facilities, the modernist developments
did not have amenities or community services (Franck 1994).
There were other major differences between the early public housing developments and
the modernist developments as well. The buildings in the early developments were aligned with
streets but the modernist era developments had buildings that were detached from streets (Franck
1994). The inward orientation of the apartments and the superblocks that interrupted the local
streets grid isolated the developments from their surroundings (Schwartz 2006).
Construction cost minimization was a big feature during this period as well and because
of that, builders often cut corners on design, construction, and inside fittings such as lighting
fixtures. The units were very basic, often lacking simple amenities such as closet doors (Franck
1994, Schwartz 2006). Since public housing served poor people and was to be used as transitional
housing, the units were very basic. This was not a smart decision because it helped to undermine
public housing and helped to cement the image that public housing was housing for the poor.
For nearly two decades, urban renewal demolished more homes than the number of
housing units built. The program received sharp criticism for heavy-handedness, poor planning,
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social and racial equities, and corruption (Bauman 1994, von Hoffman 1996, von Hoffman 2000).
The systematic destruction of predominantly poor African-American communities and their
replacement with public works projects justifiably received sharp criticisms because the projects
that resulted were often hostile to the neighborhoods. Critics aptly called urban renewal "Negro
removal‖ (Hirsch 1985). The controversies surrounding urban renewal led to uncertainty and a
sense of crisis in public housing in the late 1960s that the complete demolition of the massive
Pruit Igoe housing project, only 20 years after it was completed epitomized that sense of crisis. A
big part of the problem was that some developments had begun to foster some of the same slum
conditions they were created to replace and Pruit Igoe represented the image of high-rise public
housing developments as failure. The Nixon administration then halted construction of all new
public housing units in the early 1970s. This might well have been a politically motivated
maneuver by the Republican administration (Republican were known for opposing public
housing) but it helped to accelerate the move from government-run public housing projects
towards increasing use of private sector-focused alternatives that began in the 1960s.
2.3.3

From 1974 to 1992

After the temporary ban, public housing construction effectively ended in 1974 after Congress
passed the 1974 Housing Act that outlined a new direction in federal housing assistance. This
new direction emphasized an increased role for private sector involvement in public housing. The
severe contraction in public housing construction limited the majority of new public housing units
to mainly units for elderly households or as replacement for demolished units (von Hoffman
2000). Interestingly, many of the new developments for seniors were high-rise developments. In
the 1970s, the Section 8 voucher program that was introduced in 1974 supplanted public housing
as the largest subsidized housing program for low-income families in the country.
The 1980s brought a return to smaller-scale and low-rise family developments to public
housing and rejection of high-rise developments. Since few family developments were built in the
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1980s, design and construction addressed redevelopment, maintenance, and repair of existing
properties until HOPE VI began. This third design phase emphasized private yards, reintroduction of though streets, row housing, and other low-rise buildings around semi-enclosed or
fully enclosed courts (Franck 1994, p. 27). Unlike the inward orientation of the housing built
under urban renewal; through streets, buildings with frontage and entries onto streets, privatized
outside spaces, individual front yard and backyard, and individual street number addresses are all
highly valued features of family developments built since 1980, including HOPE VI housing.
However, HOPE VI designs are dominated by a new movement called New Urbanism (see
Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 for details).
All three stages reveal an overreliance on physical design to achieve social policy goals
but it was most pronounced in the second stage. Von Hoffman (2000) argued that modernist
designs reflected a naïve reliance on physical design to achieve social reforms because designers
and planners believed ―good design‖ would convey middle-class standards of conduct to lowerincome people. Even though the urban renewal program cemented ties between public housing
and neighborhood development, results indicate that it hobbled public housing.
Twenty years after urban renewal, HOPE VI proponents reject high-rise developments
and target them for demolition on the assumption that they were inappropriate for families and a
source of misery in distressed developments. While living in high-rise buildings may have been
risky for many public housing families, the same is true for many low-rise buildings as well but
high-rise buildings are viewed as inappropriate for public housing families with children.

2.4

Tenant Policy

One rationale for creating a public housing system was to rid urban neighborhoods of slums and
the dilapidated housing in them but over the years, some developments began to exhibit some of
the slum-like conditions they were built to destroy. Today, public housing conjures images of
dilapidated buildings in very distressed inner city neighborhoods and housing extremely poor
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families. One reason for this negative image is tenant policies. In the early years, tenant policies
emphasized two-parent working-class households. Under urban renewal, that policy was changed
to give preference to disadvantaged households and households that urban renewal dislocated. In
comparison, under HOPE VI, the goal is to mix households with diverse economic means, from
extremely low-income to households earning above 80 percent of area median income.
The early public housing developments were segregated but they served working families
primarily. They received no operating subsidy from the federal government and were expected to
be self-supporting. Some housing authorities did not even accept families on relief because they
required tenants to have enough income to pay rent that covered the operating cost of the units
they occupied (Abt Associates, et al. 1996). Tenant policies and practices in the these early
developments reflected the goal of making public housing temporary housing for poor working
families until they acquired enough financial resources to become housing self-sufficient and
move out of public housing (Franck 1994). PHAs used rent policies to enforce that regime
(Franck 1994). At first, public housing authorities determined the rent that tenants paid. Some
housing authorities charged a fixed fraction of a tenant‘s adjusted income; some based the rent on
unit size and some charged a minimum rent to the poorest households and a fraction of adjusted
income for higher income tenants. Although there was a rent ceiling of 30 percent of tenants‘
adjusted incomes, developments had no need for subsidies because rental income was enough to
meet operating expenses (Schwartz 2006). Tenants whose incomes exceeded the allowed income
limits were required to vacate public housing.
Until the 1950s, public housing also promoted tenant selection policies and practices that
favored two-parent families and racial segregation until Civil Rights legislation banned
segregation in housing in 1968 (Rosenbaum 1994). Because race was a factor in a family‘s
eligibility for public housing, in most instances, Caucasian families and African-American
families lived in separate developments and had different services. ―Whites only‖ developments
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were often built in more desirable locations than ―blacks only‖ projects that were often built in
poor inner-city communities.
The 1949 Housing Act brought several changes in tenant policies in response to pressures
from stakeholders in the real estate and private home building sectors to restrict public housing
even more to the poorest tenants to protect their private business interests (Abt Associates, et al.
1996). One of the rules required a 20 percent difference between the lowest income at which the
local private market supplied housing and the highest income eligible for public housing.
Households in the 20 percent gap qualified for neither public housing nor private housing and
most likely had to bear extraordinary housing cost burdens. Another rule required PHAs to evict
tenants whose incomes exceeded the upper income limit and a third gave priority admission or
preferences to veterans and families that the slum clearance program displaced (Abt Associates,
et al. 1996). The priority preferences allowed large numbers of poor [black] families that urban
renewal projects dislocated to move into public housing (Bauman 1994, Solomon 2005). While
the federal government implemented these amendments to restrict public housing to the lowest
income earners, the same federal government simultaneously implemented Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) and Federal Highway Administration policies to encourage working-class
families to purchase private homes in suburbs (Abt Associates, et al. 1996). The FHA did not
lend money but it guaranteed private loans, which made suburban home purchases a lot cheaper.
Because of these policies, economic and racial segregation increased in public housing and the
surrounding communities and neighborhoods.
The amount PHAs charged for rent became more controversial in 1969 and 1970 when
the two Brooke Amendments limited the amount tenants paid for rent to 25 percent of their
income and mandated federal subsidies to PHAs to make up the difference in rental income and
operating expenses. These payments began in 1975 that were never enough but only after PHAs
were already having serious financial difficulties and forced to defer repairs and maintenance. It
was a noble idea to make public housing affordable to the poorest families and most likely
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produced short-term gains. However, the full ramification of this policy without adequate
budgetary support to PHAs soon became apparent because it produced devastating adverse and
unintended outcomes in public housing developments and surrounding areas.
The rules to restrict public housing to low income people and the institutional policies
that encouraged working-class families to leave public housing and middle-class Caucasian
families to leave cites for suburbs transformed public housing in fundamental ways between 1949
and 1970. While income limit rules forced economically better off tenants with jobs from public
housing, federal preferences allowed and urban renewal forced large numbers of non-working
and very poor families into public housing. Expulsion of higher income tenants from public
housing because their income exceeded the allowed limits deprived PHAs of urgently needed
operating funds. The financial position of housing authorities also worsened when Congress gave
public housing preference to families that urban renewal projects displaced because it decreased
rental income.
The decreases in the median household income among public housing tenants after the
policy change supported that charge. Median household income in public housing declined from
57 percent of the national median household income in 1950 to 41 percent in 1960 to 29 percent
in 1970, and to less than 20 percent by 1990 (Schwartz 2006). With tenants‘ average income
declining, PHAs received less rental income than operating costs. Although tenant changes forced
Congress to implement a federal subsidy program for public housing authorities in the 1969
Housing Act to cover operating deficits (HACC 2009), successive administrations never remitted
sufficient funds to make up the deficits. Unable to fund operating costs fully, PHAs routinely
deferred repairs and maintenance and so the physical facilities deteriorated faster. To address this
problem, Congress fiddled with the rent policy once more by increasing the rent ceiling to 30
percent again in 1981. The policy change apparently had little effect because in 1989, Congress
appointed the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing to investigate living
conditions in public housing and to recommend a remediation plan.
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The federal highway program and the FHA mortgage insurance program produced
demographic changes in public housing because they pulled working class Caucasian families
away but restricted African-Americans to inner-city communities and to public housing (Jackson
1985, Salama 1999, Zonta 2005). Along with the segregationist practices of the urban renewal
program, the racial discriminatory policies and practices pursued helped to create concentrated
poverty conditions in public housing and a preponderance of single-parent, female-headed,
welfare-dependent, black families (Massey and Denton 1993). Given these outcomes, social
scientists charged that federal government policies concentrated very poor families in public
housing (Bratt 1989 and Rohe 1995, cited in Anthony 2005, von Hoffman 2000) and allowed
public housing to become ―warehouses for the poor‖ (Bratt 1985, Fuerst 1985).
These public policies produced population changes that resulted in more AfricanAmericans in public housing than Caucasians for the first time in the 1960s. By 1980, AfricanAmericans were about 48 percent of public housing residents nationwide while Caucasians were
38 percent with most being elderly residents (Bratt 1985). In 2010, the Caucasian population was
about 51 percent but the majority remained elderly residents. Also, by 2004 most public housing
households were one-parent, female-headed, largely unemployed, and dependent on government.
Nearly 75 percent of public housing householders were females in 1985 and 50 percent of them
were dependent on welfare (Bratt 1985). In Table 2.3 below, HUD‘s Resident Characteristic
Report shows a slight increase in the Caucasians population to 51 percent in 2009 but the
African-American population stayed at 46 percent. Some of the changes most likely resulted from
HOPE VI relocation policies that reduced the low-income population in public housing but how
much is due to HOPE VI is unclear.
With construction of new public housing virtually ended, the federal government focused
on repair and maintenance of the existing public housing stock (Thompson 2006) but by the
1980s public housing was widely perceived as a failure (Miseon 2010). Years of neglect,
discrimination, isolation, location in distressed neighborhoods, prejudice, shortsighted and racist
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tenant policies, design flaws, and poor management converged to produce intolerable levels of
crime and disorder, physical deterioration, poverty, and isolated public housing residents. Poverty
become so highly concentrated and average income reached so low that in the Quality Housing
and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, congress created a new income category called ―extremely
low-income‖. In this category, a family of four has annual income of less than 30 percent of area
median income. To prevent concentrated poverty, the requirement for public housing was set
much lower than that for tenant-based voucher and certificate eligibility.

Table 2.3 Characteristics of U.S. Public Housing Families in 1995, 2004 and 2010
Particulars
1995*
Household Type
Elderly with no children
Non-elderly, disabled with no children
Other, no children
Families with children
Female Headed with Children
Income Relative to Area Median
30 percent or less
31 to 50 percent
51 to 80 percent
81% or higher
Unknown
Average Annual Income
Source of Income (families with Children)
Work
Welfare
SS/SSI/Pension
Other
No Income
Race and Ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic
Black, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Asian, Pacific Islander or Native American

34
9
8
49
Unknown
(1997)
71
21
6
3
-

Percentage
2004
32
31

2010

43
38

30
16
14
41
36

$10,398

55
17
7
3
18
$13,406

31
47
?
21
-

31
16
55
17
-

32
30
55
22
2

37
47
14
3

50
46
20
2

51
46
24
3

Sources: *U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2002), U.S. Public Housing
Resident Characteristics Report (April 2009-July 2010)
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The ceiling for new tenant-based voucher recipients was set at 75 percent and 40 percent for new
project-based public housing recipients (Olsen 2003). The QHWRA also allowed PHAs to
increase ceiling rents to 30 percent of a family‘s adjusted income. The QHWRA, which
authorized HOPE VI, also announced the federal government‘s intention to use HOPE VI to
promote mixed-income housing, poverty deconcentration, and resident self-sufficiency.

2.5

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)

The Department of Housing and Urban Development or HUD has administered public housing
since 1965. HUD took over from the United States Housing Authority, which administered public
housing from inception in 1937. HUD‘s creation elevated public housing administration to a
Cabinet-level department headed by a Secretary. The US Housing Act of 1965 authorized HUD
on September 9, 1965 as part of President Lynden Johnson administration‘s ―Great Society‖
program to develop and execute federal housing and urban policies including public housing.
HUD unified the disparate federal housing agencies under one organization. Its core
responsibilities includes increasing homeownership, assisting low-income renters, fighting
discrimination in housing markets, assisting the homeless with housing, and improving urban
neighborhoods. Concerning public housing, HUD‘s mission is to help low-income renters ―obtain
decent, safe, and affordable housing‖ (Thompson 2006, p. 4) by expanding access to affordable
housing, improving the physical quality of public and assisted housing, improving management
and accountability of public and assisted housing, helping residents progress towards selfsufficiency, and increasing housing opportunities for all including elderly and disabilities people.
The FHA is the main vehicle that HUD uses to increase homeownership but the FHA
does not lend to homeowners. Instead, it insures private mortgages against default. The Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968 attempted to add 6 million new low-income dwellings over
the next 10 years.
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Despite the ideological battles and the alternatives available, public housing remains a
vital source of shelter for families and individuals that the private market ignores (Bauman 1994),
albeit for a dwindling number of people. Nevertheless, many Americans view public housing as a
failed welfare policy. Of the nearly 1,400,000 public housing units in use at the start of the 1990s,
extremely poor living conditions made at least 86,000 of them uninhabitable (NCSDPH). It may
be not be the full extent of the problem, as some observers suggest, but based on my review of the
issues, the problems manifest the unyielding and unnecessary burdens of job creation, slum
clearance, and income limits policymakers repeatedly placed on public housing (Bauman 1994)
despite their repeated failures. Maybe now is the time for a new beginning devoid of the
ideological baggage in design, construction and service provision.

2.6
2.6.1

Public Housing in Camden

Original Developments

In Camden, public housing followed a similar trajectory to most other cities and was affected by
the same set of issues. Consequently, many of the issues already discussed also apply in Camden.
Public housing in this city began on April 20, 1938 with Westfield Acres as its first development.
Tenants began to occupy the 514 units two months later in May. By 1944, three other family
developments were completed and two more in the 1950s. The four high-rise developments for
elderly tenants built in the 1960s and 1970s completed 10 developments and 2,224 rental units.
Before HOPE VI began, the city had seven public housing family developments and three highrise developments for seniors, and another 2000 Housing Choice Voucher units.
Westfield Acres actually predated the 1937 Housing Act and the HACC. The Works
Projects Administration (WPA), which planned, financed, and built it, started its construction in
1936. It was one of the 50 slum clearance housing projects that the WPA built (Writers Program
of the Works Projects Administration in New Jersey 1942). Table 2.4 shows the list of public
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housing developments in Camden in 1999, the year HOPE VI rehabilitation began at McGuire
Gardens. Branch Village, which has 279 units opened in 1944, Ablett Village with 306 units
opened in 1942, and Chelton Terrace with 200 units opened in 1944 (HACC 2005, 2006, 2007).

Table 2.4 HACC Public Housing Projects in 1999
Development
Westfield Acres
Branch Village
Ablett Village
Chelton Terrace
McGuire Gardens

Census
Year Location
Tract
6011.02 1937 Rosedale
6017
1941 Centerville
6009
1942 Downtown
6017
1943 Centerville
6013
1954
Marlton

Roosevelt Manor
6017
Kennedy Tower
6013
Westfield Tower 6011.02
Mickle Tower
6003
Royal Court
Total Pre-HOPE VI Units

1955
1966
1970
1974

Centerville
Marlton
Dudley

Units
514
279
306
200
367
268
100
103
104
93
2,334

Type
Family: 4-story mid-rise
Family: 2 story townhomes
Family: 2-story apartments
Family: 2 story townhomes
Family: 2 story
+townhomes
Family: 2 story townhomes
Senior High-rise
Senior High-rise
Senior High-rise
Family High-rise

Ownership/
Management
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC

Source: Westfield Acres 2000 Revitalization Plan, Roosevelt Manor 2003 Plan

Widespread racial segregation in public and private life in the USA also affected public
housing in Camden. Westfield Acres and Ablett Village (for war workers) were built exclusively
for Caucasians in the more prosperous Rosedale and Cramer Hill neighborhoods respectively,
while Chelton Terrace and Branch Village were built for ―negroes‖ in Centerville. Centerville
then was and still is a poor neighborhood with a predominantly African-American population and
remains so to this day (HACC 2003, U.S. Census Bureau 1999, 2000). In the 1950s, the HA built
two other family properties and three elderly-only developments and another family development
between 1960 and 1975. McGuire Garden opened a short distance from Westfield Acres in 1954
in Marlton and Roosevelt Manor opened one year later in 1955 in Centerville. Royal Court near
the downtown area was the other family development but the year it opened is not known. The
three high-rise elderly developments were built in 1966, 1970, and 1974 (Table 2.4). Kennedy
Tower was built next to McGuire Gardens and Westfield Tower was built next to Westfield
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Acres. All three elderly properties are in East Camden neighborhoods. Today, the population in
East Camden is an eclectic mix of people from several races and ethnicities but most are of
African descent. Hispanics make up more than 40 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2009).
Before HOPE VI, all 10 developments were clustered in five of the 21 census tracts. Five
of the developments are in Tract 6011.02 and 6013 in East Camden; three are in Tract 6017 in
South Camden, one is in Tract 6003 in the downtown area; and one is in Tract 6009, which
adjoins Tracts 6011.02. In the neighborhoods with more than one development, the developments
are clustered. For example, the three family developments in South Camden--Roosevelt Manor,
Branch Village, and Chelton Terrace--are all in Centerville and clustered in the southwestern part
of the neighborhood. The HOPE VI program seeks to reduce this clustering of public housing
projects in the city. Thus, four separate developments--Baldwin‘s Run, Baldwin‘s Run Senior
Tower, Baldwin‘s‘ Run II, and Carpenters Hill-- replaced Westfield Acres.
2.6.2

HOPE VI and Other Developments

Before HOPE VI, there were 10 developments with 2,334 units and approximately 4,000
residents. Including HOPE VI sites, the HACC public housing portfolio consists of eight family
properties and five elderly/disabled only properties (Table 2.3). Five developments are now in
East Camden--Baldwin‘s Run, Baldwin‘s Run II, Baldwin‘s Senior, Carpenters Hill, and
Westfield Tower in Rosedale plus McGuire Gardens and Kennedy Tower in Marlton. With four
developments, three family developments and a new elderly-only development (Table 2.4 and
Table 2.5), Centerville has the highest concentration of public housing. The family developments
include five HOPE VI and three traditional properties (Table 2.4). There are now four elderly
sites (Table 2.4). With additional HOPE VI units completed, in 2009, there were 1,823 units in 12
properties but the total number of units is still less than the number prior to HOPE VI. The HACC
manages five properties and private firms manage the others. Westfield Acres redevelopment
added three new properties--Baldwin‘s Run for seniors, Carpenters Hill, and Baldwin‘s Run II.
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HOPE VI site plan documents indicate that deferred maintenance, obsolescence, poverty
and vandalism have left most of the public housing stock in very poor shape. With HOPE VI and
other funding, four developments now have new or renovated units. Non-HOPE VI funding
allowed the HACC to demolish all 200 units at Chelton Terrace and build 166 new single-family
replacement townhomes.
Table 2.5 HACC Housing Developments in 2009
Development

Year Location Units
Type
HACC Owned and Managed Sites
Branch Village
1941 Centerville 279 Family: 2-story townhomes
Ablett Village
1943 Downtown 306 Family- 2-story Apts.
Kennedy Tower
1966 Marlton
87 Senior High-rise
Westfield Tower
1970 Dudley
103 Senior High-rise
Mickle Tower
1974 Downtown 104 Senior High-rise
Chelton Terrace
2005 Centerville 167 Two-story family townhouses
Non-HOPE VI Units
1,046
HOPE VI Sites (All privately owned and managed)
McGuire Gardens HOPE VI 2003 Marlton
253 Family: 2-story townhomes
Baldwin‘s Run HOPE VI
2007 Rosedale
197 1 & 2-story family houses
Roosevelt Manor Senior
2007 Centerville
130 Seniors: 3-story mid-rise
Baldwin‘s Senior HOPE VI 2008 Rosedale
75 Seniors: 4-story mid-rise
13 LIHTC and 36 public
Carpenters Hill
2008 Rosedale
49
housing family duplexes
Baldwin‘s Run II
2008 Rosedale
73 1 & 2-story single-family
(20 public housing units)
Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI 2008 Centerville
105 1-3 story single-family
HOPE VI Units
882
Total Units
1,928
Source: Westfield Acres HOPE VI 2000 Revitalization Plan, Roosevelt Manor 2003
January 2008 HOPE VI Coordinator Interview.

Management
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC
HACC-Private

HACC-Private
Private-Private
Private -Private
Private -Private
Private-Private
Private-Private
Private -Private

HOPE VI Plan,
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Figure 2.1 Pre-HOPE VI Public Housing Age in 1993
Source: HOPE VI Baseline Assessment Volume II

2.6.3

Residents

HACC and HUD data show that public housing residents in Camden reflect the city‘s
demographic makeup of slightly more than 50 percent African-American and more than 40
percent Hispanic. All six family developments in 1992, prior to HOPE VI, housed more than 50
percent African-American residents while the Hispanic population ranged from 11 percent to 43
percent (Table 2.6). At each site, the Caucasian population was overwhelmingly Hispanic.
The majority of public housing households have a single, unemployed female head of
household and children under the age of 18 years. At most sites, more than 50 percent of the
population relied heavily on public assistance.

Table 2.6 Ethnic Make-Up in HACC Family Developments, 1992
Development
Ablett Village
Branch Village
Chelton Terrace
McGuire Gardens
Roosevelt Manor
Westfield Acres

Percent of Households
African-American
Hispanic
Caucasian
66
29
5
84
15
1
84
11
5
54
43
3
91
8
1
91
26
8

Source: HOPE VI Baseline Assessment Volume II, 1996

Number of
Residents
677
528
484
1,128
543
1,453

CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Where we live makes a big difference in the quality of our lives, and how the places in which
we live function have a big impact on the quality of our society.
Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom, 2001

3.1

Neighborhoods Matter

Originally, public housing served the working poor to help them back on their feet. The program
was set up to be transitional housing, not permanent housing for poor families but that is what it
has become. Analysts and policymakers say the social pathologies and human and physical
distress plaguing public housing resulted from concentrating poor families (Crump 2002,
Jargowsky, Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City 1996, Massey and
Denton 1993, Wilson 1987). Admission preferences favoring disadvantaged families reshaped
public housing resident profile in the 1950s and 1960s and contributed to huge increases in
concentrated poverty. As a result, researchers have concluded that concentrated poverty was a
one of the main reason behind the decline in social, economic and physical conditions in public
housing developments nationwide. Since the mid-1990s, concentrated poverty has taken center
stage in debates about living conditions in public housing and HOPE VI, which attempts to
address physical distress and concentrated poverty, represents the federal government‘s most
visible response. The program is based on a body of social science research known as
―neighborhood effects‖ (Goetz 2010). This literature suggests that neighborhood conditions
influence opportunities for residents in important ways (Jencks and Mayer 1990). Some
researchers believe factors such as the absence of positive role models and high-quality services
like education and housing in poor urban neighborhoods retard life outcomes for residents.
Conversely, positive role models and high quality services improve outcomes (Varaday 2004).
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For example, the literature suggests that residents of distressed public housing suffer extra
hardships because they live in distressed urban neighborhoods with a lot of crime, low social
capital low economic opportunities, poor public services, and have limited opportunities for
upward mobility (Ellen and Turner 1997, Jargowsky 1996, Jencks and Mayer 1990, Wilson
1987). The mechanisms through which housing and neighborhood conditions impact the quality
of people‘s lives are not always clear but the consensus is that they are integrally connected. In
low poverty neighborhoods with good quality public services like schools, many residents are
college-educated and have decent paying jobs and crime tends to be low. In contrast, in poor
neighborhoods with poor public services, many residents do not even have a high school
education and do not have jobs, and crime tends to be a problem. The 1992 Final Report of the
National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing declared that concentrated poverty
was a major contributor to public housing distress and HUD has reframed the debate about
distressed public housing to focus it on concentrated poverty. So what is concentrated poverty?

3.2

Concentrated Poverty

Concentrated poverty refers to neighborhood poverty of 40 percent or more. It is defined as the
proportion of the poor population that resides in neighborhood with at least 40 percent poverty
(Jargowsky 1996). Neighborhoods refer to census tracts or clusters of census tracts and the
federal poverty level is the poverty benchmark used to determine poverty levels (Berube 2008,
Jargowsky 1996, Wilson 1987). Census tracts vary widely in size, economic and social
characteristics, demographic composition, and population size but are the smallest well-defined
geographic unit for which detailed physical, social, and economic data are available in the USA.
Their populations range from 2,500 to 8,000 people. Census blocks and census block groups are
smaller and equally well-defined geographic units that would be better representations of actual
neighborhoods but detailed physical, social, and economic data are not available at those levels.

48
Research indicates that before the 1970s concentrated poverty was rare in American cities
but became problematic in the 1970s and truly alarming in the 1980s before declining in the
1990s (Danziger and Gottschalk 1987, Jargowsky 1996, Jargowsky 2003). When researchers
recognized this phenomenon in the 1980s, it was already a crisis. The following alarming census
tract data indicate the severity of the problem between 1970 and 1990 (Danziger and Gottschalk
1987, Jargowsky 1996, Wilson 1987). In the 1970s, concentrated poverty in the 50 largest cities
in the U.S. increased by almost 66 percent from about 974,000 (2.5% of the population) to more
than 1.6 million (4.3% of the population). Poverty in general increased by nearly 12 percent in
cities and by 8 percent for the entire United States (Danziger and Gottschalk 1987). This trend
continued in the 1980s as the number of high-poverty tracts doubled and the number of people
who lived in those tracts jumped from four million in 1979 to eight million in 1989. In cities,
poverty increased from 12 percent to 18 percent of the urban population (Jargowsky 1996). Even
absolute poverty declined nationally yet the urban poor became poorer, more isolated, and more
concentrated in physically, economically, and socially distressed urban areas (Goetz 2000,
Jargowsky 1996). Thus, as Peterson (1991) concluded, although the national poverty rate settled
to around 13 percent, urban residents were at greater risk of becoming poor. The situation
improved in the 1990s but remains precarious; the number of high poverty areas decreased by 25
percent and the number of poor households living in those areas declined by 1.3 million.
Another problem with concentrated poverty is that the people who experience it are
overwhelmingly black. From 1970 to 1980, the poor black population in extreme poverty tracts
increased by 164 percent but by only 24 percent for poor Caucasians (Wilson 1987). During this
time ―black‖ poverty stayed stubbornly above 33 percent while ―white‖ poverty hovered around
10 percent and Hispanic poverty jumped to 39 percent (Peterson 1991). Looked at more broadly,
the picture shows that just 13 percent of the U.S. population is African-American but they
comprise more than half of the nation‘s poor and about half of the concentrated poor (U.S.
Census Bureau 2000, Jargowsky 1996, Kasarda 1993). In addition, the expansion in concentrated
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poverty coincided with a large increase in female-headed households in poverty. Roughly 25
percent of the poor population lived in female-headed households in 1960 but was 40 percent in
1987 (Peterson 1991). In an age of declining social support to the poor, if this trend continues, the
consequences could be explosive for family life and urban governance.
The forces that produce concentrated poverty are many and varied (Berube 2008).
Research suggests that the wholesale migration of Caucasians from cities to suburbs and of
African-Americans from the rural South to northern cities contributed to the disproportionate
share of African-Americans in concentrated poverty. Despite this evidence, the HOPE VI
program does not address this issue. Racialization of concentrated poverty was not a key
objective in this study but is mentioned here because it plays such a big role. Cities often built
public housing to restrict African-Americans to certain areas in a city to prevent diminution in
property values and other undesirable effects when ―blacks‖ move into ―white‖ neighborhoods
(Myerson and Banfield 1955, 210; in Goetz 2003). When the U.S. Congress finally outlawed such
racially orchestrated housing policies, most developments were already built and operational.
3.2.1

Theorizing Concentrated Poverty.

The current urban poverty literature cites four categories of events that led to concentrated
poverty: economic restructuring and de-industrialization (Wilson 1987); racial discrimination in
housing markets that reinforced racial and ethnic segregation (Massey and Denton 1993);
government intervention (Schill and Wachter 1995); and migration and suburbanization (Berube
2007, Goetz 2003, Jargowsky 1996). Berube also cites family structure. No one factor alone fully
explains concentrated poverty however.
The macro-economic change thesis states that African-Americans became more spatially
concentrated in the inner city when the structure of metropolitan area economies changed from
industrial to service based. The racial discrimination thesis addresses discriminatory and
shortsighted urban development policies and practices favoring suburbanization of middle-

50
income Caucasians (Berube 2007; Goetz 2003). Much of the contemporary scholarship on urban
poverty builds on Wilson‘s thesis about concentrated poverty in African-American urban
neighborhoods and the resulting dysfunctional environments. The debate about urban poverty is
not new but Wilson‘s thesis provided a bridge between the divergent structural theories of liberals
and the behavioral explanations of conservatives. Most importantly, by highlighting the
horrendous conditions in poor black communities, Wilson brought the pernicious effects of
extreme geographic concentrated poverty into mainstream policy discourse.
In his influential book titled The Truly Disadvantaged: The Innercity, the Underclass,
and Public Policy, University of Chicago sociologist, William J. Wilson, note that poor urban
families in the 1970s lived in concentrated poverty ―ghettos‖ while early post-World War II poor
urban families lived in stable communities with strong social connections. He theorized that the
effects of changes in urban economies trumped race as the dominant factor in creating and
maintaining concentrated poverty. He argued that the deepening spatial concentration of black
poverty in the innercity resulted from sharp changes in the economic environment that reduced
economic opportunities for African-Americans (Wilson 1987). He further argued that
―neighborhood effects‖ contributed to the cycles of poverty afflicting African-Americans in
central cities and that de-industrialization hit African-American neighborhoods the hardest, which
caused existing poverty to worsen.
Sociologists have since geocoded survey data to link individual characteristics to family
characteristics and to neighborhood conditions at various spatial levels (Clampet-Lundquist and
Massey 2008, Jencks and Mayer 1990). A multitude of studies found evidence supporting
Wilson‘s thesis that neighborhood conditions affect the residents‘ socioeconomic outcomes
(Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, et al. 1993).
3.2.1.1 Economic Restructuring (De-industrialization). Economic restructuring or deindustrialization refers to the transformation of urban economies from a manufacturing base to
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service-based economies driven by information technology. The hypothesis describes the
structural changes in metropolitan area economies that resulted in long-term economic decline in
manufacturing and rural agricultural and extraction inductive industries. The hypothesis posits
that urban economies underwent a post-industrial revolution characterized by capital-intensive
restructuring in the industrial and manufacturing sectors and a rapid and massive shift to
knowledge-based, information-backed services (Wilson 1987, Wilson & Aponte 1985). This is a
widely accepted explanation for the rapid increase in concentrated poverty during the 1970s and
1980s.
Wilson argued that until the 1970s, urban economies depended largely on producing
industrial and consumer goods but that changed dramatically between 1970 and 1990 as the
information technology revolution reoriented the urban economy from producing manufactured
goods to producing services. Wilson theorized that the deindustrialization of urban economies
impacted the black community much more than any other racial group because blacks relied more
heavily on the industrial economy for employment and decent wages in low-skilled jobs. The
closure of many industrial enterprises and their relocation overseas or to suburban areas left these
low-skilled workers without jobs and the means to sustain their families and communities. Less
skilled and less educated than Caucasians, African-Americans were not prepared for the job
opportunities that the expanding service sector afforded them. Even when jobs were available in
manufacturing plants that moved to suburbs that surround central cities, limited or no
transportation access from cities made it difficult for city dwellers to take the available jobs. This
spatial mismatch between suburban jobs and central city labor is has been a subject of much
debate as well (Wilson 1987).6 With increasing suburbanization of decent-paying manufacturing
jobs, joblessness and poverty soared among African-Americans. Joblessness among adult males
was most devastating in inner-city neighborhoods with concentrated poverty and particularly at
public housing sites with large African-American populations, reasoned Wilson (1987). He
6

For a detailed discussion of the ―skills mismatch‖ hypothesis, see Kasarda (1983)
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argued that Caucasians fared much better than African-Americans because they were better
prepared, better educated, and had the advantage of living nearer to the job centers.
Wilson based much of his de-industrialization thesis on earlier research by Kasarda in
1980 and 1983 showing that poor minorities were most vulnerable to structural economic changes
as cities transitioned from goods-producing economies to high-tech, service-based economies.
Kasarda‘s research also showed that economic shifts helped to polarize the labor market into
high-wage and low-wage sectors and that relocation of major manufacturing firms from central
cities marginalized low-skilled workers and deprived them of stable employment.
3.2.1.2 Suburbanization. Suburbanization refers to the large migration of people from central
cities to outlying areas near cities. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, businesses and middle-income
and upper-income white households left cities for suburbs. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, which included fair housing and other civil rights, helped to loosen racial restrictions that
kept influential African-Americans in inner-city neighborhoods. With the restrictions loosened,
affluent African-Americans also migrated to suburbia in large numbers in the 1970s and 1980s to
take advantage of the better job opportunities and living conditions. There is little doubt that
suburban migration negatively affected predominantly African-America neighborhoods (Wilson
1987). Proponents of the black suburbanization hypothesis argue that in earlier times, racial
discrimination in housing and labor markets forced successful black families to live in
predominantly African-American neighborhoods but their presence helped to stabilize those
neighborhoods. In contrast, their departure left those neighborhoods with their most economically
disadvantaged residents and without the means to sustain basic neighborhood social and
economic life. The presence of economically stable families not only helped to ―buffer‖ black
neighborhoods against hard times but also helped to transmit positive attitudes towards work,
family life, and education to succeeding generations. Successful and stable middle-class residents
helped black neighborhoods to maintain viable businesses and social institutions like churches
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and schools but their departure deprived the neighborhoods of these valuable elements.
Eventually, poverty and neighborhood isolation took over, Wilson (1987) argued. The absence
successful residents also deprived black neighborhoods of positive role models and contributed to
problem behaviors and social dislocations (South and Crowder 1999, Wilson 1987). Over time,
many urban neighborhoods became over-concentrated with poor families who were dependent on
public housing and welfare.
Wilson‘s public policy prescription for this demise of black neighborhoods and the
emergence of an ―underclass‖ is that programs created to alleviate poverty, joblessness, and
related social dislocations should focus on changing the social, economic, and structural issues
that contribute to neighborhood decline rather than trying to change ―ghetto‖ people culture
(1987, p. 138).
3.2.1.3 Racial Discrimination in Housing. Racial discrimination in housing refers primarily to
institutional and non-institutional policies and practices that reinforce neighborhood racial and
ethnic segregation. It has played an integral part in the development of public housing in the USA
and despite legislation against such activities, housing discrimination against non-Caucasian
homebuyers and renters persists (L. Freeman 2005, Turner, Ross, et al. 2003). Because
discrimination produces fewer housing options for non-Caucasians and low-income people, it
forces them to live in high-poverty areas. It is therefore one of the main drivers of concentrated
poverty in public housing (Massey and Denton 1993). Wilson highlighted economic change as
the main contributor to concentrated poverty in the 1970s and 1980s while acknowledging that
racism was a major contributor. Other researchers also disagree with the diminished role Wilson
ascribed to racism. In a study published in 1995, Goering, Kamely and Richardson (1995) noted
that most public housing developments were located in poor and racially isolated neighborhoods.
More than 40 percent lived in census tracks with majority African-American populations and
about 30 percent lived in developments located in tracts with fewer than 10 percent African-
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Americans. African-Americans in public housing live in predominantly African-American
neighborhoods but Caucasians in public housing live in predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods.
Bratt, Stone and Hartman (2006) also contend that people of color are less able to compete in the
housing market because of persistent discrimination.
Massey and Denton (1993) argue that pervasive and destructive racial segregation in
housing markets substantially contributed to the alarming levels that concentrating poverty
reached in the 1970s and 1980s. Their study of U.S. urban populations in the 1970 and 1980s
found that social, economic, and political activities at all levels of society created and reinforced
segregation of residential space by race and ethnicity. Rather than economic restructuring or
suburbanization, institutional and non-institutional discrimination against African-Americans led
to residential segregation and concentrated poverty.
Massey and Denton used census data to show the effects of systematic racial and class
discrimination against African-Americans in housing markets and the wider economy by public
and private institutions and by individuals. In analyzing residential patterns between different
racial groups in 125 large cities in the 1970s, they found location patterns that were completely
different from pre-1970 patterns. Unlike the invasion-succession-assimilation patterns of earlier
European immigrants, the results for African-Americans revealed extreme levels of segregation
between African-Americans and other racial groups. Extreme segregation or ―hyper-segregation‖
occurs when black neighborhoods have only other black, hyper-segregated neighborhoods
bordering them. In the 25 largest cities, African-Americans are the most hyper-segregated racial
or ethnic group (Massey and Denton 1993). Unlike poor African-Americans, poor Caucasians do
not live in hyper-segregated communities; most live in middle-class census tracts bordering other
middle-class census tracts. Based on their findings, Massey and Denton concluded that urban
policies and practices in the U.S. foisted concentrated poverty upon African-Americans
neighborhoods. They argued that segregation forces poor African-Americans to live in racially
segregated and poor inner-city neighborhoods, which often meant living in distressed public
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housing projects. Pervasive hyper-segregation limits relocation opportunities for AfricaAmericans and forces them to live in distressed neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993).
In Yonkers, NY for example, nearly all of the city‘s subsidized housing units were built
deliberately in the southwestern part of the city where the population is predominantly AfricanAmerican and Hispanic. The city has about 13,000 public housing units and the overwhelming
majority and nearly all other subsidized housing units were concentrated in this one part of the
city (Briggs, Darden and Aidala Winter 1999, Keating 1999). While not as disproportionately
concentrated as in Yonkers, in Camden, NJ, three of the city‘s six family developments and 38
percent of the public housing units are concentrated in Centerville neighborhood, whose
population is also predominantly ―African-American.
3.2.1.4 Government

Policies.

Government

policies

also

contributed

significantly to

concentrating poor and non-Caucasian families in public housing. For example, building the vast
majority of public housing developments in poor neighborhoods ensures that the residents are
always going to be poor. Schill and Wachter (1995), who examined how public housing
contributed to concentrated poverty, explained that the U.S. Supreme Court‘s ruling that blocked
the federal government from decisions regarding the location of public housing was one such
decision. That Supreme Court ruling left the decision about where to locate public housing to
local governments and localities were free to accept or reject public housing. While suburban
townships routinely refused public housing, many cities had declining neighborhoods with
severely deteriorated housing and so they accepted public housing as replacement for some of the
dilapidated properties. It is therefore no coincidence that public housing is concentrated in cities
rather than dispersed throughout metropolitan areas.
Some policies that were implemented during the urban renewal era to make public
housing more affordable made worsened concentrated poverty in public housing. Such policies
include rent ceilings and income limitations. Rent ceilings brought more economically
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disadvantaged families into public housing and income limitations forced tenants whose incomes
exceeded the ceiling to move out (Schill and Wachter 1995). These policies had good intentions
but ended up constraining attempts to provide the affordable, safe and decent housing that the
U.S. Congress pledged in the 1949 U.S. Housing Act (Abt Associates Inc 1996, Popkin, Katz, et
al. 2004, Schill and Wachter 1995). Wilson (1987) also explained that the 1968 Civil Rights Act,
although well intentioned; unwittingly helped to increase concentrated urban poverty because it
freed wealthier African-Americans to move from the city better housing and neighborhoods in the
suburbs and left the poor in the inner city. Federal Highway Administration and Federal Housing
Administration policies and programs, discussed in Chapter 2, also led to concentrated poverty in
public housing. The Federal Highway Administration encouraged Caucasian middle-class
families that highway construction projects displaced to move to the suburbs and the Federal
Housing Administration loan guarantees made buying suburban homes more affordable during
the urban renewal era (Abt Associates Inc 1996).
3.2.2

Critique

Concentrated poverty in American cities in general but in public housing in particular has many
origins but mostly appear to be economic or racial in nature. Government policies, institutional
and individual actions contributed to the problem. The result is that no single theory adequately
explains this phenomenon. To address neighborhood concentrated poverty, analysts need to know
the mechanisms through which concentrated poverty results in neighborhood distress and
negative behavior. Massey and Denton (1993) argue that because of racial discrimination, when
city economies decline, the economic and social impacts on African-Americans and Caucasians
differ. However, the reality is that the causal factors that each theory poses do not necessarily
contribute to urban decline or severely distressed conditions in public housing in every
neighborhood or to the same extent. The relative contribution of each factor depends on the
characteristics of each city, neighborhood, and housing development. Changes in the economic
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structure of metropolitan areas and de-industrialization, government policies, suburbanization,
and social factors like racial discrimination all helped to fuel concentrated poverty.
A full explanation of the causes of and solutions to severely distressed public housing
should therefore consider all factors. A theoretical framework that incorporates both structural
economic changes, behavioral factors such as racial discrimination, and public policy
interventions will likely result in a better understanding of and solutions to concentrated poverty.
Even if racial discrimination is no longer the main factor, it is still prominent in the housing
industry and one of main reasons that attempts to build racially and economically integrated
neighborhoods have had limited success to date (Massey and Denton 1993). Since HOPE VI
attempts to address concentrated poverty in public housing, the strategies used should also
address all the social, physical, and economic factors that led to the problem in the first place.
3.2.3

Effects of Concentrated Poverty

In public housing, concentrated poverty places a double or triple burden on residents. Not only
are most residents very poor, the distressed developments are located in communities that are
themselves severely disadvantaged (NCSDPH 1992). Social scientists noted that public housing
has some of the worst cases of concentrated poverty in the United States (Goetz 2002,
Greenbaum 2002) while Schill and Wachter (1995) argued that concentrated poverty in public
housing precipitates neighborhood disinvestment and decline. Due to concentrated poverty, some
researchers even describe public housing as ―vertical ghettos‖ while some refer to the most
disadvantaged segment of the public housing population as ―underclass‖ (Hirsch 1996 in Goetz
2005, p 7; Wilson 1987).
Researchers believe that concentrated poverty negatively affects the well-being of
residents, families, and neighborhoods (Kasarda, 1993; Massey and Denton 1993; Jargowsky
1996; Wilson 1987). These effects include private sector disinvestment, high crime rates, higher
local government costs, reduced housing values, underperforming schools, and restricted access
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to good healthcare services and good job opportunities (Kneebone and Berube 2009). Due to
neighborhood effects, in comparison to affluent neighborhoods, very poor neighborhoods tend to
have high rates of single-parent families, welfare dependency, and school-dropouts; low rates of
owner-occupied housing; high rates of vacant housing; and poor infrastructure services (Berube
2007, Brooks-Gunn and Duncan 1997, Clark 2005, Jargowsky 1996, Jencks and Mayer 1990,
Rosenbaum Stroh & Flynn 1998, Wilson, 1987). These impacts undermine the ability of the
residents to get and keep decent jobs and achieve economic self-sufficiency (GAO 2007).
Residence in very poor neighborhoods limits access to mainstream social and economic support
systems and opportunities (Turner and Rawlings 2005). Goetz (2002, p. 3) quoted former HUD
Secretary, Henry Cisneros as saying, ―One of the greatest challenges to America‘s urban future is
the persistent concentration and isolation of poor people and minorities in the central cites ….‖
One analyst suggested that concentrated poverty ―… poisons not just race relations but also our
attitudes toward education, law-enforcement, and city life itself‖ (Lehmann 1991, p. 35, cited in
Goetz 2002, p. 3). People who live in concentrated poverty have diminished hope.
Some observers argue that people who live in concentrated poverty lack access to
mainstream social and economic opportunities and it undermines their long-term life chances
(Turner and Rawlings 2005). Given these challenges, the urban poor usually find it extremely
difficult to get jobs that pay decent wages to get them off welfare (Wilson 1987). Wilson
theorized that concentrated poverty and income inequality breed the ―underclass‖: that is, a group
of people who are systematically isolated from mainstream social and economic life and whose
conduct often contradicts mainstream American values. Several other studies confirm positive
association between neighborhood conditions and resident outcomes.
Brooks-Gunn and Duncan (1997) reported that adolescents from wealthy neighborhoods
achieve better educational outcomes and superior cognitive development compared to adolescents
from poor neighborhoods. They concluded that these findings showed the superior resources and
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neighborhood services, role models, and the direct labor-market connections that the children
from the wealthy neighborhood had.
Other researchers reported similar neighborhood effects as Wilson did. Currie and
Yelowitz (2000), Turner and Ellen (1997), and South and Crowder (1999) show the impact of
adverse neighborhood quality on family formation and the impact on economic well-being.
Currie and Yelowitz‘s (2000) research among children living in public housing and children
living in private housing reported that children who live in public housing experienced less
stability and were less satisfied with their neighborhoods and housing than were children from
wealthy communities. For example, the children from public housing were more likely to change
schools.
South and Crowder (1999) used census and longitudinal data from the 1968 and 1986
Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine relationships between neighborhood socioeconomic
disadvantage and the timing of first marriage and the chance of premarital childbearing among
young women in concentrated poverty neighborhoods. They found strong evidence to support
Wilson‘s contention that concentrated poverty reduces the availability of marriageable men but
found no significant difference between the marriage chances of African-American women
Caucasian women who live in severely disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Hogan and Kitagawa (1985), who studied pregnancy rates among unmarried AfricanAmerican teenagers in both poor and wealthier neighborhoods, found higher pregnancy rates
among teenage girls from poor areas than among teenage girls from wealthier neighborhoods.
Crane (1991) used a longitudinal study to measure neighborhood quality using the ―percentage of
high-status workers in neighborhoods‖. This study found that school dropout rates for AfricanAmerican students increased dramatically when the percentage of high-status workers in the
neighborhoods studied fell below 5.6 percent.
A comprehensive review of the neighborhood effects literature by Ellen and Turner
(1997) noted that most neighborhood effects studies found correlations between neighborhood
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characteristics and individual outcomes. Employment studies found positive correlation between
employment and neighborhood characteristics and between earnings and neighborhood
characteristics. Some studies reported that residents from poorer neighborhoods had poorer
quality public education, childcare, medical care, and after-school services than residents from
more affluent neighborhoods. Regarding social networks, most studies found that people whose
social networks have few employed persons were less likely to have connections to employment
opportunities than were people with connections to employed individuals.
Most neighborhood effects studies use neighborhood poverty rate as proxy for
neighborhood quality. A neighborhood with a high poverty rate is of a poor quality and a
neighborhood with a low poverty rate is a good or high quality neighborhood. That assumption
implies that relocation from a poor neighborhood to a non-poor neighborhood will improve the
economic and social well-being of relocatees. However, some studies show positive outcomes
from such relocation but other studies show negative outcomes for some populations. Research
by Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn (1998) suggests that poorer neighborhoods exert stronger
influences on residents than the influence that affluent neighborhoods exert on their residents. If
this is so, the presence of so-called positive role models in a neighborhood may not be as relevant
as generally indicated. This information may be relevant to HOPE VI since the program
advocates relocation from distressed public housing to neighborhoods with low levels of poverty.
In general, many studies found detrimental impacts of concentrated poverty on residents
but policy prescriptions are rare. One of the few analysts that proposed policy solutions is Wilson
(1987). He proposed mixed-income housing as an alternative in the belief that the mixed-income
approach provides positive role models for low-income tenants. Although little empirical
evidence exists to validate the mixed-income approach to public housing, HOPE VI has been
emphasizing mixed-income housing since the mid-1990 but has not given sufficient attention to
other aspects of concentrated poverty such as racial discrimination. Consequently, even HOPE VI
housing is concentrated in the same racially concentrated neighborhoods as before.
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3.3

Deconcentrating Poverty: Residential Mobility Programs

Relocation of families from very distressed public housing developments is a key part of HOPE
VI‘s drive to eliminate concentrated poverty in public housing. About residential mobility, the
Gautreaux and MTO programs offer valuable research insights (Berube February 2007). These
programs attempted to improve the lives of public housing families by moving them to lowpoverty neighborhoods (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010).
3.3.1

The Gautreaux Program

The Gautreaux program emanated from a class-action lawsuit against the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA) by tenants led by Dorothy Gautreaux in 1966 alleging racial discrimination in
site selection and unit allocation by the CHA (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz Summer 2000).
Federal courts agreed with tenants and imposed a desegregation remedy to rectify this long
history of systemic racial discrimination towards African-Americans (Clampet-Lundquist and
Massey 2008). The goal was to move African-American public housing families to
neighborhoods with 30 percent or fewer African-American residents. In 1998, the program had
facilitated the dispersal of about 7,000 low-income African-American families from inner-city
housing projects to low poverty and less segregated neighborhoods throughout the six-county
Chicago metropolitan area (DeLuca, et al. 2010).
In the 1969 and 1976 rulings, the courts ordered the CHA to stop building other largescale public housing developments in African-American neighborhood, and to provide smallscale housing in white neighborhoods for black residents. To ensure that desegregation occurred,
the court excluded neighborhoods with more than 30 percent African-Americans from
consideration. Participating families received rent subsidies that allowed them to live in private
sector housing at the same cost as public housing. Led by the non-profit group Leadership
Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, the Gautreaux program helped black public
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housing residents and families on waiting lists to move into private suburban homes and to
revitalizing neighborhoods in the city of Chicago.
Results from Gautreaux program studies show mixed outcomes for relocated residents.
Rosenbaum and Popkin (1991) reported several positive outcomes. Adults who relocated to the
suburbs were much more likely to find jobs; high school graduation rates among children who
moved to suburbs increased; and high school graduates were more likely to attend college get
better paying jobs than their peers who relocated within the city limits (Rosenbaum, Stroh and
Flynn 1998). Spence (1993) also found higher employment levels, higher labor force
participation, higher high school graduation rates, and better college attendance records among
families that moved to less racially concentrated suburban neighborhoods than among families
that stayed within Chicago city limits. These positive findings emboldened housing mobility
advocates to argue for a similar program nationwide to give poor residents access to social capital
that connects them to job opportunities, reduce extreme poverty, and improve conditions in innercity neighborhoods (Spence 1993). These findings have been influential in HOPE VI‘s evolution
such as the increasing use of relocation and income integration in HOPE VI developments as
strategies to deconcentrate poverty.
3.3.2

The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Program

The MTO was a ten-year experimental program to assess residential mobility outcomes among
public housing families when they move from distressed public housing in high poverty
neighborhoods to private housing in low-poverty neighborhoods after relocation counseling. The
experiment tested the hypothesis that families that live in areas of concentrated poverty would
benefit from improved access to better paying jobs, better schools, and better housing by moving
to low-poverty neighborhoods (Collins, et al. 2005, Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn 1998). Using
volunteer families from New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and Baltimore (Goetz
2004; HUD website 2010), the experiment assessed long-term effects on employment, housing,
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and education by assigned randomly each family to either a control group, a comparison group, or
an experimental (treatment) group. Families in the control group received no subsidy and no
counseling; families in the comparison group received housing vouchers and no relocation
restriction while the experimental group received relocation counseling and housing vouchers
valid only in low-poverty neighborhoods (DeLuca, et al. 2010).
Research done five to seven years the MTO began shows mixed but encouraging
outcomes. Overall, families in the treatment group lived in better neighborhoods and adults
experienced improved mental and physical health (e.g., reduction in depression and obesity) after
moving. Studies also indicate that girls in the treatment group showed improved mental health but
boys in the treatment group displayed worse emotional and behavioral outcomes than boys who
remained in public housing, the control group (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010). In a Baltimore
study, some families that moved initially to better housing in lower poverty neighborhoods later
returned to poor neighborhoods (Clark 2005). About half of the families moved to neighborhoods
where poverty increased in the 1990s, including families who made long-term moves to highpoverty neighborhoods where they had families and friends. Despite the apparent overall
improvements in housing quality and mental well-being, based on employment, earnings, and
welfare dependency outcomes, MTO families did not improve in economic self-sufficiency,
which was expected to be the main outcome. Although final evaluation results are not yet
available, the results suggest that relocation from high-poverty to low-poverty neighborhoods
may not be a sufficient condition for achieving economic self-sufficiency.
Gautreaux and MTO results suggest caution regarding the assumed benefits of residential
mobility because they have not provided clear pathways for how to deconcentrate poverty in
public housing. They provide vital information to guide planning but do not answer all questions
about the efficacy of residential mobility to residents who live in distressed public housing. In the
Gautreaux program for example, inherent differences between families that moved to the suburbs
and families that stayed in the city rather than differences due to neighborhood location and
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quality may have affected some of the positive outcomes. With predefined operating parameters,
the MTO is sharply different from the HOPE VI program in which projects vary from site to site
and where the rules are often confusing or unclear. Officials should therefore not expect the same
results from the two programs (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Unlike the MTO however, in
HOPE VI, entire housing developments are rehabilitated or demolished, relocation is involuntary,
relocation assistance is inconsistent and it is not available to every family, and residents are
expected but not required to move to low poverty neighborhoods. The parameters are clearly
different in HOPE VI (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009).
While the research indicates that residential mobility as a poverty deconcentration tool
has merit, it does not improve living conditions in high-poverty neighborhoods. Instead,
residential mobility takes the best from these areas, which leaves them more disadvantaged than
before (Goetz 2004).

3.4

Poverty Deconcentration in HOPE VI

Studies of HOPE VI projects enrich understanding of how the program affects residents and
neighborhoods (Hanlon 2010). These studies show impacts on residents‘ lives and shed light on
the validity of relocation as a means to deconcentrate poverty. The following studies illustrate
HOPE VI‘s effectiveness. HUD sponsored cross-site studies provide a comparative framework
for assessing program outcomes across several sites but most of the results were preliminary
(Hanlon 2010) because the projects were incomplete.
In terms of poverty deconcentration the ―HOPE VI Resident Issues and Changes in
Neighborhoods Surrounding Grant Sites‖ study in 2003, which examined HOPE VI effectiveness,
the Government Accountability Office reported that poverty deconcentration varied widely at the
160 HOPE VI sites studied and found no conclusive evidence to support HOPE VI residential
mobility assumptions about its effectiveness. The study examined: a) the types of housing to
which original residents had moved, b) the share of original residents expected to return after
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redevelopment, c) how 1996 grantees involved residents in the HOPE VI process, d) the types of
community and supportive services that residents received, and e) changes in neighborhoods
surrounding sites that received 1996 fiscal year grants. The study found that the largest
percentage of relocated residents moved to public housing sites not slated for rehabilitation and
that grantees expected about 50 percent of original residents to return after revitalization. It also
found that 31 percent of original tenants received vouchers to rent homes in the private market
but 6 to 14 percent were evicted or they moved on voluntarily. Relocation to other developments
was generally not positive but there were improvements in education, income, and housing
conditions in most neighborhoods surrounding grant sites. Additional assessments at four sites
showed inconsistent and mixed results. Most of the 160 projects were incomplete however so it is
likely that some results improved after completion.
The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study (Buron, et al. 2002) was the first systematic
cross-site study examining relocation outcomes for original residents and the most comprehensive
study of resident outcomes in the HOPE VI program to date. This retrospective survey examined
relocation outcomes for original householders at eight sites that received revitalization grants
between 1993 and 1998. The results provide a snapshot of the living conditions and well-being of
former residents as of spring 2001—two to seven years after the HOPE VI grants were awarded.
At the time of the study, redevelopment was in progress at six of the eight sites so the results
describe work-in-progress. The results indicate that some residents moved to lower-poverty
neighborhoods with slightly more racially diversity and to neighborhoods with significantly less
crime. Poverty rates at grant sites also declined by 12 percent on average. Additionally, voucher
recipients who moved to private housing experienced more positive outcomes than households
who moved to other public housing developments. For example, 45 percent of families who
moved to another public housing site reported serious drug problems in the neighborhoods
compared to 23 percent of voucher holders. Part of the problem is that a large percentage of
residents relocated to neighborhoods with high levels of segregation, poverty, and crime. At least
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42 percent moved to high-poverty neighborhoods and 76 percent to neighborhoods with at least
89 percent non-Caucasians.
Despite the lack of baseline data, the findings provide vital information about HOPE VI
outcomes. Even though the findings at six of the eight sites were preliminary, the results were not
as positive for HOPE VI as expected because most relocated residents did not move to improved
living conditions.
The HOPE VI Panel Study (Popkin, Harris, et al. 2002) is a quasi-experimental study that
examined effects on the lives of original residents. The research examined long-term location,
neighborhood condition, physical and mental health, and socioeconomic outcomes for original
residents at five HOPE VI sites in different cities that received HOPE VI grants in 2000. Using a
sample of 887 heads of household from the five Panel Study sites, researchers conducted
interviewed at two-year intervals starting just before relocation began in 2001. In-depth
interviews with 70 adults and children provided additional information. The latest findings
indicate that HOPE VI had benefited many households who relocated to less poor communities
but had negligible economic impact, even among households that moved to less poor
neighborhoods.
The ―Interim Assessment of the HOPE VI Cross-Site Report‖ (Holin, et al. 2003)
explored HOPE VI‘s impacts on residents, developments, and neighborhoods at 15 sites in 15
cities soon after re-occupancy began to determine the changes made since the award was
announced. This study used baseline data from the HOPE VI Baseline Assessment Survey. The
baseline assessment contains information about residents, developments, and surrounding
neighborhoods for the 15 grant sites at the HOPE VI award date and early implementation results.
Study results indicate that on average, HOPE VI residents had higher incomes, were more likely
to be employed, were better educated, had smaller households, and were more likely to be elderly
than pre-HOPE VI residents.
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―False HOPE‖ (National Housing Law Project, et al, 2002) criticized the HOPE VI
program for lacking clear standards, lacking hard data on program results, and for misleading and
contradictory statements from HUD about the program. The report noted that HOPE VI had
moved away from the problems that the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public
Housing identified and from the goals stated in the HOPE VI statutes. The study cited concerns
about the exclusion of original families from HOPE VI sites, reductions in public housing units,
and a lack of information about HOPE VI outcomes.

3.5

Physical Redevelopment

The most noticeable manifestation of the quality of life in a public housing development is the
appearance of the physical environment. Physical appearance is also the most visible evidence of
HOPE VI impacts on distressed public housing communities. Many factors contributed to
physical deterioration in severely distressed developments. Poor design and construction,
insufficient funding for maintenance and repair, poor management, and HUD policies that
withheld funding for managerial inadequacies when the developments desperately needed the
funds. However, considering the strong ideologies underlying past public housing design,
improving public housing quality requires new design ideas. HOPE VI brought new design ideas
to public housing but just as in the past, this program also adheres to the use of one design
paradigm. A plurality of design ideas encourages diversity and greater local inputs in the design
process and helps to avoid uniformity in design across jurisdictions. By using New Urbanism as
the only design paradigm, HOPE VI is no different from the past whereby a single paradigm
produced uniform building and site designs from city to city.
Distressed public housing developments face several issues regarding site layout,
building form and orientation, construction quality, amenities, and indoor and outdoor spacing for
private and public uses. At some developments, units are aligned with streets but have entries that
face interior courtyards (Franck 1994). The NCSDPH (1992) noted that most distressed public
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housing were in blighted urban neighborhoods and were physically separated from mainstream
social and commercial services or neighborhood diversity. The report noted that distressed
developments were often too large and too dense and some suffered from inferior construction
and widespread use of shared spaces like stairways, corridors, and elevators (NCSDPH 1992).
HUD therefore requires HOPE VI applicants to propose physical redevelopment plans that
demonstrate significant changes to the physical environment and use at least 80 percent of the
HOPE VI grant for physical redevelopment.
HOPE VI adopted the position that public housing built in the modernist tradition
negatively affected residents‘ quality of life (Goetz 2003) and therefore requires significant
design changes. Physical redevelopment constitutes the major component of the HOPE VI
program. HOPE VI appears to be a sort of laboratory to test the newest ideas about the physical
design of public housing. Public housing designs that were once viewed as attractive HOPE VI
rejected as inappropriate for public housing now. The main target has been developments with
apartments in high-rise buildings (elevator building of six or more stories), which social scientists
and architects believe to be inappropriate for low-income families, and particularly for families
with children (Newman 1973, Newman 1996) and housing in buildings with barracks-like
designs that are today seen as too institutional in appearance. The HOPE VI program also rejects
superblocks because analysts said that type of design isolated housing developments and the
residents from their communities. Similarly, shared entrances and large open spaces common to
large traditional developments are security risks today although they were viewed as
advancements when they were built (Franck 1994). In HOPE VI, these previously widely used
features are rejected for New Urbanism and Defensible Space designs. New Urbanism and
Defensible Space promote different design principles from the design of modernist public
housing developments, such as low-rise buildings, single-family units, and lower density
(Zimmerman 2003). New Urbanism promotes a return to traditional neighborhood types the street

69
grid, private outdoor space, diverse housing types, and integrating public housing into the
neighborhood fabric.
The HOPE VI program emphasizes the use of Defensible Space principles to accomplish
―good design‖ and as a way to enhance safety by putting residents in control of the spaces outside
their dwelling. The program also emphasizes designing the housing site in way that makes
residents less vulnerable to crime. The strategy puts residents in control of the spaces outside their
dwellings by emphasizing physical and symbolic features that distinguish public and private
spaces, minimizes the amount of public space, stresses buildings oriented towards streets and
individual entrances to units (Newman 1973, Newman 1996). Defensible Space and New
Urbanism share some common principles. Both promote smaller scale family developments in
place of large, impersonal developments. HOPE VI developments possess most of these features.
The choice of a single design philosophy allows for little design flexibility locally since PHAs are
required to use New Urbanism designs. Another design philosophy might be just as appropriate
or more appropriate even. In the 1950s and 1960s, modernist architecture dominated public
housing design but modernist architecture is no longer considered credible for public housing.

3.6

Self-Sufficiency

Before the 1980s, public housing residents received little direct assistance from HUD to
overcome poverty and dependency. Despite criticism that public housing policies focused too
narrowly on brick and mortar solutions, public housing polices primarily addressed housing
needs. However, times have changed and so have public housing values and the public housing
landscape (Franck 1994). Researchers now believe that providing a basic dwelling unit is not
enough to adequately address the socioeconomic needs of poor families and get them out of
poverty. The most vulnerable families often need additional support to help them achieve
economic independence and self-sufficiency (NCSDPH 1992, Rohe 1999, Shlay 1993).
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The self-sufficiency component or the ―people side‖ of HOPE VI attempts to address this
concern. HUD requires HOPE VI grantees to provide support services to tenants to help them
escape poverty and welfare dependency and to achieve economic self-sufficiency (Sard 2002,
Shlay 1993). Previous programs include Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) and Project SelfSufficiency. In 1997, HUD had 23 different programs targeting self-sufficiency and economic
opportunity for those receiving housing assistance (U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) 1997). These programs aimed to transform public housing from being permanent housing
for the poor to ―way stations‖ for families needing temporary housing assistance (Rohe 1999).
Family Self-sufficiency programs help families with Housing Choice Vouchers to gain
employment, become financially independent, and move away from government cash assistance.
In FSS programs, housing authorities work with welfare agencies, businesses and other local
agencies to develop programs that enable voucher holders to get jobs that pay living wages and
lead to economic independence. (A living wage is the minimum earnings that a full time worker
needs to meet his/her and family basic housing, clothing, food, healthcare, childcare, and
transportation needs.) The program offers education, job training, employment counseling,
substance abuse treatment and counseling, household skill training, childcare, transportation, and
homeownership counseling (HUD website).7 The FSS is the program that is most similar to the
HOPE VI self-sufficiency program.
Community and Supportive Services provide self-sufficiency assistance to all residents
whether or not they intend to return after redevelopment (HACC 2009). This is required under the
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998. The Act requires HAs to implement
measures to reduce or avoid concentrated poverty in public housing and to provide services that
help residents achieve economic self-sufficiency. Typically, HOPE VI self-sufficiency programs
include job training, counseling, childcare and health-care services, transport, and education
assistance. Since families in distressed public housing have some of the most pressing
7

Details available at www.hud.go www v/offices/pih/programs/hcv/fss.cfm
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socioeconomic needs, self-sufficiency programs that meet their needs are crucial to achieving
HOPE VI‘s goals.
The effectiveness of past self-sufficiency programs in alleviating poverty among public
housing families is not clear because research is sparse in this area (Rohe 1999). The Family SelfSufficiency program has received good reviews about its potential benefits to participants (Sard
2002) but information about actual outcomes is scarce. Most program reviews address program
potential rather than actual outcomes, which make it difficult to draw reliable conclusions.
Although evaluation research about self-sufficiency programs in HOPE VI is thin, there are
indications that well planned and carefully implemented self-sufficiency programs can have
positive impacts on poverty in public housing (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). However, several
HOPE VI studies show that self-sufficiency is the least successful aspect of the program because
few residents show improvements in their economic situation (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009).
Part of the problem is that standard programs may not be appropriate for all families. For
example, families with serious mental or physical health problems do not benefit from standard
self-sufficiency programs (Popkin, Harris, et al. 2002).
3.6.1

What Does Self-Sufficiency Mean?

Part of what makes it challenging for PHAs to implement well-planned self-sufficiency programs
is the lack of clarity about the definition of self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency is an important
aspect of HOPE VI and therefore PHAs need to have a clear understanding of what it means and
how to evaluate resident‘s progress. Although HUD has not defined self-sufficiency, in the
studies reviewed, researchers tend to equate self-sufficiency with economic self-sufficiency
generally and independence from welfare in particular (Silva and Harris. 2004). In that sense,
self-sufficiency does not necessarily mean freedom from all government assistance, only
independence from welfare. Normally, other public assistance programs such as free school
lunch, Medicaid, Earned Income Tax Credit, and housing subsidies are not included in
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discussions about self-sufficiency requirements. Resin, Ronda and Muzzio (2001) noted that
economic self-sufficiency means independence from welfare generally but not from Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families or public housing.
HUD defines an economic self-sufficiency program as a program to encourage, assist,
train, or facilitate economic independence or provide work for assisted families (HACC 2009) but
provides no clear guidance for HAs to determine objectively when a tenant achieves selfsufficiency. Neither has it provided any measurable standard for HAs to use to assess selfsufficiency outcomes. Having no clear standard or guidance from HUD, HAs use their own
interpretations. As a result, it is difficult to compare results across housing authorities. With no
clear outcome goals, HAs focus too much on inputs and process rather than on outcomes. In
Camden for example, the HACC views self-sufficiency as a continuous process of economic and
social self-improvement in residents. There is no defined stage at which self-sufficiency is
achieved nor is there any specific measurable indicator of progress (Pagan 2008).
Since 1996, self-sufficiency has received much more attention than during the previous
three years. Passage of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996 and the Public Housing Reform Act of
1998 pushed self-sufficiency to the forefront of public housing policies and forced HAs to
implement measures to address residents‘ non-housing needs. The 1996 Welfare Reform Act
requires HAs to adopt measures to improve self-sufficiency and decrease dependency of public
housing residents on public assistance programs. The 1998 Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act (QHWRA), which authorized the HOPE VI program for the first time in 1999,
mandated community service for non-working, non-elderly, non-disabled adult residents in public
housing. HAs may spend up to $5,000 per housing unit on self-sufficiency services (Finkel,
Lennon & Eisenstadt 2000, in Collins, et al, 2005).
At first, HUD required HOPE VI grantees to formulate community service goals to
strengthen the entire public housing community (Holin, et al. 2003) but after Welfare Reform in
1996 and Public Housing Reform in 2008, the focus shifted from community building to
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individual responsibility. Part of that responsibility included the requirement that non-working
tenants perform community service in order to continue receiving housing assistance but HAs
were not equipped to provide self-sufficiency services.

CHAPTER 4
METHOD

The purpose of this research was to examine impacts of physical redevelopment, poverty
deconcentration, and resident self-sufficiency services on living conditions and the lives of public
housing households at HOPE VI developments in Camden, New Jersey. The research focused on
HOPE VI residents at the site of the original public housing development. The study uses
quantitative and qualitative data from several sources, including face-to-face interviews with:
returning and new public housing tenants at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s Run, HOPE VI
officials, and the property manager and social worker at McGuire Gardens. Non-public housing
residents and residents from offsite HOPE VI properties were not interviewed. Other key data
sources were HOPE VI administrative reports, HOPE VI studies, HUD publications, census data,
public Housing Resident Characteristic Reports, press releases from HUD and the HACC, and
newspaper reports.

4.1

Research Questions

The study addressed eight research questions about physical redevelopment, poverty
deconcentration, and resident self-sufficiency services (Table 4.1).
Physical Design:


What building and site designs were used to develop the three HOPE VI sites?



How do these designs compare to housing designs in the neighborhood?



How do the physical characteristics of each HOPE VI development compare to the
original development?



How do HOPE VI residents view the physical design changes?

Poverty Deconcentration:


How has redevelopment affected concentrated poverty at HOPE VI sites?

75


How has redevelopment affected population characteristics at redeveloped sites?



What impact has redevelopment had on public housing residents‘ main income sources?

Resident Self-Sufficiency:


What types of self-sufficiency and supportive services were available to residents?



What are the impacts of the self-sufficiency services on employment, earnings, and
education among public housing residents?

Table 4.1 Research Questions and Data Sources, and Data Collection Methods
Focus

Research Questions

Sources and Instrument

Self-Sufficiency

Poverty Deconcentration

Physical Improvements

What building and site designs were used to develop the HOPE VI design documents
three HOPE VI sites?
Site observation
How do these designs compare to housing designs in the Site observation
neighborhood?
HOPE VI redevelopment plans
Other HOPE VI projects
How do the physical characteristics of each HOPE VI
development compare to the original development?

Site observation, redevelopment plans,
HOPE VI Coordinator interview

How do HOPE VI residents view the physical design
changes?

Householder surveys

How has redevelopment affected concentrated poverty at HOPE VI quarterly and annual reports,
HOPE VI sites?
other HA reports
Interviews with HOPE VI Coordinator
and HOPE VI CSS Coordinator
How has redevelopment affected population
characteristics at redeveloped sites?

Resident Characteristics Reports
Household Survey
HACC Administrative reports

What impact has redevelopment had on public housing
residents‘ main income sources?
What types of self-sufficiency and supportive services
were available to residents?

HOPE VI Household Survey

What are the impacts of the self-sufficiency services on
employment, income, and education among public
housing residents?

HACC reports
HOPE VI householders survey

Housing authority HOPE VI reports,
HOPE VI household survey
HOPE VI redevelopment plans
HOPE VI CSS plans
HOPE VI Coordinator interview
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4.2

Site Selection

The projects studied were selected after reviewing documents about HOPE VI and public housing
programs and researching HOPE VI projects in New Jersey. I used the information gathered to
develop four site selection criteria. Using these criteria the shortlisted cities were Camden,
Newark, Jersey City, and Patterson: The site selection criteria were:


city with at least two HOPE VI projects,



at least one project must be completed and operating for six months or more,



relocation of residents, where applicable, must be completed, and



at least two different redevelopment strategies must be evident (e.g., new construction
v rehabilitation).
In reviewing the HOPE VI projects in New Jersey, I searched various websites for

information about HOPE VI projects, including websites for HUD, the Council for Large Public
Housing Authorities (CLPHA), the Housing Research Foundation, which documents information
about HOPE VI projects, and the website of the HAs in New Jersey with HOPE VI projects. The
HAs on the shortlist were then contacted for status updates on their HOPE VI projects and to
inquire about the HAs interest in supporting this study. Based on the responses the shortlist was
reduced to three cities that met all the criteria: Camden, Jersey City, and Patterson. Newark
otherwise met the site selection criteria but the HA showed no interest in the study. In 2005, each
shortlisted city had two or more HOPE VI projects completed or in progress. Camden was
selected because its three HOPE VI developments fulfilled the criteria and provided opportunities
to compare outcomes between the sites. The HA officials also consented to the research and to
provide relevant information, which officials at the other shortlisted HAs had not done.
Camden had one completed project, one partially completed project and one project yet
to complete relocation in 2006. Some consideration was also given to the city‘s extreme and
widespread poverty (Census 2000 data showed that poverty exceeded 20 percent in all but one of
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the city‘s 21 census tract neighborhoods) and widespread physical blight. With poverty being so
widespread, rather than trying to find a low-poverty neighborhood, relocated residents may have
to search for housing in low-poverty communities.

4.3

Study Sites

The study sites are McGuire Gardens, Westfield Acres/Baldwin‘s Run, and Roosevelt Manor.
Site descriptions include resident characteristics, physical characteristics before redevelopment
HOPE VI, and physical and social characteristics of surrounding areas. The three HOPE VI sites
are in three different census tract neighborhoods. McGuire Gardens is in Marlton neighborhood
(Census Tract 6013); Baldwin‘s Run is in Rosedale neighborhood (Census Tract 6011.02); and
Roosevelt Manor is in Centerville neighborhood (Census Tract 6017). Figure 4.1 shows a map of
Camden‗s 21 neighborhood. McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s Run are in the eastern part of the
city and Roosevelt Manor is in the south. While all three neighborhoods have high poverty levels,
the poverty rate is highest in Centerville and lowest in Rosedale (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).
Field observations on foot and by car confirm previous reports that housing in Camden is
generally in poor condition, especially in Centerville where the three public housing
developments dominate the housing market. The neighborhood observations reveal significant
variability in housing condition and very poor to excellent (newer units) within and between
neighborhoods, especially in Marlton and Rosedale. Overall, Rosedale appears to have the best
quality housing. Table 4.2 shows the main physical characteristics of the original developments.
Table 4.2 shows that the three developments originally had 1,050 public housing units
(368 at McGuire Gardens, 514 at Westfield Acres, and 268 at Roosevelt Manor). Redevelopment
has reduced the total number of units to 680 units, including 403 public housing units and 277
non-public housing units. McGuire Gardens now has 253 units (all are public housing) while
Baldwin‘s Run has 78 public housing units and 197 total units, and Roosevelt Manor now has
105 public housing and 230 total units.
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Table 4.2 Summary of Pre-HOPE VI Site Characteristics
Site (Acres)
Land Area
Year Built
Units
Type
Unit density
Building Type

McGuire Gardensa
21 acres
1954
368
Family
18 units/acre
51 two-story bldgs

Westfield Acresb
25 acres
1938
514
Family
21 units/acre
18 four-story bldgs

Roosevelt Manorc
14 acres
1955
268
Family
13 units/acre
38 two-story row bldgs

Sources: aInterim Assessment of the HOPE VI Program Cross-site Report, 2003
b
Westfield Acres 2000 Revitalization Plan
c
Roosevelt Manor 2003 Revitalization Plan

Figure 4.1 Camden neighborhoods map showing location of HOPE VI sites. Each Neighborhood
represents a census tract. Rosedale is same as Tract 6011.02, Marlton is same as Tract 6013, and
Centerville is same Tract 6017.
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Figure 4.2 East Camden neighborhoods showing McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s Run
Source: Camden Redevelopment Agency, 2008

4.3.1

McGuire Gardens

This development occupies a 21-acre former garbage dump site (Holin, et al. 2003)in East
Camden between Marlton Road, Federal Street, Route 30 (Admiral Wilson Boulevard), and Baird
Boulevard (Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4). The site is near the center of Marlton neighborhood and
only two city blocks from Dudley neighborhood (Figure 4.2). It is part of Block Group 4, Census
Tract 6013 (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Watson Street to the west, Bank Street on the east, South
20th and Randolph Streets on the south, and Morse Street to the north form the site boundary
(Figure 4.4). The immediate environs include Watson Towers, which houses elderly residents and
the HACC‘s administrative offices west of Watson Street, a small community of mostly two-story
single-family row houses north of the Morse Street border, and a large open lot and a bowling
alley along the Watson Street border. Between Morse Street and Marlton Road are six dilapidated
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two-story houses and a new elementary school. There is a small residential community east of the
site between Bank Street and Baird Boulevard. The houses in this community are mostly one- and
two-story, single-family row houses and a few two-story apartment buildings.

Figure 4.3 Marlton Neighborhood (Census tract 6013) and surrounding areas in East Camden
McGuire Gardens is at the center of the census tract.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey.

Figure 4.4 McGuire Gardens street map showing boundaries and local streets.
Source: Google Maps, 20098
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4.3.1.1 Physical Characteristics. Originally, McGuire Gardens had 368 units in 51 row
buildings containing 25 one-bedroom units, 158 two-bedroom units, 172 three-bedroom units,
and 12 four-bedroom units. One-bedroom units averaged 550 square feet, two-bedroom units
averaged 700 square feet, three-bedroom units averaged 895 square feet, and four bedroom units
averaged 1,040 square feet. The buildings had wooden frames on a concrete bases, concrete
flooring and walls, brick facades, and flat roofs. The 368 units made McGuire Gardens the second
largest public housing development in Camden. The site‘s defining characteristic was the absence
of front and backyards. Before HOPE VI, in previous renovations, the flat roofs on half of the
buildings were replaced with pitched roofs and new heating and hot water systems were installed
in the buildings with the new roofs (Abt Associates Inc 1996). The physical issues that affected
the development included flooding and ground instability. The site‘s location in the Cooper River
flood plain most likely contributed to these problems. Socioeconomic problems, illicit drug
activities, and violence had damaging effects on the development in the 1980s. In a survey of
residents before redevelopment began, residents reported that the illicit drug trade and violence
were major problems in the development and in nearby communities. They also the site lacked
adequate police protection, which made them fearful. These problems and poor management led
to vacancy skyrocketing to 34 percent in 1992 (Holin, et al. 2003).
4.3.1.2 Resident Characteristics. To compile a picture of the social and economic
characteristics of residents at this site, the researcher examined several HUD documents. The
available information about pre-HOPE VI residents was sketchy and as a result, this analysis
relied on information from HUD‘s 1996 ―Picture of Subsidized Households‖ report, the Historic
and Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI, and the HOPE VI Cross-Site Report to create a profile of
the residents. At the HOPE VI award date, about 346 households lived at the site and 93 percent
of the heads of household were single females with dependent children under age 18 (HUD
1996). A large percentage of the householders were unskilled, had unstable employment, were

82
poorly educated, very poor, and dependent on public assistance such as welfare to meet daily
needs (HUD 1996, Holin, et al. 2003, Abt Associates, et al. 1996). Up to 75 percent of the
households relied on some form of government assistance, which was the main income for at
least 50 percent of all households. Fifty percent depended on welfare alone for most income but
only 18 percent reported employment as the primary source of income in 1993-1994. Median
income for 1996 was only $6,093 (HUD 1996). HUD‘s 1996 Picture of Subsidized Housing
reported that the site had 287 households and that the average household income of $7,300.
About 81 percent of the households had less than $10,000 per year in income. At that time, 15
percent of tenants had work-related income but 56 percent were welfare recipients. By the time
rehabilitation began in 1999, only 131 households remained and 79 percent of them were in
extreme poverty. Table 4.3 shows key resident characteristics for 1996 including income and
race. Non-Caucasians were 97 percent of the population and the majority was African-American.
The average household size was 3.5 and most householders were 25 to 44 years old. A sizeable
percentage of tenants was also disabled. This included 60 percent of residents aged 62 and over
and 13 percent of residents under age 62.
Initially, community services took precedence over self-sufficiency as HUD required
HOPE VI recipients to formulate community service goals to help strengthen entire public
housing communities (Holin, et al. 2003). However, Welfare Reform, which became law in 1996
and the Public Housing Reform, which followed in 1998 placed adult householders under the
spotlight by requiring them to work or perform community service as a condition to continue
receiving government assistance, including housing. This effectively shifted the focus from whole
developments to family economic self-sufficiency. A previous HOPE VI study early in the
implementation of the HOPE VI plan reported that some residents were self-starters and
extremely capable but others had few skills and lacked motivation but virtually all residents
lacked the experience of doing things for themselves (Abt Associates Inc 1996).
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Table 4.3 McGuire Gardens Population Characteristics, 1995/1996
Household Income Characteristics
Household Size
Average Annual Household Income
Median Household Income (1993-1994)
Income Distribution:
$0 - $5,000 (ELI)
$5,000 - $10,000 (ELI)
$10,000 - $20,000 (ELI - VLI)
>$20,000 (VLI and above)
Source of Income:
Earned Income
Public Assistance (TANF)
Other Sources
Disability
Disabled < age 62
Disabled >= age 62

Household (n=287)
3.4
$7,300
$6,093
22%
59%
2%
17%
15%
56%
59%
13%
60%

Source: A Picture of Subsidized Housing, 1996

Before HOPE VI, no program or service was in place to ameliorate poverty or to help
residents become self-sufficient. The HACC operated primarily as manager of public housing
properties. As a HOPE VI awardee, the HACC had to perform social service roles to reduce
poverty and to help residents improve their economic and housing self-sufficiency.
4.3.1.3 Neighborhood Characteristics. The communities surrounding McGuire Gardens had
similarly appalling socioeconomic conditions. According to Census 2000 data, in 1999, Block
Group 4 had a population of 865 and the unemployment rate was 22 percent. The block group
boundaries indicate that the majority of the 865 residents lived at McGuire Gardens. At that time,
the block group median household income was $9,135 compared to $20,708 for the entire census
tract, while the poverty rate was 79 percent and 41 percent for the census tract (Census Bureau
website 2007). The Census Bureau estimated that the poverty rate Block for Group 4 was 37
percent in 1995/96 (Census Bureau website). The neighborhood population was 96 percent
minority, 45 percent non-Hispanic African-American, and 45 percent Hispanic/Latino. The
neighborhood population in 2000 was 5,049, which was 24 percent less than in 1990. In that time,
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Camden‘s population declined by nine per cent. Census 2000 reports also indicate that the
population was 53 percent African-American, 16 percent Caucasian, and 30 percent Hispanic.
The neighborhood median household income was approximately $20,708 compared to $23,421
for the entire city. About 51 percent of the adult population aged 25 and over had a high school
diploma, the same as Camden.
The neighborhood was about 75 percent residential and most units were single-family
houses but a sizeable proportion lived in small multi-family buildings (US Census Bureau 2000).
Approximately 55 percent of the housing was in the form of two- and three-story row houses and
30 percent in small developments of 5-10 units. In 1990, the neighborhood had a ratio of 56
percent rental housing to 44 percent owner-occupied housing with 80 percent of the housing stock
being at least 60 years old (Census 2000). The census block data for 1999 showed a population of
131 households. Approximately 69 percent of them had less than $15,000 in annual household
income, 18 percent had between $15,000 and $24,000, and 11 percent had more than $25,000 in
household annual income (U.S. Census 2000). The block group data indicates the conditions
immediately surrounding the housing site.
Neighborhood observations in summer 2007 and 2008 confirm a 2003 report that the
communities surrounding the HOPE VI site were in poor physical condition (Holin, et al. 2003).
The worst areas were the Carman Street area west of McGuire Gardens and the entire area north
of Morse Street. The one-and two-story houses in these communities were severely deteriorated,
the streets were in poor condition, and litter was everywhere. Residents reported that the north
area has a long reputation for being ―rough‖. East of McGuire Gardens, the area has a middleincome appearance with a mix of small and large apartment complexes and single-family row
houses. The large vacant plot of land south of the project site was covered with tall grass and
shrubbery. Immediately south of that is the limited access Route 30 highway with an on/off ramp
in and out of the development.
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A new elementary school adjoining McGuire Gardens that opened in 2009 is the only
other civic institution found in Marlton. To obtain most services, residents must go to downtown
Camden, Philadelphia, or suburban Cherry Hill. These areas also provide most employment
opportunities. Although Marlton neighborhood lacked most neighborhood facilities, some
facilities are available in adjoining neighborhoods. Nearby facilities include a post office a short
walking distance away in Stockton; Dudley Grange Park, a new Community school and a Boys
and Girls club near to Baldwin‘s Run in Rosedale and Stockton. Regarding public safety in 2002,
communities surrounding McGuire Gardens had high levels of crime, prostitution, and limited
police presence because the city lacked the resources to provide effective police patrols in all
neighborhoods (Holin, et al. 2003).
These statistics for McGuire Gardens and the immediate surrounding environment
revealed urgent social needs, including decent housing. However, decent and affordable housing
alone cannot change the economic and social conditions. To break the cycle of poverty and
hopelessness that beset the area, the residents need new opportunities to achieve housing selfsufficiency and economic independence such as education, childcare support to allow nursing
mothers to work, better access to quality affordable healthcare, in addition to better housing.

Figure 4.5 Westminster Avenue streetscape at entrance to McGuire Gardens
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4.3.2

Baldwin‟s Run:

4.3.2.1 Physical Characteristics. Baldwin‘ Run is a 197 unit HOPE VI housing development
built between 2000 and 2008 to replace Westfield Acres, the previous development from 1938
that was demolished in 2001. According to several 1938 articles in the Camden Courier-Post,
Westfield Acres was Camden‘s first public housing development and the largest (The Writers
Program of the Works Projects Administration in New Jersey 1942). The site is 25 acres on a
moderately sloping property in the Rosedale neighborhood, Census Tract 6011.02, in the East
Camden area. The property is located between Dudley Street (west), Pleasant Avenue (north),
Westfield Avenue (south), and 32nd Street. Beideman Street bisects the site from Westfield
Avenue to Pleasant Avenue. This street was only the point of vehicular entry and exit until
demolition.

Figure 4.6 Rosedale Neighborhood showing location of Baldwin‘s Run.
Source: CamConnect at http://www.camconnect.org/fact/rosedale01.html
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Figure 4.7 East Camden Census Tracts. Tract 6011.02 (Rosedale Neighborhood) is in the center.
Source: Census Bureau website, 2008

Westfield Acres, the original development, consisted of 18 four-story walkup buildings
and 514 apartments in one- to three bedroom configurations at a density of almost 21 units per
acre. Housing occupied just 25 percent of the 25-acre site; the rest was mostly open space and a
few communal areas for recreation and parking (HACC 2000, Writers Program of the Works
Projects Administration in New Jersey 1942). Communal facilities included laundries in 10 of the
buildings, a library, and space for indoor community and recreational activities and outdoor
concerts. The apartments had kitchens with linoleum-covered floors, electric cooking stoves, and
refrigerators. Bathrooms had tiled floors. Frequent flooding was a problem and it forced the
housing authority to close 20 units. Based on an independent engineering assessment in 2000, the
HACC declared that the site had deteriorated infrastructure, inappropriate site layout, institutional
design, and large areas of indefensible open spaces made the development obsolete and costly to
operate (HACC 2000). After receiving a $3,138,500 demolition grant from HUD in 1998, the
housing authority moved the residents out and demolished all units between 1998 and 2001.
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4.3.2.2 Resident Characteristics. Just before the first demolition in 1998, Westfield Acres had
433 households and 1,116 residents. The 433 households became 580 when the housing authority
split them into different family units because many of them were previously under-housed
(HACC 2000). However, the Community and Supportive Service Evaluation report by Rutgers
University noted that only 239 of the original households were still on the tenants list when
construction of Baldwin‘s Run began in 2003. The HA had evicted some tenants, some moved
away voluntarily, some were incarcerated, and some died (Wise 2005). Table 4.4 shows the
distribution of residents by age. About 43 percent were working age adults, 50 percent were
youths under age 18, and 7 percent were seniors age 62 years and above. About 78 percent of the
youth population (437 youths) was 12 years or younger. Approximately 57 percent of the preHOPE VI population was dependent youths and seniors; two groups with special needs that selfsufficiency programs should target.

Table 4.4 Householder Age Distribution in 1998
Household Characteristics
0 - 5 years
6 - 17 years
18 - 61 years
62 and over

Households
Number Percent
172
15
389
35
476
43
79
7

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey

To understand poverty conditions in this development before redevelopment began,
Census 2000 reports and the Westfield Acres 2003 Redevelopment Plan were reviewed and the
data obtained used to construct Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. The information is incomplete but most
residents had very low incomes and were dependent on government assistance (Table 4.5).
Overall, about 75 percent of the original Westfield Acres households (438 households) received
public assistance while 35 percent or 205 households had earned income. Received by 45 percent
of households, Social Security Income was the largest contributor to public assistance and 30
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percent of the households relied on welfare for most income (HACC 2000). According to the
HOPE VI revitalization plan, average annual household income was $11,062 from wages, $3,935
from welfare, $5,009 from Social Security Income, $6,715 from Supplemental Social Security
and Pension, and $4,317 from all other sources (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5 Sources of Household Income at Westfield Acres
Income Source
Wages/Salaries
Social Security Income
Supplemental Security/Pension
Welfare
Other
All Public Assistance

Average
Income
$11,062
$5,009
$6,715
$3,935
$4,317
-

Number of
Households
205
263
119
175
48
435

Percent of
Households
35
45
25
30
8
75

Source: *Westfield Acres HOPE VI 2001 Redevelopment Plan

Table 4.6 shows the distribution of annual household income before demolition began.
About 14 percent of the 580 families had no income; 90 percent had annual incomes of $15,000
or less; and 10 percent had annual incomes between $15,000 and $30,000. No household reported
income above $30,000 (HACC 2000). The poverty rate for the site could not be determined from
the available data. However, from the 2000 census, the poverty rate of 31 percent for the Census
Block Group 1 shows a poverty rate for the site that exceeded 31 percent. With no other
information available, in this study, Block Group 1 poverty rate of 31 percent represents the
minimum poverty in Westfield Acres where the population was about 80 percent of the block
group population in 2000.
Results of the resident needs surveys the HACC did before relocation showed that 50
percent of the residents cited employment as their greatest need, but the other 50 percent cited
―quality of life‖ needs as barriers to improving self-sufficiency. For example, 45 percent cited
their need for childcare, afterschool and evening programs; 58 percent said substance abuse
counseling and treatment; and 47 percent cited a need for round the clock transportation service.

90
In addition, 56 percent cited recreational programs for youths, 67 percent cited access to quality
medical care, including pre- and post-natal health care, 53 percent said family violence
prevention and counseling, 39 percent said parenting skills, 56 percent cited senior services, 40
percent cited health care for youths, and 37 percent cited money management training (HACC
2000). With such a large percentage of the population citing quality of life needs, self-sufficiency
programs that focus too much on increasing employment and income at the expense of these
other needs are likely to bypass (and fail) sizeable portions of the population. For example,
people with substance abuse and serious health problems may be better off getting help with their
condition more than being placed in jobs but unable to keep those jobs due to their problems.
Relocation was completed after the HACC received the $35 million HOPE VI revitalization grant
in 2001 to build a mix of new rental and homeownership (public and private housing) on the site.

Table 4.6 Income Distribution before Demolition
Income ($)
0
1 - 5,000
5,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 15,000
15,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 25,000
25,000 - 30,000
More than 30,000

Householders
14
156
265
85
41
15
4
0

Percent
2
27
46
15
7
3
1
0

Source: Westfield Acres 2003 Revitalization Plan

During the relocation process, previously under-housed households were split into different
family units. This process increased the number of relocated families from 433 to 580, which is
more than the number of dwellings in the development. Westfield Acres had 514 apartments and
so HUD awarded 514 Section 8 Vouchers for relocation, but after the family splits, the HACC
applied for additional vouchers (HACC 2000) but that outcome is not known.
Resident characteristics data in the redevelopment plan were sketchy and the HA refused
to fulfill requests for additional information about relocated residents. The population profile
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described here came from incomplete information in the Westfield Acres HOPE VI
Redevelopment Plan and HUD databases. The information is a snapshot of the population prior to
relocation and demolition and is used to compare self-sufficiency outcomes before and after
redevelopment. When demolition began in 1998, there were 379 households in the development
and 46 percent of them relied on welfare and other public assistance programs for most income.
In the residents‘ needs survey that the HACC did before relocation, 50 percent of the
residents cited employment as their greatest need. However, unlike the HACC‘s focus on
employment residents‘ other priority needs did not involve moneymaking activities. Instead,
residents cite ―quality of life‖ issues. This is somewhat different from the HACC single-minded
approach to increase the level of employment. Youths comprised 50 percent of the population,
which help to explain the big focus residents gave to youth activities. More than 50 percent of the
residents mentioned need for youth-focused activities.
4.3.2.3 Baldwin‟s Run: Neighborhood Characteristics. Baldwin‘s Run is in the Rosedale
neighborhood, which borders the Dudley neighborhood. The site‘s immediate surroundings
therefore include communities in both neighborhoods. Rosedale is a very diverse neighborhood.
The Census Bureau reported that in 2000, the population was approximately 4,954, which was 16
percent less than in 1990. In Dudley, the population was 3,730, which was 12 percent less than in
1990. Census 2000 data show a population distribution of 35 percent African-American, 23
percent Caucasian, 16 percent Asian, and 25 percent from ―mixed‖ backgrounds. Dudley‘s
population was just as diverse. Nearly 33 percent are African-American, 22 percent were
Caucasian, 11 percent were Asian, and 25 percent from ―other‖ backgrounds. Hispanics were 46
percent in Rosedale and 57 percent in Dudley. In both neighborhoods, about two-thirds of the
population was between ages 18 and 44. In both neighborhoods, the African-American share of
the population was significantly less than that of the city but the Hispanic population percentage
in each neighborhood was a lot higher than that of Camden. The median household income was
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$25,400 in Rosedale, which is higher than that for Camden but lower than the $31,065 in Dudley.
Regarding education, 45 percent of Rosedale‘s residents and 43 percent of residents in Dudley
over age 25 had a high school diploma. Although the median income in both neighborhoods was
higher than Camden‘s, smaller proportions of their populations had completed high school.
4.3.3

Roosevelt Manor

Named in honor of President Franklyn Roosevelt, for 50 years from 1954 until 2007 when the
HACC demolished it, this was one of three family developments in Centerville, the oldest
predominantly African-American community in Camden. It occupied a 14-acre site on Ferry
Avenue between South Seventh and South Ninth Streets adjacent to Branch Village and Chelton
Terrace. Construction was funded with money that the federal government allocated to Camden
in the 1949 United States Housing Act in the early 1950s. No other neighborhood had more than
one public housing family development. This was also the last public housing family
development built in Camden. The first residents were World War II veterans.
Before redevelopment began, this site and the entire Centerville neighborhood had many
extremely poor families. This site and the adjoining Branch Village public housing development
comprise Block Group 3 of Census Tract 6017, which had very low levels of employment and
household income. Census data from Block Group 3 supplements the missing information from
the HACC about resident characteristics.
4.3.3.1 Physical Characteristics: The original development had 268 apartments, including 168
three-bedroom units, 68 two-bedroom units, and 32 four-bedroom units, in 38 barracks-like,
brick-faced, two-story buildings on two superblocks (HACC 2009). Each building contained four
to eight apartments. The buildings on the site were arranged in four sectors and the buildings in
each sector aligned differently. One sector had buildings aligned diagonally to the street while
facing other buildings and in another sector; the buildings were diagonal to the street. A few
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building were paralleled to the street. All units faced inwards. The buildings were of the Bauhaus
design and constructed to meet very strict federal cost guidelines (HACC 2003a).
By the 1980s, the buildings had begun to show signs of physical deterioration and the
mechanical and electrical systems began to breakdown frequently. For example, in the 1980s, the
central heating system that was built to support all the buildings on the property through
underground pipes started to decay and was subsequently replaced. Some problems were the
result of residents‘ actions, many were the result of aging, poor design and maintenance. Eighty
units (30 percent) were removed from service in 2003 because they needed extensive
modernization to bring them up to HUD‘s Housing Quality Standards. Consequently, only 70
percent of the units (188 units) were available when HUD awarded the HOPE VI grant in 2004.
To make matters worse, in the 1990s, the illicit drug activities in South Camden became prevalent
in Roosevelt Manor (HACC 2003a).
While pursuing HOPE VI funding in the late 1990s, the HA also used modernization
funding from HUD to upgrade the existing facilities. Modernization included installation of new
pitched roofs on all the buildings, new facades, individual boiler rooms for each building, and
new kitchens and baths in several apartments. In 2004, HUD awarded the housing authority a
$20,000,000 HOPE VI revitalization grant for demolition and construction of new housing on the
site. To facilitate redevelopment, some residents received vouchers to relocate to housing in the
private market and some were relocated to nearby Branch Village, Chelton Terrace, and other
public housing developments in the city. Some residents left voluntarily and some were evicted.
4.3.3.2 Resident Characteristics. As Tables 4.8 and 4.9 indicate, residents had very low
incomes, even when employed. Poverty was pervasive and many residents depended on some
form of government assistance. HACC data show that the average median household income was
less than $15,000 for about 91 percent of the families (209 families) and more than $16,000 for
the remaining 10 percent in 2004. Thirty-eight percent reported earned income and 58 percent
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reported government assistance as primary income. About 26 percent received TANF and
General Assistance benefits and 32 percent received Social Security or Supplemental Security
Income. All but one family had total incomes below 50 percent of AMI but 97 percent had
―extremely low incomes‖ or annual income of less than 30 percent of AMI (HACC 2003a, HACC
2005). The annual income for one householder exceeded 60 percent of AMI.
Because of their low employment and income status, Roosevelt Manor residents were
highly dependent on government economic assistance (HACC 2005). Before demolition in 2006,
the average annual household income for the 232 households was $12,400 or just 16 percent of
AMI (HACC 2005). Of the 232 households, 224 or 96 percent of them had total annual income of
less than $20,640, or less than 30 percent of the AMI of $68,800 in 2004. That means HUD
categorized 96 percent of the families as ―extremely low income‖ households. Just three percent
of households had average incomes above 30 percent of median income and only 38 had income
from employment 24 percent depended on TANF and General Assistance payments as their main
income, and 30 percent relied on SSI or SSI for most income. Before HOPE VI household
income was so low, residents had little choice but to be dependent of government handouts.

Table 4.7 Income Distribution at Roosevelt Manor before Demolition
Percent of AMI
Less than 30 percent
30 – 60 percent
61 – 80 percent

Income Range ($)
Less than $21,000
$21,000 - $41,300
$41,301 - $55,040

Households
224
7
1

Percent
97.6
3.0
0.4

Source: Westfield Acres 2003 Revitalization Plan

Considering that the dependent population of children under 18 and seniors over age 65 is
58 percent of the total population, many families needed a significant amount support services to
facilitate their progress towards self-sufficiency. Support services facilitate employment because
householders get the services they need such as childcare, which allows them to work outside the
home. Often times public housing tenants are unable to leave home to work because of barriers to
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affordable health care or due to a lack of childcare assistance. With the right kind of help, more
tenants are able to work. An HACC survey showed 23 percent of household who required
childcare services and 19 percent who needed after-school assistance.

Table 4.8 Household Self-Sufficiency Characteristics before HOPE VI
Household Characteristics
Average Household Income (90% of households)
Average Household Income (10% of households)
Sources of Income:
Wages/Salaries
Welfare/TANF
SS/SSI
Average Household Income
Income Distribution
$0 - $5,000
$5,000 - $10,000
$10,000 - $15,000
$15,000 - $20,000
$20,000 - $25,000

Households
Number
Percent
<$15,000
>$16,000

90
10

88
55
69
$8,000

52
54
30
24
53
14
5
23

>$20,000
Self-Sufficiency Eligible Beneficiaries:
Children under 6
Children ages 6-18
Adults 19-64
Seniors (Ages 65+)
Source: HACC VI CSS Plan, approved April 2005

76
319
288
28

11
46
41
3

Regarding education and training, the CSS plan noted that there was a big need for
education and training programs to improve employment opportunities. A resident needs survey
that the HACC undertook in 2004 showed that 24 residents had college degrees, 77 had high
school diplomas, 17 said they wanted to obtain GEDs, and 14 desired ESL instruction. About 40
percent of the residents requested vocational and job training, 45 percent requested
entrepreneurship training, and 64 percent requested homeownership opportunities. Individually
and collectively, these factors impinged on residents‘ employment and earnings prospects. The
self-sufficiency plan has provisions to address these and other employment barriers and to equip
residents with employment skills (HACC 2005).
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4.3.3.3 Neighborhood Characteristics. Centerville, Census Tract 6017, is a predominantly an
African-American neighborhood whose boundaries are Carl Miller Boulevard to the North, Mt.
Ephraim Avenue to the East, Bulson Street to the South, and Interstate Highway 676 to the west.
The neighborhood is primarily residential but industrial enterprises, two neighborhood parks, and
a cemetery occupies a sizeable amount of the land. Industrial activities are concentrated in the
southeastern and southwestern corners and open space and commercial land uses are primarily in
the northern section. The limited commercial activities are generally interspersed within the
residential areas. The three public housing developments--Roosevelt Manor, Chelton Terrace, and
Branch Village—dominate the housing market. In 1941, Branch Village became the
neighborhood‘s first public housing development but in the next 14 years, two other
developments (Chelton Terrace in 1943 and Roosevelt Manor in 1955) were built. Before
redevelopment, these three properties accounted for nearly one-third of the public housing units
in Camden (Table 2.4 in Chapter 2). A 2002 report indicates that 37 percent of the 692 land
parcels were vacant lots, 42 percent had occupied buildings, and 10 percent had vacant buildings
(City of Camden 2002). There were 320 unused lots, 272 residential lots, 18 commercial lots and
13 mixed-used lots.
Private residences are mainly of brick construction in two-story single-family
townhouses, twin type row houses, garden apartments (e.g., Nimmo Court Apartments), and the
85-unit Woodlyne Trailer Park development in the southeast part of the neighborhood (City of
Camden 2002). Public use areas include Staley and Elijah Perry Park in the northern part of the
neighborhood while private open spaces include Evergreen Cemetery. The cemetery is the single
largest land use in Centerville. The newly built H. B. Wilson Elementary School, which replaced
the previous school, is the sole public school in the neighborhood. The few commercial
establishments include three grocery shops, a fast food outlet, a liquor store, and a tavern in close
proximity to Roosevelt Manor. Seven protestant churches-two Baptist, a Seventh Day Adventist,
two non-denominational, a Methodist, and an AME—are just a few blocks from the site.
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Census 2000 data show a neighborhood population of 2,874. About 79 percent were
African-Americans, 8 percent were Caucasians, 8 percent were mixed, and 18 percent were
Hispanics. For 1999, the median household income was $14,104 ($11,012 in Block Group 3)
while unemployment was 30 percent (42 percent in Block Group 3). An extremely large 55
percent of the neighborhood population (71 percent in Block Group 3) was in poverty. Just 39
percent of residents over age 25 had a high school diploma.

4.4

City of Camden

Camden city in Camden County is the largest city in southern New Jersey and fifth largest by
population in the state. It is 27 km² or 10.4 square miles in area of which 15 percent is water.
Philadelphia is directly across the Delaware River. In Camden borders five other New Jersey
municipalities, namely, Collingswood, Gloucester City, Haddon Township, Pennsauken and
Woodlyn. Camden became a Gloucester County city in 1828 but was transferred to the newly
created Camden County in 1844. Camden built its economic base on industrial production and so
the urban industrial decline in the United States has devastated the city. The economic decline has
led to large population declines, demographic shifts, and escalating poverty, plus the dubious title
as New Jersey‘s poorest city and one of the poorest in the country (Legal Services of New Jersey
Poverty Research Institute 2007, U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Crime and violence have become
big problems too. The city has some of the highest rates of urban crimes nationwide. Morgan
Quitno Press (2005) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2007) ranked Camden as the most
dangerous city in America in 2003 and 2004

4.4.1

Demographics

After peaking at 124,555 people in 1950, Camden‘s population declined rapidly to 87,492 in
1989 and to 79,904 in 1999 and is projected to decline slightly to around 79,000 by 2010 (U.S.
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Census Bureau 2009, U.S. Census Bureau 2000). The largest decline occurred during the urban
renewal era between 1950 and 1970 when the city lost more than 17 percent of its residents. An
influx of mostly Hispanics in the 1990s appeared to have stabilized the population to around
80,000 people. Camden‘s population decline between 1950 and 2000 contrasted sharply with the
massive population increases in the surrounding suburban areas. This scenario was not unique to
Camden as cities throughout the U.S. were similar affected after World War II ended in 1945.
Before 1960, Camden‘s population was majority Caucasian but became majority AfricanAmerican by 2000 because Caucasians moved to the surrounding suburbs and, like many other
cities in northern states, black urbanization increased rapidly in the second half of the twentieth
century (Lehman 1991). Accelerating this population were economic and social pressures such as
deindustrialization and public policies favoring white suburbanization but forced blacks to live in
ghettos (Jackson 1985, Massey and Denton 1993). Figure 4.8 shows changes in the racial and
ethnic composition in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. During this time, the Hispanic share of
the population more than doubled from less than 20 percent in 1980 to nearly 40 percent by 2000.
In that period, the non-Hispanic Caucasian population decreased from more than 20 percent to
seven percent and non-Hispanic African-Americans remain in the 50 plus percent range.
In 2000, approximately 49 percent of Camden‘s population over the age of 25 had not
completed high school. Only 29 percent had only a high school diploma or equivalent level of
education and eight percent had a college degree. Sixty percent speak English only and 35 percent
speak Spanish of which 16 percent did not speak English very well.
Physical disability is common in the population and particularly among the lowest
income households. In 2005, the rate of disability was 22 percent, compared to 15 percent for
Camden County and 12 percent for the state. Among people with poverty-level incomes, the
disability rate is more than a quarter of the population (Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty
Research Institute 2007).
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Chart 1: Population by Race and Ethnicity,
Camden, NJ
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Figure 4.8 Racial Distribution in Camden, 1980-2000
Source: US Census Bureau (2007)

4.4.2

Economy and Poverty

By U.S. standards, Camden is a very poor city. Poverty here is substantially higher that in
Camden County for all age groups (Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute
2007). In 2000, the average annual household income for Camden was $24,233 while per capita
income was $9,815. The annual income for the poorest 25 percent of the population averaged less
than $10,000 per year. For 2005, the estimated median household income was roughly $18,000.
In contrast, the median household income for Camden County exceeded $53,000 for a family of
four (Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute 2007).
Regarding employment, the job market has been depressed for a long time and so
unemployment is very high, and is substantially higher than the unemployment rates for Camden
County and the State of New Jersey. In 2000, unemployment reached 42 percent for civilians
aged 16 and over (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). About 72 percent of Camden‘s the residents
received some form of public assistance in 1999 with 24 percent receiving social security (U.S.
Census Bureau 2000).
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Like many other cities, de-industrialization has left Camden‘s economy in ruin.
Unemployment, poverty, vacant and abandoned buildings, and visible signs of physical
deterioration characterize the city. Table 4.9 shows the extent of the economic decline over the
last four decades as poverty rose. Whereas the average poverty rate was 21 percent in 1969, it
climbed to a high of nearly 49 percent by 1993 then declined to 36 percent in 2003 and has
hovered around that figure ever since (U.S. Census Bureau 2006, 2008; State of the Cities Survey
2006). In 1990, poverty exceeded 20 percent in 18 census tracts and exceeded 40 percent in 11
tracts; but in 2000, poverty exceeded 20 percent in all but one census tract (U.S. Census Bureau
2000). In comparison, surrounding suburbs experienced massive population and economic
expansion and almost no poverty. Today, health and government services employ the most people
(U.S. Census Bureau 2000) but the city has very limited ability to provide essential services such
as policing at housing developments due to financial constraints. Table 4.10 shows average
poverty rates for Camden and surrounding suburbs from 1969 to 2003. Baldwin‘s Run is in
Census Tract 6011.02 where the poverty rate exceeded 31 percent. McGuire Gardens is in Census
Tract 6013 where poverty exceeded 41 percent in 2000, and Roosevelt Manor is in Census Tract
6017 (Figure 4.1) where poverty was nearly 55 percent in 2000. Of the three neighborhoods, only
in Census Tract 6011.02 (Rosedale) was the poverty rate lower than that for Camden as a whole.
Table 4.9 Poverty Rates in Camden and Suburbs, 1969 to 2003
Year

Camden

Suburban

1969
1979
1990
1993 (Estimated)
1995 (Estimated)
1997 (Estimated)
2000 (Estimated)

20.7
36.9
36.6
49.2
44.2
46.3
35.5

5.8
6.5
4.9
6.7
6
6.0
5.5

Source: State of the Cities Database (SOCD)
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4.4.3

Housing

Census data show that 46 percent of occupied housing in Camden in 2000 was owner-occupied,
54 percent were renter-occupied and19 percent was vacant. About 75 percent of the housing units
were built more than 60 years ago; 34 percent were built more than 70 years ago; and two percent
were less than 15 years old (Figure 4.9). Public housing accounted for approximately seven
percent of total units (two percent nationwide) in 2008. At the end of 2007, the HACC operated
eight housing developments, including the three HOPE VI developments. Five were low-rise
family developments and three were high-rise developments for seniors (see Table 2.4 and Table
2.5 in Chapter 2).

Age of Housing in Camden

1960-1979
20%

1980-1994 1995-2000
Pre 1939
2%
5%
34%

1940-1959
39%

Figure 4.9 Camden‘s housing stock by year constructed
Source: U.S. Census 2000

4.5

Data Sources

The quantitative analyses in this study use Census 2000 data and information gathered through
the household survey in this study. The qualitative analyses used data from site visits, discussions
with HACC officials with knowledge of the HOPE VI projects in the city, HACC HOPE VI
Documents, HOPE VI studies, property managers, newspaper articles, and the householder
survey, HUD HOPE VI documents, and HUD‘s public housing Resident Characteristic Reports
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(RCR). RCRs are generated from the Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System (MTCS), a
HUD database containing personal information about residents and housing information
concerning all public housing units in the country. The redevelopment plans for Baldwin‘s Run
and Roosevelt Manor were reviewed but not the plan for McGuire Gardens because it was not
made available. That plan underwent numerous revisions before HUD accepted it.
4.5.1

Census Data

The study used data from 1990 and 2000 Population and Housing Censuses. Census reports
provided information about neighborhood characteristics like population and race, education,
housing types and number, employment, and poverty levels. The 1990 and 200 censuses also
provided important block group data. For location analysis, both track level and block level
census data were used to analyze poverty, housing conditions, and population characteristics from
the 1990 and 2000 censuses for the City of Camden and census tracks in which the developments
are located, and trends analyzed. Census data files were downloaded from the Census Bureau
American Fact Finder website (Census Bureau 2009).
4.5.2

HUD Data

HUD data included press releases, Resident Characteristic Reports (RCRs), and HOPE VI
documents on HUD‘s website. Press releases about the three HOPE VI grants to the HACC were
reviewed to get information about the original plans and to compare outcomes regarding type,
number, and arrangement of housing units. According to the webpage description, Resident
Characteristic Reports summarize aggregate demographic and income information about public
housing households. The report gives information in six categories: units, income, total tenant
payments, race/ethnicity, household, and length of stay.
The data used in the reports come from HUD‘s Multi-family Tenant Characteristic
System (MTCS). This database contains detailed information about public housing households
and Section 8 recipients including addresses, occupancy status, householders‘ income and rental
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payments, and descriptions of dwelling units. The information comes from the quarterly reports
that PHAs send to HUD. PHAs send the required information electronically to HUD Public
Information Center (PIC) from which the MTCS is updated monthly. The main limitations of the
MTCS are that it does not have information for all units and the information may be slightly
dated. The MTCS had household records for about 86 percent of all occupied public housing
units in 1999 and each RCR covers 15 months activities. Despite these limitations, it is the most
comprehensive and most reliable dataset of households across public housing agencies.
4.5.3

HACC Reports

HACC 2004, 2005, and 2007 Annual reports were reviewed. Among other things, the annual
reports provide data about the total number of properties, number of units, occupancy, number of
Housing Choice Vouchers (formerly Section 8 vouchers) the Authority manages, and status of
modernization programs such as HOPE VI. The HOPE VI Coordinator provided copies of the
HOPE VI redevelopment plans used to obtain the HOPE VI grants for Baldwin‘s Run and
Roosevelt Manor but not for McGuire Gardens because it was not available at the time.
4.5.4

Site and Neighborhood Observations

On my second visit to the housing authority offices in 2006 to discuss the possibility of Camden
as the research location, the HOPE VI Coordinator and this researcher visited the three project
sites and the surrounding communities and community facilities in Centerville. We also visited
the Branch Village public housing development and the two completed phases of the newly
redeveloped Chelton Terrace public housing development, and observed construction activities at
the new 86-unit elderly property near the Roosevelt Manor site. This was Phase 1 of the
Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI redevelopment. This was a familiarization tour to get visual sketches
of each site and surrounding areas and to get photographing opportunities, especially of a boarded
up Roosevelt before demolition. Before starting the research, I revisited these places on my own
to become more familiar with the neighborhoods.
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4.5.5

Interviews

Several semi-structured Interviews with HOPE VI official, site management and residents were
the key sources of information for this study. HOPE VI Coordinator and the Community and
Supportive Services (CSS) Coordinator, and site manager at McGuire Gardens were interviewed
about ownership structure, management challenges, maintenance, and resident services. The
HOPE VI Coordinator provided descriptive, explanatory and policy information about the HOPE
VI projects in the city. He provided current information about renovation, relocation, designs, and
supportive services and details about project goals and objectives; design changes, including
housing types and configuration; implementation; status and progress of HOPE VI projects;
relocation processes and issues; supportive services; re-occupancy progress and issues;
neighborhood plans; and revitalization plans and projects for other developments. Being the
director for the HACC modernization department as well, he was very knowledgeable and well
equipped to provide information on a broad range of redevelopment topics in addition to HOPE
VI projects and linking the HOPE VI redevelopment projects to other modernization efforts the
housing authority was undertaking. There were three face-to-face interviews with the HOPE VI
Coordinator at different times during the research.
In three interviews, the CSS Coordinator addressed questions about Community and
Supportive Services to residents, including information about re-occupancy, relocation, selfsufficiency programs/services, and project evaluation at Roosevelt Manor only. She provided no
information about supportive services at McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres. The HOPE VI
Coordinator had directed questions about resident services to the CSS Coordinator but that
official did not provide the information requested for the first two developments because she was
not involved with those projects. HOPE officials then refused to provide further information.
McGuire Gardens‘ site manager and social works answered questions about the operation
of that development, but attempts to interview the manager at Baldwin‘s Run failed. While there
was one formal interview with the site manager and none with the social worker (her employer,
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Michael‘s Development Company, prevented her from doing the interview), much information
was gathered through several information conversations with her and the social workers onsite.
Format interviews were undertaken in 2008 and 2009 spring and summer.
4.5.6

Household Survey

To participate in the survey, householders had to be at least 18 years old and lived in the
development for three months or more. Participants were interviewed in English only. Tenants
who could not do interviews in English were excluded. In two instances, children translated for
their mothers. A lack of funding precluded the hiring of a Spanish translator. Thirteen tenants at
McGuire Gardens and 10 at Baldwin‘s Run were excluded on this basis.
4.5.6.1 Respondents. To learn about residents‘ experiences with living at each HOPE VI site,
their concerns and their reactions to the redevelopment, in-depth face-to-face interviews were
conducted with 57 English-speaking householders (Appendix A). Thirty-three householders at
McGuire Gardens and 23 at Baldwin‘s Run were interviewed. No interview was done at
Roosevelt Manor because re-occupancy had not yet started and so the site did not satisfy the
three-month minimum occupancy requirement. The HA experience delays in relocation and
construction start-up which also delayed re-occupancy. The goal was to interview between 60 and
75 householders at this site.
4.5.6.2 Procedures. Initially, a two-step process was used to select study participants.
Participants were then notified about the study by letter that requested their participation in the
study. Before doing so, the questionnaire was pretested with seven residents who were not
included in the final survey. After all modifications, letters were hand delivered to all households
in the sample to inform them about the survey and to obtain their participation. The householders
were randomly selected from the lists of addresses that the HACC provided for McGuire Gardens
and Baldwin‘s Run. The Authority provided a list of 193 addresses at McGuire Gardens and 75 at
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Baldwin‘s‘ Run from which random samples of 100 from McGuire Gardens and 60 from
Baldwin‘s Run were selected. Interviews began two weeks after recruitment letters were hand
delivered to the 160 public housing addresses in the sample. Letters were addressed to heads of
households and interviews were undertaken from spring 2008 through summer 2009 but most
interviews were done during 2008. After the survey began at McGuire Gardens, the procedure
was modified when it was discovered that the list that the housing authority provided excluded
several addresses, including all households on Jones and Bank Streets, which had several original
tenants. After consultations with the social worker to determine the addresses that were vacant
and those with returning and new tenants, 20 addresses not on the HA‘s list were added to make it
213 addresses. Participation was extremely poor at first due to absent householders and few who
wanted to take part. As a result, the sample was expanded to include all 213 tenants at McGuire
Gardens and the 75 at Baldwin‘s Run. The response improved and 34 householders from
McGuire Gardens and 23 from Baldwin‘s Run were interviewed. However, the use of nonrandom sampling techniques limits the generalizability of the study findings.
Eighteen addresses at McGuire Gardens and 14 at Baldwin‘s Run were excluded because
the units were vacant or the tenants had lived there for less than three months. Twelve tenants at
McGuire Gardens and 10 at Baldwin‘s Run who did not speak English and the three tenants at
McGuire Gardens and two at Baldwin‘s Run who did the pretest were excluded from the survey
as well. Most tenants either refused to participate or were not found. Approximately 80 percent of
tenants at McGuire Gardens and 62 percent of the tenants at Baldwin Run were not located or
they refused to participate. The majority who refused to participate did so by asking the
researcher to return other days or at times when they were unavailable (Table 4.10).
The survey was done through face-to-face interviews mostly in householders‘ homes. Six
interviews were done at the Community Center at McGuire Gardens with participants in the
computer and art and craft classes. Interviews typically lasted about forty-five minutes. With
participants‘ consent, interviews were tape-recorded but some residents objected to the recording.
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Fifty-eight householders participated in the survey but two householders from McGuire Gardens
did not complete their surveys. A few minutes into the interview, one tenant refused to continue
without payment. The other householder abruptly stopped the interview mid-way through to get
ready for work. She asked the interviewer to return but ignored the interviewer when he returned
the next day. Households not found the first time received up to two other visits until interviews
were done or the tenants refused to participate or were not found. When necessary, second and
third visits were on different days of the week and at different times in the mornings, afternoons,
and evenings to maximize the likelihood of finding the householder. When practical, the
researcher obtained neighbors‘ advice concerning the most likely times the tenants were at home.

Table 4.10 Survey Participation
Participation
Addresses Ineligible Eligible
No
Outright
Targeted Addresses Addresses Response Refusals Number Percent
112
31
34
20
36
177
213
McGuire Gardens
16
17
23
38
14
61
75
Baldwin‘s Run
HOPE VI
Development

―No Response‖ includes tenants who scheduled interviews and did not turn up.
4.5.6.3 Survey Questions. The survey consisted of seventy-two quantitative and qualitative
questions. Some of the questions are similar to those used in the HOPE VI Panel Study (Popkin,
Harris, et al. 2002), the HOPE VI Baseline Assessment Study (Abt Associates, et al. 1996), and
the HOPE VI Tracking Study Residents Study (Buron, et al. 2002). Survey questions addressed
housing design and conditions, education, employment status, public assistance status,
availability of and satisfaction with self-sufficiency support services, site and neighborhood
safety, neighborhood services, relations with neighbors in the development, employment, and
income, and personal and household characteristics (Appendix H).

FINDINGS

CHAPTER 5
PHYSICAL REDEVELOPMENT

There is more space here and all the children have their own rooms now so there is less
fighting and arguing among them. I feel like I am in heaven; like a burden has been lifted.
I feel so much better about myself now that I could go out to get a job. Before moving
here, I was down. I did not want to do nothing.
New tenant at McGuire Gardens HOPE VI, June 2008

HOPE VI targets public housing developments with major physical defects. Based on HACC data
and comments by residents, the three developments studied had major physical problems such as
leaking roofs, unstable building foundations, cracked walls, drab exterior, mismatch between
household size and bedroom configuration, and lack of private outdoor space, inappropriate site
design, poor construction, and obsolescence (HACC 2000, HACC 2003a). Redevelopment
involved site redesign, rehabilitation of units, and demolition and replacement of deteriorated
dwellings. The above quote from a new resident at McGuire Gardens shows some of the positive
impacts of the physical improvements on residents. Unlike the original developments, the
redeveloped sites have single-family housing, some of which are designed to resemble some of
the housing in surrounding areas; defined public and non-public outdoor spaces; and streets that
mimic the local street patterns. Site redesign removed superblocks that contributed to isolating the
developments from their surroundings (HACC 2000, HACC 2003a). However, HOPE VI funded
demolitions have reduced the total number of units at the three sites from 1,050 before
redevelopment to 680 built and planned, including a meager 403 public housing units but 677
homeownership and LIHTC units (Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1 HOPE VI Housing Units by Tenure Type and Site in Camden
Development
McGuire Gardens
Baldwin‘s Run
Roosevelt Manor
Total

All Units Tax Credit Units
Private Units
Public Units
253
0
0
253 onsite
516
300
119 onsite 100 offsite 78 onsite 130 offsite
668
286
86 onsite 16 offsite 72 onsite 208 offsite
1,437
586
305
741
338

Sources: Manager‘s Office, Westfield Acres 2000 HOPE VI Plan; Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Plan

5.1

McGuire Gardens

In the early 1990s, McGuire Gardens was reputed to be one of Camden‘s most deteriorated public
housing developments. The site had flooding problems (it is in the Cooper River flood plain), was
detached from the rest of the community, and many units were too small for their families.
Rehabilitation rectified these issues and transformed the 368-unit development into a more
attractive property of 253 units. In redesigning the site, the HA utilized the repeal of the federal
one-for-one replacement rule for public housing to demolish 115 units without replacing them.
This is Camden‘s first HOPE VI site and was funded by the $42 million HOPE VI Revitalization
grant that HUD awarded in 1994. Planning and management problems at the housing authority
delayed project implementation, which took nine years to complete (Holin, et al. 2003).
Rehabilitation began in summer 1999 with Michael‘s Development Company as the developer
and ended in 2003 after extensive site and building reconfiguration and redesign. Site
improvements included reopening of neighborhood streets, addition of front porches, addition of
private entrances, and delineation of public and non-public outdoor spaces.
5.1.1

Site Condition Before HOPE VI

Before HOPE VI, the development had 368 two-story housing units at 17 per acre. In the late
1960s and 1970s, McGuire Gardens was arguably a well-kept, clean, and safe development that
had four play areas for children (Holin, et al. 2003). Like other distressed developments however,
analysts often cite deferred maintenance, suburbanization, and federal public housing policies that
favor low-income residents as contributors to concentrated poverty, physical deterioration, and
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crime. In the late 1970s, concerns developed about unstable building foundations that led to a
federal investigation and eventual demolition of three buildings. The issue forced many residents
to move and by 1993, vacancy had soared to more than 30 percent. Many of the close social ties
that existed were severed as residents moved away out of fear (Holin, et al. 2003).
Original tenants reported that before redevelopment, the site had no recreational facility
and lacked aesthetic appeal because the buildings all looked the same and noticeably different
from other residential buildings in the area, which some analysts say isolated the site and the
residents from its surroundings. Unlike most of the private single-family homes in the area, the
units at McGuire Gardens had no front porch or other external facility and many of them did not
face streets. Some buildings faced streets and some were perpendicular to streets (Holin, et al.
2003). Interestingly, the privately owned housing developments observed nearby also lack front
porches or other outdoor facility but most units face streets. Other site features that led to physical
distress included having no separation between public and private outdoor spaces, poor
landscaping, and a large and very conspicuous communal dumpster near the front of the property
(Holin, et al. 2003). These features helped to set the site apart in the neighborhood generally and
local communities in particularly. The private single-family houses face streets and most have
defined front yard and back yards. The private apartments also have buildings that are uniform in
design. A 2003 HOPE VI report suggests that a sizeable percentage of the residents viewed their
housing negatively. This report cited a 1995 resident survey that showed about half (51 percent)
of the residents were satisfied with their housing and 49 percent were dissatisfied. Just six percent
were ―very satisfied‖ while 29 percent were ―very dissatisfied‖ (Holin, et al. 2003). Part of the
dissatisfaction was due to the high levels of unemployment and poverty among residents. Census
data and previous research indicate that poverty exceeded 38 percent in 2000 (U.S. Census
Bureau 2000, Holin, et al. 2003). The high unemployment and poverty conditions may help to
explain the presence of many young people who were observed idling with friends on the streets
during the daytime.
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Conditions in the surroundings areas were also appalling. A 2003 report indicates that
gang violence, drug dealings, prostitution, vandalism, vacant, abandoned, and dilapidated
buildings were prevalent (Abt Associates Inc 1996, U.S. Census Bureau 2000). A 1996 survey of
residents showed that only 31 percent of them viewed their neighborhood as safe while 70
percent said it was unsafe. Six percent said it was ―very safe‖, 25 percent said it was ―somewhat
safe‖, 33 percent said it was ―somewhat unsafe‖ and 37 percent said it was ―very unsafe‖. Streets
were in poor condition and many buildings were dilapidated and abandoned. This included
housing units, many of which were derelict (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).
The main goals of the redevelopment plan were to improve the physical condition of the
site and meet residents‘ physical, educational, and psychological needs. The plan proposed a
comprehensive overhaul of all major systems, modifications to existing unit plans, modification
to the interior and exterior of units, and site improvements. The plan included a proposal to have
the tenant council represented in management of the development. Other provisions included
training residents in life and occupational skills, and small business ownership to serve the
community (Abt Associates, et al. 1996).

Figure 5.1 Partially occupied apartments on Figure 5.2 Carman Street housing adjacent to
Carman Street adjacent to McGuire Gardens. McGuire Gardens.
The physical condition seen is widespread here.
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5.1.2

Site Improvements

HUD awarded the HACC the $42 million HOPE VI grant in 1994 but rehabilitation began in
1999 due to several implementation setbacks. Redevelopment was completed in 2003. The basic
building design remains the same but there were facade improvements and street realignments.
The street realignment ensures that the entrance to every dwelling faces a street, which also gives
each unit its own street number (Figure 5.4). The revitalized site has 253 public housing units.
Reconfiguring the site layout (Figure 5.4), fixing infrastructure problems, and
reconnecting the site to the neighborhood were the major physical revitalization goals for this
project. The result is a 115-unit reduction and dismantling of the superblock, a reconfigured site,
new streets that connect to neighborhood streets and reopening of streets that the superblock
arrangement had blocked. The remodeled units have street frontages, the own entrance, and own
street numbers. Other site improvements include construction of new drainage and sewage
systems and a multi-purpose community building.
Front yards and back yards are two notable additions to the site. The small front yards
abut sidewalks and are semi-private. Between 4 and 28 units share a backyard (Figure 5.4). Rows
of buildings and metal fences surround each backyard that residents access through the back of
their units. Non-residents can easily enter most backyards by going over the perimeter fence.
The new street network has improved walkability and made the site safer for residents. It
also helps to connect the development to the community and therefore remove the isolation that
existed previously. However, although the site is not as isolated as before, it remains separate and
distinct from the surrounding communities. By appearance, it is still easily identifiable as a
distinct housing development but not readily recognizable as public housing because the site
looks a lot better than its surroundings. The buildings are more attractive than other neighborhood
housing and the streets are in better condition. The site is distinct because its design is unlike the
two multi-family properties in that part of the neighborhood that are one block away.
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Figure 5.3 McGuire Gardens HOPE VI site layout plan. The small rectangles represent
dwellings and the numbers on the rectangles represents the number of bedrooms. Most new units
are on Jones and Bank Streets in Phase I and Phase II occupy the rest of the site.
Source: McGuire Gardens site manager (unknown date).

The revitalized development has town square, a community multipurpose building, a
mini park, and a small playground for children in the mini-park. The facilities were absent from
the original development. The original development had no green space to speak of but with the
site redesigned with fewer units, backyards provide ample amount of open spaces for residents.
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The play area has swings and slides for children to enjoy (Figures 5.5 and 5.5). From the
dwellings that surround the town square, residents can easily monitor park activities. Residents
said drug dealers often use the park to transact business. The community center is in a new 6,000
square feet building that also houses HACC offices, a social work office that the management
firm operates, a resident‘s board office (resident board does not now exist), and a Neighborhood
Network Computer Lab. The community center hosts HACC monthly meetings, training
activities, community service events, church services, social activities, summer programs for
children from the development, and activities for seniors.

Figure 5.4 A shared backyard surrounded by a perimeter wall along Watson Street near the
HACC Head office and two rows of residences. Shared backyards typically look like this one.
Kennedy Towers, which house elderly residents and the HACC administrative offices, is the
high rise building on the left side.
Photograph: Michael Brown
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Figure 5.5 McGuire Gardens Town Square
showing the mini-park park and small children
playground at the center.

5.1.3

Figure 5.6 McGuire Gardens Town Square.
The mini-park, children‘s playground, and a
residential building can be seen.

Unit Design Today

The physical plan for McGuire Gardens aimed to improve the condition of the buildings to give
residents a better living environment. The new development achieves this goal with fewer units
and a more varied set of building designs. The remodeled buildings are more attractive and
definitely do not all look the same but it would be inaccurate to say they represent the diverse
architecture of in the neighborhood. Site design show strong influences from New Urbanism and
Defensible Space. All buildings face a street and site appearance, amenities and community
facilities are significantly improved. Reducing the number of units has helped to make the site
more appealing.
Redevelopment took place in two phases from 1999 to 2003 during which 190 of the
original units were demolished and 178 were rehabilitated. Seventy-five new units were
constructed on existing and new foundations near the boundaries of the site to replace some of the
demolished buildings. Phase I consists of 76 rehabilitated units and 65 new units and Phase II
consists of 102 rehabilitated units and 10 new units (Holin, et al. 2003). Twenty percent of the
new units are handicapped accessible. The rehabilitated buildings are two-story row house
buildings and each contains six to eight units and two- to 4-bedrooms per unit. The new buildings
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are a mix of two-story row house buildings, two-story semi-detached buildings, and one-story
semi-detached bungalow-type units. The new buildings are smaller than the rehabilitated
buildings and have no more than five units per building. The two-story semi-detached units have
two- to four bedrooms each and the bungalow-type units have one, two, or three bedrooms.
To break up the monotonous appearance of the original buildings, improve the
appearance of the site, and to make the buildings look more harmonious with residential
architecture in the surrounding area, the HOPE VI Manager (Valentine 2008) explained that the
exterior of the original buildings were modified to give each rehabilitated building a different
appearance. One modification was to replace all flat roofs with pitched roofs. Roof overhangs
vary slightly from building to building. In addition, a second-floor Bay Window has been added
to every two-story unit to improve appearance and to break up the previous flat exterior of the
buildings (Holin, et al. 2003). Other modifications included installation of rear patios and covered
front porches. Each front porch has a pitched roof and painted wooden rails (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.7 Townhouse units at McGuire
Gardens showing 2nd floor Bay windows.

Figure 5.8 Backyard area of rehabilitated
buildings.

Source: Author

Source: Author

New buildings also have Bay windows, covered front porches, and rear patios but look
slightly different from the rehabilitated buildings at the back and front. New buildings have brick
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veneer in front and white vinyl siding on the backs but rehabilitated buildings have brick facades
on the back and front and no vinyl siding. Some of the new two-story buildings also have
bungalows as end units.
The interior of rehabilitated units were remodeled as well to create more space.
Demolishing some units and merging remaining adjacent units created larger interior spaces and
changed the bedroom mix to create more two bedroom units at the expense of three-bedroom
units (Valentine 2008).
Like the original development, building materials remain wood, concrete block,
reinforced concrete, vinyl siding and brick facade (Abt Associates, et al. 1996, Holin, et al. 2003).
The new and rehabilitated units have pitched roofs, which are common in the area. Figure 5.7
shows townhouses with pitched roofs, second floor bay windows, and front porches facing the
street. Figure 5.8 shows a section of the typical shared backyard space and patios. Other physical
changes include realigning units to fact streets rather than the previous inward facing alignment
or perpendicular alignment to the street. This alignment allows each unit to have its own street
number, mailbox on the front door, and entrance from the street to the front porch. Individual
entrances facing streets increase comfort and privacy and enhance safety and security in the
development (Newman 1973) because they allow residents to keep ―eyes on the street‖ (Jacobs
1961). Other improvements include the provision of central air conditioning and heating systems
in every unit, as well as a laundry with washer and dryer hook-ups. Householders install their
own appliances. Householders expressed delight with having these features, especially the central
A/C system because the one unit cools the entire home.
The 253 apartments include 29 one-bedroom units, 119 two-bedroom units, 92 threebedroom units, and 13 four-bedroom units (Table 5.2). Unit size varies based on whether they are
rehabilitated or new and whether they are on new or existing foundations. Rehabilitated units
range from 477 square feet for one-bedroom units, 632 and 732 square feet for two-bedroom units
to 976 square feet for three-bedroom units. New units built on new foundations are generally
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larger and range from 560 square feet for one-bedroom units, 753 square feet for two-bedroom
units, 1,141 square feet for three-bedroom units to 1,302 and 1,327 square feet for the 4-bedroom
units. New units built on old foundations range in size from 500 square feet for one-bedroom
units to 1,132 square feet for three-bedroom units (McGuire Gardens Management Office).
Table 5.2 shows changes in the number and distribution of bedrooms resulting from the
redevelopment. The changes in bedroom configuration were relatively small. The biggest changes
were the reduction in three bedroom units from 45 percent to 36 percent of total and the increase
in two-bedroom units from 43 percent to 47 percent of total. Because the development now has
253 units, the density is down from 17 units per acre before redevelopment to 12 units per acre.
All units have individual utility meters and each household receives a monthly utility allowance.

Table 5.2 Configuration of HOPE VI Units at McGuire Gardens
Bedroom Configuration
One-bedroom units
Two-bedroom units
Three-bedroom units
Four-bedroom units
Total

HOPE VI Units
Number Percent*
29
119
92
13
253

Original Units
Number
Percent*

12
47
36
5

25
158
172
13
367

7
43
47
4

Source: Property Manager‘s Office (no date).
*

Due to rounding, total percent may not equal 100.

Indefensible open space was one factor that led to distress in public housing (NCSDPH
1992). The project was redesigned with Defensible Space principles playing a strong role.
However, the management firm limits its application. Residents‘ complained about the lack of
backyard privacy but the property management company said it makes cutting the grass easier.
Management also limits the kind of activities allowed in the space around the units. For example,
residents are not permitted to do gardening or other landscaping to enhance the front yard, or
barbeque in backyards, even though each unit has a small concrete patio at the back door. In fact,
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residents are not permitted to do anything that may affect the spaces around the units or
appearance of the site, including leaving patio furniture or toys on the front porch.
Despite HOPE VI‘s push towards mixed-income housing developments, McGuire
Gardens remains a wholly public housing property. This is typical of sites that were redeveloped
solely using HOPE VI funds (Holin, et al. 2003). The reduction in the number of units conforms
to HOPE VI goal to build smaller-scale developments.
5.1.4

Impact on Surrounding Areas Negligible

The physical condition of the surrounding neighborhoods looked no better than the conditions in
McGuire Gardens. In fact, some communities had worse conditions. The dilapidated condition of
the communities west and north of the McGuire Gardens appears to be the same as before. The
houses in these areas are mostly two-story row houses and apartments in two-story buildings.
East of McGuire Gardens, the housing appears to be in fair to good condition but the housing to
the west and north side, the houses are in very poor physical condition. The two communities
west and north of McGuire Gardens has numerous dilapidated and abandoned houses, very poor
roads, and overgrown empty lots littered with refuse the physical condition of the houses depicts
extreme poverty (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). The community to the east is much less physically
distressed. Here, the housing is a mix of two-story apartment buildings, two-story row houses,
and detached one story, single-family houses, most of which appear to be in good physical
condition. Detailed observations in the community indicate that many of the row houses were in
need of repair.
5.1.5

Residents‟ Perceptions

The real significance of the physical changes depends on their impact on residents. If the changes
improve living conditions and the quality of life in the development, then the main physical
redevelopment objective has been achieved. Householders were interviewed to learn how the
physical changes affected them. Ten returnees and 24 new householders were interviewed.
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Respondents from both groups gave positive comments about their HOPE VI housing. More than
90 percent of returnees and about 87 percent of new residents said their HOPE VI housing was
more attractive than their previous housing.
Table 5.2 shows the results when householders were asked to compare their previous
housing with their current HOPE VI home. Overall, the majority said their HOPE VI housing was
better. Approximately 55 percent said it was ―a lot better‖ and 24 percent said it was ―a little
better‖. Considering how distressed the site was, it is hardly a surprise that 90 percent of returnees
said their current unit was better. It may be a surprise to some that 22 percent of new tenants said
their HOPE VI unit was the same quality as their previous unit. One returnee explained that she
said her HOPE VI unit was the same quality as her previous unit at Westfield Acres due to the
restrictions on residents‘ use of the facilities and the outdoor space. No one said HOPE VI
housing was worse than before. An interesting part of the results of these two questions is that
even new tenants who came from private single-family homes and apartments overwhelmingly
said their public housing units were better and looked better than their previous houses. This
shows the substantial improvements in the physical environment at HOPE VI sites and also
indicate that the poor quality of some low-income housing in the private market.
Householders in the survey also cited the three things they liked and disliked most about
their HOPE VI houses. The three features chosen most frequently were ―own entrance‖ with 46
percent, apartment design with 42 percent, and central air conditioning with 36 percent. One-third
said they liked having a unique street number, and 21 percent said they liked having a backyard,
even if it is not private. The results are in Table 5.4. These and other features, like houses facing
the street and private front and back yards, are important aspects of Defensible Space and New
Urbanism. When asked specifically how important these features were to them, survey
participants overwhelmingly said they were very important. The results indicate near unanimity
in the responses among returning and new residents.
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Table 5.3 HOPE VI Housing Compared to Previous Housing
Ratings
A Lot Better
A Little Better
About the Same
Don‘t Know

%ALL Tenants % Returnees
(n=32)
(n=10)
55
70
24
20
18
10
3
0

% New Tenants
(n=22)
48
30
22
0

Source: McGuire Gardens Household Survey

Among returnees, 100 percent said private entries were ―very important‖, which validates
their earlier selection of it as the feature they like best; 90 and 70 percent said having a unique
street address and having a private backyard, respectively, were ―very important.‖ Ten percent
and 20 percent said having a unique street and a private backyard were ―somewhat important‖.
Among new householders, 92 percent said having their own entrance and unique street addresses
were ―very important‖, 75 percent said having a private backyard was ―very important‖, while 17
percent said the private backyard was ―somewhat important‖.
Table 5.4 HOPE VI Features Householders Like Best
House Feature
Own Entrance
Design
Central Air
Own Street Number
Having a Backyard

Percent of Householders Interviewed
All (n=32)
Returnees (n=10) New (n=22)
47
50
45
53
50
55
50
30
59
34
30
36
22
30
18

Source: McGuire Gardens Household Survey

Most householders like their HOPE VI homes but not all the features. The three features
they disliked most were ―open backyards‖ that 33 percent mentioned, ―inadequate storage space‖,
which 24 percent cited, and ―no basement‖, which 24 percent cited. Another 15 percent said the
rooms were small and 12 percent said the floor was not carpeted and 6 percent mentioned the
absence of a doorbell. Some householders complained that interior paint was too flat for homes
with young children because it is easily soiled and they were being charged for marks on the
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walls that their young children made. They noted that a gloss paint would remedy the problem.
They also said the flat paint makes the apartments dull. One tenant said: ―The apartments need to
be more lively or colorful; they are too dull‖. Several tenants said the HA has denied their
requests to repaint the walls but the site manager said tenants may repaint the inside of the units
but would be required to return it to the original color and type paint upon moving. None of the
residents said they got that permission.
The survey results show that one-third of the participants said the lack of backyard
privacy was one of the things they disliked most. Nearly every interviewee complained about the
backyard was too open. They also complained about the restrictions on their use of the spaces
outside their units. For example, barbequing and swimming pools are not allowed in the
backyards and flowers are not allowed in front yard. Some restrictions diminish the effectiveness
of the Defensible Space features on the site. About backyards, one householder said:
―Right now there is no privacy. I can‘t even barbeque because the place is too open and
other people come over and destroy everything.‖
Table 5.5 shows almost every householder expressing satisfaction with the HOPE VI units. Of the
97 percent who were satisfied, 50 percent said they were ―very satisfied‖. No householder
expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the units.

Table 5.5 Resident Satisfaction with McGuire Gardens HOPE VI Homes
Level of Satisfaction

All

(n=32)
Very Satisfied
Somewhat Satisfied
Somewhat Dissatisfied
Very Dissatisfied
Don‘t Know

50
47
0
0
3

Percent of Interviewees
Returnees
New Residents
(n=10)
(n=22)
50
50
50
46
3

Source: McGuire Gardens Household Survey
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Housing Features Households Dislike
Porch Safety
No Doorbell
No carpet
Small rooms
No basement
Storage
Backyard

Percent

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

Figure 5.9 HOPE VI Housing Features Tenants Disliked Most (32 interviewees).

5.2

Westfield Acres/Baldwin‟s Run

Completed in 2007, Baldwin‘s Run has 78 single-family homes for public housing families and
119 affordable single-family, owner-occupied homes. In contrast, Westfield Acres had 18 fourstory, brick-faced apartment buildings and 514 apartments for public housing families. The
transformation is so dramatic that former residents and neighbors no longer call it ―Acres‖. The
lone street in the previous development is now part of a street network that mirrors that of the
locality. The new development is called Baldwin‘s Run and has both public housing and nonpublic housing units and 11 different combinations of one-story and two-story detached, semidetached, and attached single-family houses, ranging from two to four bedrooms (Research
Works 2005). The redevelopment strategy used here is different from the strategy used at
McGuire Gardens. The first set of 78 completed units received a 2003 ―Best in American Living
Award‖ from HUD and the completed development received a Cottage Living Magazine8 ―Best
Cottage Communities Award‖ in 2008. In the January 2008 edition, the magazine described
Baldwin‘s Run as ―The Miracle Turnaround‖ because the ―Before and After is Astounding‖.
Residents and neighbors refer to Baldwin‘s Run as ―mini Cherry Hill‖ because it resembles a

8

Parent company, Time Inc., closed Cottage Living magazine and its website cottageliving.com in November 2008.
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housing development one expects to find in affluent Cherry Hill9 rather than a central city
housing development containing public housing in poor and distressed Camden.
HUD rejected previous applications in 1998 and 1999 before awarding the HACC a
second HOPE VI revitalization grant in 2000 for $35 million to build a new mixed-income,
mixed-tenure housing complex on the then vacant site. The main physical redevelopment goals
were to improve the quality of the site and the housing and reduce density. Demolishing the
original apartments and constructing Baldwin Run achieved those goals substantially. Almost 40
percent of the units on the site (78 units) are public housing rentals and 60 percent (119 units) are
owner-occupied. The site and building designs reflect the strong desire to avoid previous public
housing designs that engendered negative stereotypes such as being ―dull‖ and ―inappropriate
design and scale‖ that isolated developments in their communities. Instead, the housing authority
and the two developers adopted private sector housing styles.
5.2.1

Site Condition before HOPE VI

Westfield Acres occupied a 25-acre gently sloping property between Westfield Avenue, Rosedale
and Dudley Avenues, Beideman Avenue, 32nd Street, and railroad tracks to the south in the
Dudley neighborhood in East Camden, bordering the Rosedale neighborhood. The development
opened in 1937 with 18 three-story, brick-faced walk-up buildings and 514 apartments at nearly
21 per acre. Figure 5.8 shows the layout of buildings on the site. Westfield Acres had 275 onebedroom units, 165 two-bedroom units, and 74 three-bedroom units. The 18 residential buildings
were constructed using reinforced concrete with brick veneer and flat roofs. Inside, concrete slabs
separated the apartments. Residents accessed their apartments from interior stairways shared that
four to eight other units shared. The apartments ranged in size from 531 square feet for a onebedroom unit to 802 square feet for a three-bedroom unit. Originally, there were no handicap
accessible units but some of the units were modified to contemporary accessibility standards.

9

Cherry Hill is a prominent suburban township about six miles away.
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Buildings occupied just 25 percent of the site, which left large areas of indefensible open
space. This open arrangement fuelled security concerns among residents (HACC 2000).
Additionally, the superblock design interrupted the neighborhood street grid and left only one
street, Beideman Avenue, to connect the site to the outside world. The revitalization plan noted
that Westfield Acres suffered from poor maintenance, mismanagement, structural and
infrastructure failure, an outdated institutional type design, inappropriate layout, large areas of
indefensible open space, high operating costs, high crime rates, and high vacancy rates, all of
which made life miserable for residents. Several original residents interviewed said Westfield
Acres was a dangerous place to live. With HOPE VI funding available, in 1998 the housing
authority decided that the buildings and infrastructure were obsolete and no longer economically
viable. This decline appears to have followed Camden‘s economic decline. When the economy
performed well, Westfield Acres appeared to have done well too but residents‘ economic fortunes
floundered with the city‘s economic decline. The HACC condemned the site and eventually
demolished all buildings between 1998 and 2001 after receiving the $3 million HOPE VI
demolition grant in 1998. Using the $35 million HOPE VI revitalization grant, the HACC
leveraged another $65 million to build Baldwin‘s Run.

Figure 5.10 Aerial view of Westfield Acres
buildings and layout before demolition.

Figure 5.11 A Vacant Apartment Block at
Westfield Acres Before Demolition in 2001.

Source: http://www.dvrbs.com/hacc/CamdenNJ-HousingAuthority.htm
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5.2.2

Site and Housing Improvements

Baldwin‘s Run was built through a joint venture arrangement with St. Joseph Carpenter Society
as the lead developer, owner, and operator of the new development. St. Joseph Carpenter Society
is a non-profit community development corporation with several active investments in East
Camden. The first 78 public housing units were completed in 2005 and the 119 homeownership
units were completed in 2007 (HACC 2008). This mix of public and private housing created a
new mixed-income development that is about 40 percent public housing rentals and 60 percent
affordable owner-occupied units.10 The public units have one- to four-bedrooms but the private
units have two- to four-bedrooms (Table 5.4).

Table 5.6 Bedrooms Per Unit by Tenure at Baldwin‘s Run
Unit Type
Total Units Public Housing Private Housing
One-bedrooms
10
10
0
Two-bedrooms
39
35
4
Three-bedrooms
122
25
97
Four-bedrooms
30
8
22
Total
197
78
119
Source: Westfield Acres 2003 HOPE VI Revitalization plan

Baldwin‘s Run site design is sharply different from that of Westfield Acres. The network
of interconnected streets that mimics the neighborhood street grid illustrates the transformation in
the site design considering that Westfield Acres had one street. This allows units to face streets.
The entire site was redesigned and new single-family detached, semi-detached and row houses
built. The new housing reflects the new ideas about public housing discussed in Chapter 3.
The street network mimics the neighborhood street pattern and is a deliberate attempt to
integrate the development within the neighborhood. Unlike Westfield Acres, units face streets,
have private entries from the street to the front porch, and private driveways (Figure 5.1). At
Westfield Acres, most apartments faced interior courtyards, but in Baldwin‘s Run, all the units
10

HUD requires housing authorities to allocate at least 40 percent of new units to public housing tenants.
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face streets. Each unit has a unique street number and own entrance. Defensible Space and New
Urbanism principles shaped the site redesign. The site reorganization employs Defensible Space
features. Defensible Space helped to transform the large areas of public outdoor space in the
previous development into clearly defined public and private zones that allow residents to
exercise care and control of the spaces around their units. No doubt, this feature has contributed
to the marked improvements in site security and the peacefulness that several residents
mentioned.

Figure 5.12 Aerial View of Baldwin‘s Run showing public housing units on Baldwin‘s
Run Lane on left side. The four-story building at the bottom of the picture is Baldwin‘s
Run Seniors building. The right side of picture shows Westfield Towers (for seniors).
Source: Bing Maps

As a mixed-income development, the physical arrangement of the units on the site is
important. It is important for homeowners and public housing tenants to be able to interact
positively with each other for income mixing to be beneficial. In this development, 16 of the 25
acres of land contain the 197 houses and the rest consists of roadways, a small (non-functioning)
children playground, and yard space. The site plan at Figure 5.12 shows the unit configuration.
The northern half of the site has 16 public housing units and 35 owner-occupied units and the
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southern half has 62 public housing and 84 owner-occupied units for 78 public housing and 119
homeownership units. HUD requires the public housing units to be interspersed with owneroccupied units to avoid clustering them. In reality though, most of the public housing units are
clustered in the southern half along Baldwin‘s Run Lane, Saunders Street, Dudley Avenue, and
the middle section of North 31st Street. In contrast, the bulk of the owner-occupied houses are
concentrated in the northern half of the site. This arrangement does little to facilitate interaction
between public housing tenants and homeowners and so it is no surprise that public housing
tenants reported almost no interaction with homeowners.

Figure 5.13 Baldwin‘s Run construction Phasing Plan
Source: Westfield Acres 2000 HOPE VI Redevelopment Plan

5.2.3

Unit Design Today

Three underlying goals guided the final housing design choices for this development: providing
public housing and non-public, owner-occupied housing on the same site; building all housing to
the same standards; and using architectural and building styles that reflect the architectural
character of the whole neighborhood. A windshield survey of neighborhood housing reveals a
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wide variety of housing types and styles. The two-story framed single-family house with pitched
roofs was the most popular housing type observed but there were several different variations of
this type. Similarities in housing styles tended to be local to a community rather than the entire
neighborhood. Baldwin‘s Run houses reflect just a few of the styles observed but mainly the
designs of the newer private single-family houses in the 36th Street to 40th Street area near to the
River Line train station. This area is not actually Camden but neighboring Pennsauken, which
borders Camden at 36th Street. This style (Figures 5.12 and 5.13) dominates the owner-occupied
units along 32nd Street below Saunders Street. Another model (Figure 5.14) is a two-story framed
design with pitched roof and gabled end across the front and a porch facing the street. The steep
pitch of the roof in this model made it attractive because it facilitates an extra room in the attic.
Many of semi-detached two and three-family units and have this design. The main difference
between this style and the previous is the roof design. All units have front and rear yards. The
second model is a bungalow-style house with pitched roof facing the street, a partial hip near the
peak, and porch extending across the front of the house (Figure 5.14). The steep pitch of the roof
in this model also facilitates an extra attic room. The detached units use this model. Both models
are used for public and homeownership units in one-, two-, and three-family configurations but
most are two-story semi-detached units.
The housing density at Baldwin‘s Run is approximately eight units per acre (Westfield
Acres had 20 units per acre). The housing authority also built a 74-unit, four-story development
for seniors on a separate portion of the original site along the Westfield Avenue border. Two
offsite properties next to the original site contain 73 and 49 public housing and tax credit units.
The larger property is Baldwin‘s Run II. This family development occupies a Superfund site of
the former General Color Company. This property is two blocks from Baldwin‘s Run. This site
has 53 LIHTC rentals and 20 public housing rentals for formerly homeless women and their
families (HACC 2000). The smaller offsite location is Carpenters Hill on 36th Street. This site
was assembled from vacant and abandoned private properties and has 30 public housing units and
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19 homeownership units. Another 81 abandoned properties in Dudley and Rosedale
neighborhoods were to be rehabilitated as owner-occupied units. It is unclear how many of these
units are completed. Westfield Acres Redevelopment plan indicates that when fully completed,
there would be 219 homeownership units, 182 public housing units, and 115 LIHTC units but the
HACC‘s 5-year Plan reported 219 homeownership units, 208 public housing units, and 66 LIHTC
units (Table 5.7).

Table 5.7 HOPE VI Onsite and Offsite Units by Tenure at Baldwin‘s Run
Public housing
Homeownership
LIHTC
All

Original
514
0
0
514

New Onsite
78
119
0
197

New Offsite
130
100
115
345

Total
208
219
66
493

Source: Westfield Acres HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2000

Figure 5.14
Semi-detached houses at
Baldwin‘s Run. The fenced property in right
foreground is a homeownership unit. Public
housing tenants are not allowed to erect fences.

Figure 5.15 Baldwin's Run two-story units on
N 31st St. Shows some of the two-story units
with pitched roofs, front porches, and off-street
parking.
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Figure 5.16 Baldwin‘s Run Twin Units on 32nd
Street. Twin style housing is in the foreground
and detached single-family units are further
down the street.

Figure 5.17 Baldwin‘s Run houses showing a
detached unit in the foreground. The white
picket fence indicates that it is owner-occupied,
not public housing.

Table 5.8 shows the bedroom mix at Westfield Acres and at Baldwin‘s Run. To account for
changes in population composition and needs in public housing, Baldwin‘s Run bedroom mix
differs from the previous bedroom mix, shifting the focus from one- and two-bedroom units
(86%) to two- and three-bedroom units (80%). For the 78 public housing units, 45 percent are
two-bedroom units compared to 32 percent before and 32 percent are three-bedroom units
compared to 14 percent before. The changes orient Baldwin‘s Run towards larger families more
than Westfield Acres did. The HOPE VI Coordinator said three-bedroom units meet the needs of
larger households, which was a problem at Westfield Acres (HOPE VI Manager 8/2008).

Table 5.8 Bedroom Size by Tenure Type at Westfield Acres and Baldwin‘s Run
Number of
Bedrooms
One-bedrooms
Two-bedrooms
Three-bedrooms
Four-bedrooms
Total

Westfield Acres
Units
275
165
74
0
514

%
54
32
14
0
100

HOPE VI Units
Units
%
10
5
39
20
118
60
30
15
197 100

Source: Westfield Acres 2000 HOPE VI Revitalization Plan

Baldwin‟s Run
Public Units
%
Units
10
13
35
45
25
32
8
10
78
100

Private Units
Units
%
0
0
4
3
93
78
22
19
119
100

133
Rental units come in single-family detached, single-family semi-detached and threefamily attached forms, and homeownership units are single-family detached and single-family
semi-detached dwellings. Rental and homeownership houses are built to the same standards to
make them indistinguishable in appearance, quality, space, and basic amenities. Making public
housing and homeownership housing visually indistinguishable is an important HOPE VI goal
intended to change public perception of public housing as warehouses for the poor.
The homeownership units on the northern border of the site look similar to newer housing
in the outside neighborhood in that area. Additionally, the houses and overall development has a
suburban look and feel, which make conspicuous amidst the older houses surrounding the site. No
other large housing development is in the area, so despite the physical appeal, Baldwin Run
contrasts sharply with older and detached single-family houses in the area.

Table 5.9 Housing Types and Bedroom Mix by Tenure at Baldwin‘s Run
Tenure Type
Homeownership
(119 units)
Public Housing
(78 units)

Housing Style
Single family detached
Semi-detached unit
Subtotal
Single family detached
Semi-detached (twin) unit
Attached triples dwelling
Subtotal
Total

Bedroom Configuration
1 BR 2 BR 3 BR 4 BR
49
12
4
48
10
4
93
22
12
17
8
23
3
10
5
10
35
25
8
10
39
118
30

Source: Westfield Acres 2000 HOPE VI Revitalization Plan

5.2.4

Residents‟ Perceptions

Results from the household survey indicate that the majority of resident believe that their HOPE
VI housing is better than what they had before and they are satisfied with their houses and
physical aspects of the development as a whole. In Table 5.10, all returnees and 88 percent of
new tenants said their current house was better, which is an overall rate of 91 percent. No
householders said their HOPE VI house was worse but 12 percent said it was ―about the same‖ as
before. Asked to explain their responses, the 12 percent said their responses expressed their
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dissatisfaction with the management of the property, not concerns about their homes. Most
householders complained about too many restrictions and the time management takes to effect
repairs. First public housing tenants who moved from their original family homes appeared to be
those who complained the most.
Because Defensible Space is a key ingredient in the physical redevelopment, the
interviewer asked householders how important having their own street address, private entrance,
and private backyard was to them and the results shown in Table 5.11. Like McGuire Gardens,
the public housing units at Baldwin‘s have shared backyards. Between 86 percent and 100
percent of returnees and new tenants said these features were very important. Many householders
complained about lack of privacy in the backyard. The HOPE VI coordinator said the developer
decided to leave backyards open because it made cutting the grass easier.

Table 5.10 Tenants‘ View of HOPE VI Housing vs. Previous Housing
Returning New Residents
(n=7)
(n=16)
A Lot Better
86
50
A Little Better
14
38
About the Same
0
12
Source: Baldwin‘s Run Public Housing Household Survey

Income Mixing

All
(n=23)
61
30
9

Table 5.12 shows the housing features that householders liked most. The top three
choices among new tenants were private entrance, design, and having one‘s own street address.
Returnees had the same three as their top choices but the percentages were different. Fifty-seven
percent said ―design‖, 29 percent said ―private entrance‖, and twenty-nine percent said, ―own
street number address‖. Commenting on the design, residents who liked it said that it was
comfortable. Additionally, 39 percent of all participants said ―central air-conditioning‖. While
few respondents mentioned it as one of the features they like most, several residents said they
liked living in single-family houses more than in apartments.
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Table 5.11 Importance of Selected HOPE VI Housing Features to Householders (%)
Importance
Very Important
Somewhat Important
Neither important nor unimportant
Don‘t Know

Returning Residents (n=7)
Private
Street
Private
Entrance Address Backyard
100
100
87
0
14
-

New Residents (n=16)
Private
Street
Entrance Address
94
94
6
6

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Public Housing Household Survey

Table 5.12 HOPE VI Housing Features Householders Like Best
House Feature
Own Entrance
Own St Address
Design
Central Air
Size

All
(n=23)
47
43
43
39
13

Returnees
(n=7)
29
29
57
14
29

New
(n=16)
56
50
31
50
06

Source: Baldwin‘s Run 2008 Survey of Public Housing Household

Householders also cited the aspects of their housing that they disliked most. Table 5.13
shows the six aspects they disliked most. Fifty-seven percent complained about not having
storm/screen doors. Householders noted that their absence made it more difficult to keep their
homes warm in the winter and increased their utility bills. This was the only issue that more than
50 percent of householders mentioned. No more than 39 percent of residents mentioned any other
single concern, including ―too many restrictions‖ (39%), ―lack of private backyards‖ (35%), and
―small rooms‖, ―poor quality wall paint‖, and ―lack of roof lighting fixtures‖ (17% each). Even
though a substantial proportion of householders liked the design of their homes, the features that
they disliked most were also design-related. Greater proportions of new tenants than returnees
also liked each feature.
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Table 5.13 HOPE VI Housing Features Householders Dislike Most
Housing Issues
No storm door
Backyard not enclosed
Too many restrictions
No interior roof lighting
Rooms too small
Poor quality paint used

Percent of Householders
Returning (n=7)
New (n=16)
All (n=23)
43
29
14
14
14
14

63
44
44
19
19
19

57
35
39
17
17
17

Source: Baldwin‘s Run 2008 Public Housing Household Survey

Considering that returnees and new householders liked and disliked the same features, the
reasons for the percentage differences between returnees and new householders is not clear.
Returnees may have lowered their expectations based on previous negative experiences at
Westfield Acres. They might have a lower expectation of screen doors or private yards because
they never had them before in public housing. Being familiar with public housing restrictions,
they probably expected the same and were not inclined to voice their opinions because they
expect nothing to be done. New householders, on the other hand, might have had higher service
expectations since they do not have any prior experiences in public housing.

Table 5.14 Householder Satisfaction with Baldwin‘s Run HOPE VI Housing
Satisfaction
Very Satisfied
A Little Satisfied
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
A Little Dissatisfied
Very Dissatisfied

Percent of Householders
Returnees (n=7) New (n=16) All (n=23)
57
56
57
43
38
39
0
0
0
0
6
4
0
0
0

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Public Housing Household Survey

Table 5.14 shows responses to the question about resident‘s satisfaction with their HOPE
VI housing. About 96 percent said they were satisfied with their housing, including 57 percent
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who were ―very satisfied‖ and 39 percent who were ―a little satisfied‖. About 57 percent of
returnees and 56 percent of new householders were ―very satisfied‖. Given that householders
rated the appearance and overall quality of their homes highly, the relatively high percentage of
householders who said they were ―a little satisfied‖ expressed dissatisfaction with restrictions on
gardening, use of the outside water pipe, backyard barbequing, and use of swimming pools. They
expressed the view that the restrictions interfere with their enjoyment of the facilities. When
asked to explain her response, one returnee said her current house was ―a lot better‖ than her
previous but she was only ―a little satisfied‖ because ―it is boring‖. ―We can‘t make any change‖,
she explained. Another former Westfield Acres resident of many years and one of the leaders at
Baldwin‘s Run, expressed strong sentiments about the development. She said:
―I like the way the outside looks and we have to take care of it, but we are limited in
terms of what we can do, like planting a garden, which is therapeutic. We are not allowed
to disturb or change or add to anything.‖
Regarding the specific features of Baldwin‘s Run that householders liked the most, the
top three were having ―own entrance and street address‖ and ―safety‖ with 61 percent each and
―private parking‖ with 57 percent (Table 5.15). Returnees and new householders‘ views differed.
Nearly 69 percent of new tenants cited ―own entrance and address‖ compared to 43 percent of
returnees. Similarly, private parking was joint first among new tenants with 69 percent but fifth
among returnees with 29 percent, which is probably due to lower automobile ownership among
returnees. The small sample size of seven returnees might have been a determining factor as well,
although returnees‘ share of the public housing population was unknown. (HOPE VI officials did
not disclose the number of returnees among the 78 public housing households).
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Table 5.15 Baldwin‘s Run Features Householders‘ Like Most
Site Characteristics
Own Entry & Address
Safety
Parking
Backyard
Quiet/Peaceful

Percent Householders Interviewed
Returnees
New
All (n=23)
(n=7)
(n=16)
61
43
69
61
57
63
57
29
69
39
43
38
30
29
31

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Public Housing Household Survey

Table 5.16 show householders‘ main reasons for moving to Baldwin‘s Run. About 75
percent of them said ―appearance;‖ 48 percent said it was safer than where they lived before; 39
percent said ―wanting to live in a new house or needing a bigger place‖ and 35 percent said it was
the housing authority‘s decision, not theirs. Several of them said they had applied for public
housing a long time ago but their applications were placed on a waiting list and when Baldwin‘s
Run opened, they surprisingly received letters from the HA informing them of their selection for
housing at Baldwin‘s Run. Householders said that they accepted because the rent was lower than
what they were paying then and the conditions were better than before.

Table 5.16 Top Five Reasons Interviewees Moved to Baldwin‘s Run
Site Characteristics
Appearance
Safety
HACC decision
New House
Bigger Size

Percent Householder Interviewed
All (n=23)
Returnees (n=7)
78
86
48
43
35
27
39
28
39
-

New (n=16)
75
50
38
44
38

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Public Housing Household Survey

Virtually everyone said Baldwin‘s Run was a lot better than Westfield Acres. The
housing development is like an oasis given that the houses look better than the properties around
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it. The low density and single-family housing features gives the site the appearance of a suburban
type housing development rather than an inner-city project with public housing. In that regard the
redevelopment achieved the physical transformation intended. It now appears to be the
development of choice in East Camden in terms of attractiveness.
Safety is not a physical element, yet it can be enhanced or diminished by the quality of
the physical environment. Since almost 44 percent of interviewees said they moved to Baldwin‘s
Run for safety reasons; that is dramatic turn-around in perception about the site from the
dangerous place that returning residents said Westfield was and indicates the success of the
physical design changes. Table 5.17 shows the features that householders dislike most about
Baldwin‘s Run were the many restrictions; the open backyard; the lack of speed traps on the
streets to slow cars; and having no functioning playground for children.

Table 5.17 Baldwin‘s Run Features Householders‘ Dislike Most (by Percent)
Site Feature
Restrictions
Backyard
Speeding Cars
No Children Playground
Crime/Safety

Householders (n=23)
74
61
61
39
26

Returnees (n=7)
71
43
86
14
43

New (n=16)
75
69
50
50
19

Source: Baldwin‘s Run 2008 Public Housing Household Survey

When asked, 91 percent of participants said their living situations had improved since moving to
Baldwin‘s Run and nine percent said their living situations had not improved. A new tenant
summed up the views of most interviewees:
Everything has been positive so far. It feels good to be able to return home from work at
the end of the day to a home that one feels good about. I feel like I am home. It is a safer
environment for renters and it makes you want to succeed more in life; it is motivating.

140
5.3

Roosevelt Manor

In 2004, the HACC received a third HOPE VI revitalization grant to demolish all original 38 twostory, barracks-like apartment buildings (Figures 5.19 and 5.20) and facilitate building new
single-family type housing on the site and elsewhere in the neighborhood. The rebuilding plan
included twin, row, and condominium type affordable units and public housing rentals and
homeownership units onsite and offsite to serve households with a broad range of incomes
(HACC 2003a). HUD later issued 166 housing vouchers for relocating all households. More than
one year passed between relocation and demolition in 2007 and reconstruction did not start until
late 2008 and was set to end in 2010. The completed development is expected to have at least 230
units onsite and 438 units in other parts of the neighborhood. At the time of writing this
dissertation, the community center and a substantial number of housing units were completed and
occupied. The community building was one of the first building constructed in order to have a
place for supportive services.
5.3.1

Site Condition before HOPE VI

Franklyn D. Roosevelt Manor was built in the early 1950s in Centerville for the mostly AfricanAmerican population and was named in honor the United States 32nd President. When the
development opened in 1954, World War II and Korean Wars veterans received preference for
the 268 apartments. The 14-acre site is on Ferry Street adjoining Branch Village and a block from
Chelton Terrace. Sixty percent of the units had 3-bedrooms, 25 percent had 2-bedrooms, and 15
percent had 4-bedrooms. Each building contained 4 to 8 apartments and up to four apartments
shared a landing. The buildings had pitched roofs and brick façades but their barracks-like
appearance made their design unattractive. Figure 5.18, original site plan, shows that some of the
buildings were aligned to nearby streets and some were slanted to streets but all units faced
inwards. The site was really two superblocks with no through street, which was common to
public housing developments that were built in the modernist architecture tradition.
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Major site improvements were carried out in the 1990s but by 2003, continued physical
deterioration and social problems led to vacancy soaring to 32 percent of the 3-bedroom units and
20 percent of the 2-bedroom units (HACC 2003a). According to the revitalization plan, in
addition to physical deterioration, the development had become obsolete and difficult to operate
due to frequent flooding, mechanical and electrical systems breakdown, illicit drug activities,
vandalism, and extreme poverty. The first became known in the 1980s when the electrical and
mechanical systems began to malfunction and heavy rains began to flood certain areas because
the storm-water drainage system on the site was no longer adequate. Maintenance and repair did
not keep pace due to inadequate funding. Improvements done in the 1990s alleviated some
problems but others remained and did not halt the deterioration. The improvement works included
installation of new roofs and new facades, construction of boiler rooms for each building, and
renovation of kitchens and baths. These improvements alleviated some problems. By then, the
illicit drug trade had found its way into the development in a big way (HACC 2003a). With these
and other problems, the HA obtained HUD‘s permission to demolish the property and replace it
with a new mixed-income development. HUD rejected two HOPE VI requests before approving
the revised application in 2004 and awarded the HACC a $20 million HOPE VI revitalization
grant.
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Figure 5.18 Original Roosevelt Manor site\buildings layout plan. Note that apartment buildings
were oriented inwards. Most were angled diagonally or 90 degrees to streets.
Source: Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Redevelopment Plan, 2003
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Figure 5.19 Vacant Roosevelt Manor Buildings Figure 5.20 Vacated buildings at Roosevelt
Manor waiting demolition.
Awaiting Demolition, Spring 2007.

5.3.2

HOPE VI Improvement Plan

With 668 total units planned onsite and offsite, this is the largest of the three HOPE VI projects.
Like Westfield Acres, the entire project was demolished to create a new development. The
redevelopment plan includes 230 new single-family units onsite compared to 268 before and
another 438 single-family units offsite but in the neighborhood. It includes 101 units already
constructed in Phase II at Chelton Terrace. Overall, there will be 280 public housing units, 286
tax credit rentals, and 102 homeownership units (Table 5.17). That distribution will satisfy the
project goal of 42 percent public housing, 43 percent LIHTC units, and 15 percent owneroccupied housing. The projected 230 onsite units include at least 105 public housing units, plus
86 affordable homeownership units, and 39 tax credit units (Table 5.18). The HOPE VI
coordinator advised that the 86 homeownership units were to be on a separate 4-acre portion of
the site but that plan was later modified to integrate the homeownership units with the rental
units. The 438-offsite units include 16 affordable homeownership units, 208 public housing units,
and 214 LIHTC rentals. The inclusion of homeownership units is a deliberate attempt to stabilize
the neighborhood housing market (HACC 2003a). Chelton Terrace Phase III is to be a 66-unit
scheme at the Chelton Terrace site. The original Chelton Terrace had 200 apartments that the
housing authority demolished in 2005 and already built 167 new replacement townhouse units in
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Phases I and II. These 66 Phase III LIHTC rentals will complete the redevelopment at that site,
which will then have 233 single-family units.11
Table 5.18 Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Development Proposed Unit Mix
Onsite
Off-Site
Units Percent
Units
Percent
Public Housing Units
105
46
175
40
Owner-occupied Units12
86
37
16
4
LIHTC
39
17
247
56
Total Units
230
100
438
100
Source: Roosevelt Manor 2003 HOPE VI Revitalization Plan
Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100.

Unit Type

ALL
Units Percent
280
42
102
15
286
43
668
100

This HOPE VI project has three developers--Pennrose Properties, Ingerman Affordable
Housing Development, and Michael‘s Development Company. Pennrose Properties is responsible
for the two homeownership phases and one rental phase, including all the onsite units. Ingerman
is responsible for four offsite rental phases (all LIHTC units), including the Chelton Terrace
Phases II and II and the senior property already constructed and described elsewhere in this
section. Michael‘s Development, which also developed McGuire Gardens, is responsible for two
offsite rental phases and the 16 offsite homeownership units. Each developer also has
management responsibility for the units it builds. Each worked on two HOPE VI projects. Site
reconstruction began in 2008, which was several months later than projected, and was scheduled
to finish by the end of 2010. Ingerman began to build offsite units in Phase I in 2005. Phase I
consisted of 64 units in the new three-story, rental facility named Antioch Manor for adults aged
55 and over on a previously vacant plot on Ferry Avenue that is adjacent to Roosevelt Manor.
Sixty-six additional units were constructed later to complete this 130-unit facility in 2008. These
130 units are part of the offsite tax credit housing mix. This scatter-site approach to the
redevelopment is one of the strategies being used to deconcentrate poverty. Table 5.19 shows the

11

The two earlier phases did not involve HOPE VI funding. Funding came from other HUD and state sources.
Unsubsidized Units sold to households earning 80 to 120 percent of median income.

12
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unit mix before and after HOPE VI. By the end of 2009, 57 units in Phase V and 48 in Phase VII
were completed and occupied.

Table 5.19 Pre-HOPE VI and Proposed HOPE VI Housing Mix Roosevelt Manor Site
Bedrooms
1-Bedroom
2-Bedroom
3-Bedroom
4-Bedroom
Total

Original
Units
0
67
161
40
268

Public
Housing
39
127
94
20
280

HOPE VI Units (onsite & offsite)
OwnerTax Credit
Seniors
occupied
0
16
110
0
81
20
94
57
0
8
2
0
102
156
130

Total units
165
228
245
30
668

Sources: Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI CSS Plan (12/2004) & Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI 2003 Application

5.3.3

Site Improvements

The entire site was reconfigured to reduce density, to construct new streets, and to build
homeownership housing and public housing. The site was reconfigured deliberately to remove the
superblock layout and to create a compact urban neighborhood complete with small city blocks
and a street pattern that ties the development directly to the wider neighborhood. The 86 owneroccupied housing units, named Carl Miller Homes, are being constructed on 4.5 acres set aside in
the middle of the property bordering Ferry Avenue and Carl Miller Boulevard. The public and tax
credit rental housing occupies the remaining 10.5 acres north and south of the owner-occupied
houses. This arrangement separates the homeownership units from the rental units even though
HOPE VI requires the low-income units to be dispersed. It is not clear why the HACC proposed
clustering the units but one strong possibility is that it was done to make the homeownership units
more attractive to potential purchasers. The homeownership units are less attractive to
prospective buyers when they are integrated with public housing units. At several HOPE VI sites
visited, most of the owner-occupied units are separated from the rental units.
A new street system connects directly to neighborhood streets surrounding the
development. The streets are also finished with sidewalks, curb walls, and crosswalks. On-street
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parking allows residents to monitor their vehicles parked in front of their homes. In addition,
Defensible Space measures make clear separations between public and private spaces. In
addition, all houses face the street, and have individual private entrances defined by a street
number. Site infrastructure work includes improvements to sewer and water systems.
Site amenities include a new 8,000 square foot multi-purpose community building
(Figure 5.23), tot lot, and parking spaces. The multipurpose building has a small health center, a
daycare center, a Neighborhood Network Computer Center, management office, and a multiactivity room. Neighborhood redevelopment already undertaken or to be undertaken includes a
new community school and library (already constructed near the site before redevelopment
commenced), renovating the Isabel Miller community center on Carl Miller Boulevard, Stanley
Park, Elijah Park, and Johnson Park between Roosevelt Manor and Branch Village.
5.3.4

Unit Design Today

The physical plan seeks to transform the site by building semi-detached single-family houses and
townhomes architecturally styled to reflect the neighborhood character. The redevelopment plan
indicates that units are to be two-story semi-detached, two-story triples, quads, and townhouses in
one-bedroom, two-bedroom, three-bedroom, and four-bedroom configurations. The floor plans
for the 86-unit Miller Homes development include detached and semi-detached three-bedroom
and four-bedroom units only. Unit designs reflect architectural themes from private housing in
adjoining neighborhoods (HACC 2003a). In terms of size, the one-bedroom units range from 650
to 800 square feet, two bedroom units should range from 1,007 to 1,250 square feet, and three
bedroom units should range from 1,300 to 1,342 square feet. The sizes for the 4-bedroom units
were not disclosed. All units have front porches, semi-private front and backyards. Front porches
facilitate social interaction among residents. Figures 5.23 and 5.24 show two models of row
houses. The buildings in Figure 5.23 have prominent roof overhangs and units have prominent
front yards. In Figure 5.24, roofs are simpler with no overhang and front yards are smaller.
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Unlike the original development, the buildings and units are not uniform in design.
However, to avoid the public housing stigma, public housing, tax credits housing, and
homeownership housing have similar designs to make them indistinguishable from the outside.
On the inside, the redevelopment plan outlined energy efficient heating and air conditioning
systems, laundry connections, telephone and cable wiring for all units. Kitchens are to have
energy efficient electric ranges, refrigerators, and dishwashers; bedrooms are to be carpeted; and
bathrooms have tiled floors and mini blinds (HACC 2009). At the end of 2009, 57 public housing
units were completed and occupied in Phase V and 48 in Phase VII.

Figure 5.21 Multi-purpose Community Center Figure 5.22 Antioch Manor. Seniors housing
building at Roosevelt Manor.
facility by Antioch Baptist Church situated next
to Roosevelt Manor.

Figure 5.23 Town-house Units at Roosevelt
Manor.

Figure 5.24 A Six-family Rental Building at
Roosevelt Manor.
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5.4

Defensible Space and New Urbanism at HOPE VI Sites

As the preferred design philosophies in HOPE VI, Defensible Space and New Urbanism
principles are evident at all sites. A 1996 signed agreement between HUD and the Congress for
the New Urbanism (CNU) formalized New Urbanism‘s role as the preferred site design paradigm
in HOPE VI, while Defensible Space is used primarily to promote safety. HOPE VI developers
redesigned and reconfigured each distressed development using New Urbanism and Defensible
Space guidelines. The redeveloped sites do not occupy superblocks, densities are lower, internal
street networks connect directly to local streets, public and private areas are well-defined, and all
dwelling units face streets. Shared spaces include backyards and but every unit has a unique street
number address. These changes helped to improve the attractiveness of the sites. Table 5.20
summarizes the main Defensible Space features used.

Table 5.20 Defensible Space Features at Camden‘s HOPE VI Developments
Development
McGuire Gardens
Baldwin‘s Run
Roosevelt Manor

Public & Private
Space defined
Yes
Yes
Yes

Units Face
Streets
Yes
Yes
Yes

Private
Entrance
Yes
Yes
Yes

Street #
Address
Yes
Yes
Yes

Source: Site Observation

There are three types of single-family houses: detached, semi-detached, and row houses
(Newman 1980). In single-family homes, there is no shared interior space between units and the
grounds around the units are assigned to the individual units. Based on site observations and the
site plans reviewed, all three sites have single-family units only. Public housing units share
backyard space with bordering units but the owner-occupied units have private backyards.
Perimeter fences around the shared backyards restrict access to outsiders and give residents
access through the rear door of each unit.
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Site observations and interviews with householders at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s
Run indicate that householders had very limited use and almost no control of the spaces outside
their dwellings. Management rules limit how residents use those spaces and the kinds of activities
permitted. Because of the restrictions, several householders expressed indifference towards the
developments. McGuire Gardens‘ manager said the restrictions were implemented to avoid
ruining the appearance of the site. However, at Baldwin‘s Run the restrictions apply only to
public housing residents. Each site has maintenance workers who maintain the grounds and do
repairs. My conclusion is that the physical evidence of Defensible Space design exists but
residents have no control of the space around their dwellings, which contradicts the basic tenets
of Defensible Space: that residents, not management, control the outdoor space near their
dwellings. Defensible Space is not only about erecting physical or symbolic barriers; it is also
about defining the outdoor space and assigning responsibilities to residents however. Defensible
Space seeks to protect developments by increasing residents‘ involvement in caring for and
protecting their surroundings, to bring all residents into the social mainstream, and to give them a
measure of respect of property rights by assigning them their own spaces (Newman 1996).
New Urbanism emphasizes traditional neighborhood forms such as mixed-use,
walkability, public transit, diversity, houses with front porches that face streets, interconnected
streets, separation of public and private spaces, and minimum sharing of space such as entrances
to dwellings (Bohls 2000, Holin, et al. 2003, Congress for the New Urbanism 2010). Each
development exhibits aspects of New Urbanism.
Walkability emphasizes pedestrian-friendly street design such as placing buildings close
to and facing streets, and placement of porches, windows and doors to face streets, not each other.
Walkability includes provision of on-street parking and attractively landscaped streetscapes to
encourage walking. The three developments achieved some level of walkability through on-street
parking, positioning of housing units close to and facing streets; prominent front porches, and
doors and windows positioned to give residents adequate surveillance of their surroundings.

150
Connectivity refers to internal street networks to disperse traffic, facilitate walkability,
and tie the development to the locality. Each development should have its own internal street
system that matches the local street system. Walkability is limited because residents and vehicles
battle for road access. At McGuire Gardens and at Baldwin‘s Run, competition for road access
caused several tenants to express big concerns about speeding cars and motorbikes.
Diversity emphasizes a broad range of housing types, prices, and sizes to bring people
from diverse social and economic backgrounds into regular contact to establish and strengthen
personal and civic bonds. This principle applies most to Baldwin‘s Run and Roosevelt Manor
because they have diverse housing types (public and non-public) and facilitate a broader range of
household incomes. Being public housing only, McGuire Gardens does not provide as much
diversity as the two mixed-income sites. Still, within the 80 percent of AMI income limitation,
site management achieved some level of income diversity by allocating units to households in
different income bands. this helps to avoid poverty reconcentrating in the development. The two
mixed-income developments provide housing for households from a more diverse range of
economic backgrounds than the public housing only development.
New Urbanism emphasizes increased density to improve resource usage but the opposite
occurred at all three sites even though the original densities were not high to begin with. In the
case of Baldwin‘s Run, the original density was 20 units per acre but it is now eight units per
acre. This is an example of expediency at work. This strategy is to attract higher income families
to this inner-city housing development.
Overall, site and housing designs reflect strong efforts to incorporate architecture from
the surrounding area. In this regard, the mixed-income developments achieved better results than
the renovated site because modifications to existing structures were not required. Site
observations indicate that the houses at Baldwin‘s Run, along the lower half of 32 Street, strongly
resemble some of the housing styles in the adjacent community. Interestingly, the part of 32 nd
Street has only owner-occupied houses. One has to look elsewhere in the Dudley-Rosedale-
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Marlton area to find most of the models at the opposite side of the development where most of the
public housing units are located. In Centerville, where multifamily rental housing dominates,
most of the few private houses in existence are of two-story townhouse designs with pitched roofs
and covered front porches. Some of the new houses at Roosevelt Manor adopted this style while
others were modeled from housing design in adjoining neighborhoods.

5.5

Summary

Redevelopment changed the physical environment dramatically at all sites but the changes were
more dramatic at the two developments with both homeownership and public housing units. One
is the was the former Westfield Acres site, where a 197-unit development consisting of detached,
semi-detached, and attached single-family rental and homeownership houses and a 74-unit
property for seniors replace 18 apartment blocks and 514 units. The of site is Roosevelt Manor
where two and three-story single family houses are being built replace the previous 38 two-story
barracks-like buildings. The redeveloped sites have fewer total units and ewer public housing
units than before. As Table 5.21 shows, there is a 396-unit reduction in total units, a net loss of
415 public housing units but addition of 205 owner-occupied units.
The reopening of neighborhood streets through the developments makes each site appear
to be a part of the neighborhood rather than isolated, which achieves a fundamental HOPE VI
goal. Advocates argued that blocking neighborhood streets isolated the sites from their
surroundings and encouraged crime and other anti-social behaviors within the developments. The
most important outcome however is that large majorities of residents at both the rehabilitated site
and the one new site expressed satisfaction with the site and housing improvements.
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Table 5.21 Housing Units Before and After HOPE VI changes onsite
HOPE VI
Development
McGuire Gardens
Baldwin‘s Run
Roosevelt Manor
Total

Units
Before
368
514
268
1,150

Units
After
253
*271
230
754

Onsite Public
Housing
253
78
105
436

Offsite Public
Housing
0
50
175
225

LIHTC
Units
0
53
39
39

Private
Units
0
119
86
205

Sources: Westfield Acres 2000 and Roosevelt Manor 2003 HOPE VI Redevelopment Plans and
McGuire Gardens property manager office (no date)
*Includes 197 family units and 74 senior apartments
!
74 elderly units are a mix of LIHTC and public housing

CHAPTER 6
POVERTY DECONCENTRATION

A key HOPE VI goal is to deconcentrate poverty at severely distressed public housing sites
(Stegman Summer 2002). In this study, pre- and post-HOPE VI poverty characteristics data for
each are examined. The HACC used four strategies to deconcentrate poverty: relocation, income
mixing, strict re-entry criteria, and provision of self-sufficiency services to increase employment
and income and reduce dependence. Like other HAs, the HACC uses its new power to set strict
tenant policies to limit the return of very poor original tenants to redeveloped sites to reduce
poverty, even when they wanted to return. This practice is common at HOPE VI developments
(U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003). The analysis is limited to public housing tenants,
not homeowners, and uses the income categories shown in Table 6.1. This analysis uses
dependence on public assistance and income levels to assess poverty deconcentration. The
percentage of households that received public assistance is a poverty indicator (Boston 2005).
Reductions in public assistance may indicate increased income from other sources because public
assistance receipts depend on income from other sources such as employment. However,
decreases in welfare do not necessarily mean that income from other sources increased. Several
other factors can cause welfare benefits to decrease. There is a five-year lifetime limit on
receiving welfare benefits at which time recipients get less welfare benefits.
Table 6.1 Camden County Area Median Income and Income Limits, 1996, 1999 & 2008
Year

AMI

1996
1999
2008

$49,300
$63,800
$74,300

30% of AMI
Extremely low
income (ELI)
$14,799
$19,140
$22,290

Income Category
50% of AMI
80% of AMI
Very low income
Low income
(VLI)
(LI)
$24,650
$39,440
$31,900
$51,040
$37,150
$59,440

> 80% of AMI
Above low income
(ALI)
$39,441+
$51,041+
$59,440+

Source: HUD‘s Resident Characteristics Reports; HUD website13
13

http://www.novoco.com/low_income_housing/facts_figures/income_limits.php, (HUD PIC 2010)
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6.1
6.1.1

McGuire Gardens

Redevelopment Strategies

By the early 1990s, McGuire Gardens was known for being physically distressed, a haven for
criminal activities, and many very poor, welfare-dependent families (Holin, et al. 2003). Most
residents were African-American, including a large proportion of Hispanics.
As one of the first 13 HOPE VI grantees, redevelopment involved rehabilitation,
demolition, and new construction. Rehabilitation minimized the need to relocate residents and the
costs and disruptions associated with relocation. Seventy two households received housing
vouchers to relocate to private housing, some moved to other HACC properties, but some
remained onsite and the HA evicted so-called ―problems tenants‖ (details were not provided).
Physical redevelopment took place in two phases to facilitate onsite relocation. Upon completion
of Phase 1, residents moved into the completed units to facilitate completion of Phase 2.
Conversations with the social worker and site manager revealed that in 2007 and 2008,
most of the tenants were not original residents but first time public housing residents. Stricter reoccupancy rules kept many former residents out because they did not satisfy the new
requirements. A 2003 Urban Institute study noted that the stringent re-entry rules were relaxed at
first compared to some other HOPE VI sites (Holin, et al. 2003). Relaxing the rules might have
allowed many original residents to return at first but some appeared to have moved out later. The
householder survey done in this study also indicated that first time public housing tenants were
the majority of residents in 2008. In fact, new tenants were twice the number of returnees (22 to
10) in the study.
HACC HOPE VI officials divulged very little information about the relocation and
reoccupancy process, so the impact of the new rules on the initial return rate could not be
determined. Interviews, anecdotes and comments by residents and staff familiar with the
development provided valuable insights however. The admission policies manual that the site
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manager provided set out very strict admission rules but these new rules might have been
developed and put in place after the initial re-occupancy. The new re-occupancy rules require
applicants to undergo credit and criminal history screening, rent payment verification, utility
verification, employer proof of income, and home inspections, in addition to other previous
requirements. Failure to satisfy any one of these requirements can disqualify an applicant.
Like rehabilitated developments in other cities, this development retains its public
housing status after redevelopment (Holin, et al. 2003). The HOPE VI Coordinator said the HA
uses a form of income targeting to broaden the range of household incomes and to avoid
reconcentrating poverty in the development. Income targeting is a requirement under the
QHWRA as well. The QHWRA requires HAs to maintain HUD specified income targets for new
residents and the entire development. In practice, the HACC gives preference to applicants who
have job. The income mix that HUD requires for this development was not revealed, but HUD
generally requires 40 percent of new residents to have incomes in the ―extremely low income
category‖. To achieve the income diversity that the QHWRA requires, the HA prioritizes
applicants based on their income. Per HUD requirements, public housing units are rented to
households with incomes of up to 80 percent of the median income and 40 percent of the units
must be allocated to households with extremely low incomes (HACC 2009). In HOPE VI
developments, households with the best income potential usually get priority.
Results from the household survey show a small clustering of higher-income tenants
along one street and a preponderance of original tenants along another street in the development.
The findings show a clustering of original tenants on Jones Street, which may have resulted from
the phased redevelopment and onsite relocation. While the proportion of returnees to the
development is not known, the profile of returnees who participated in the household survey and
informal discussion with the onsite social workers indicate that returnees are generally older than
new residents. In addition, most returnees who participated in the survey were retired or have a
disability of some kind, and they depend heavily on government economic assistance programs.
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6.1.2

Impact on Residents: Changes in Poverty Indicators

Survey results indicate that in ―current dollar‖14 value, household income was higher than before
redevelopment. In the householder survey, the average household income among participants was
$13,145 in 2008 ($13,884 in the Resident Characteristics Report for September 30, 2008). In
comparison, the average household income of approximately $9,135 in the development before it
was redeveloped was 44 percent lower than that of survey participants and 52 percent lower than
the Resident Characteristics Report shows. Returnees reported 38 percent higher average
household income while new tenants reported approximately a 21 percent higher average
household income. One original two-adult household whose reported annual household income
exceeded $40,000 had a large positive effect on the overall average household income, but
especially for returnees. Only eight of the 10 original householders interviewed reported
household incomes and no other household reported income above $25,000. Without this outlier,
income distribution remains consistent between returnees and new tenants.
6.1.2.1 Income and Poverty Levels. Table 6.2 shows household income distribution in the
Resident Characteristics Report. For comparison, the year 1996 is used because the site was still
occupied then and that was the year for which reliable data was obtained. At that time, 81 percent
of households had annual incomes of $15,000 or less and 19 percent had between $15,000 and
$25,000. None had more than $25,000 annual income. With an AMI of $49,300 in 1996 dollars,
these figures indicate that close to 100 percent of residents had very low incomes, meaning they
earn less than 50 percent of AMI and close to 81 percent of them had extremely low incomes
(below 30 percent of AMI).
In the household survey, 70 percent of participants reported annual household incomes of
$15,000 or less and 26 percent reported household incomes between $15,000 and $25,000. Three
percent reported household income exceeding $25,000. Fifty percent of returnees and 77 percent

14

At current dollar values, inflation, time vale of money, and purchasing power are not considered.
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of the new tenants reported annual incomes of $15,000 or less and nearly 38 percent of returnees
and 23 percent of new tenants reported incomes between $15,000 and $25,000. Thirteen percent
of returnees reported annual incomes above $25,000 but no new householder did so. The Resident
Characteristics Report also shows marked differences in income from the pre-HOPE VI levels.
Approximately 63 percent had $15,000 or less in income, 24 percent had between $15,000 and
$25,000, and 14 percent had over $25,000 in annual income. The RCR figures are somewhat
similar to the survey results. The median income (AMI) for the Camden Metropolitan Area in
2008 was $74,300 (HUD 2008). Comparing these results to the poverty estimates in Table 6.1
indicate that about 83 percent of survey participants had ―extremely low incomes‖ compared to
81 before; 10 percent had ―very low incomes‖ compared to 19 percent before; and seven percent
had ―low incomes‖ compared to none before. The comparative figures in the Resident
Characteristics Report are approximately 75 percent, 22 percent, and 4 percent respectively.

Table 6.2 2008 Household Income Levels at McGuire Gardens
Household Income Category
Household Survey
Resident Characteristics Report

Low Above Low
Households Extremely Very Low
Income
Low Income Income Income
30
83
17
0
0
236
75
22
04
0

Sources: McGuire Gardens Resident Characteristics Report at September 30, 2008

Further analysis indicates that about 75 percent of returnees and 86 percent of new
tenants had ―extremely low incomes‖ and 14 percent of returnees and 26 percent of new tenants
had ―very low incomes‖. Clearly, then, despite the higher nominal incomes in 2008, poverty
levels remain very high since at least 75 percent of the households had ―extremely low incomes‖
of less than 30 percent of AMI.
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Table 6.3 Poverty Levels by Household Income at McGuire Gardens in 2007-2008
Data Source
Household
Survey

All Participants
Returnees
New Households

n
30
8
22

Extremely Very Low
Low Income Income
83
75
86

17
26
14

Low
Income

Above Low
Income

-

-

McGuire Gardens household survey
6.1.2.2 Dependence on Public Assistance. Research shows that high-poverty households have
low levels of earned income and high levels of public assistance. The household survey and the
RCR show that the largest source of income for public housing residents was public assistance,
including welfare. Most households obtained some form of public assistance, other than housing,
in 2007-2008. Approximately 60 percent of the 34 survey participants received Social Security
and TANF/welfare benefits (64 percent in the Resident Characteristics Report including 43
percent in social security and pension and 21 percent in welfare), 42 percent received earned
income, and 32 percent received income from other sources such as alimony and child support.
Municipal and state assistance are not included, so in reality, more than 64 percent likely received
some form of public benefit. Before redevelopment, 59 percent of residents received welfare
benefits and only 15 percent had earned income as their main source of income. Welfare
dependency appeared to have decreased substantially as the RCR shows but this may have to do
with changes in welfare policy implemented after 1996 that limit welfare benefits to five years
rather than to HOPE VI. Overall, there appears to be little change in dependence on government
support. The relative share of income from each source changed but not the overall level of
dependence. To be certain, more research is needed to fill the gaps in the data.
Before site redevelopment began in 1999, about 22 percent of the residents in Block
Group 4 of Census Tract 6013, which includes McGuire Gardens, reported income from
employment as their main income (Census 2000) compared to 15 percent at McGuire Gardens in
1996 (HUD 1996). In comparison, among survey participants, 32 percent (42% in the RCR for
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September 2008) said earned income was their main income in 2007/2008. This suggests that a
larger proportion of residents had jobs and earned more in 2008 than in 1996.
The specific deconcentration goals for this development are unclear but the findings show
that five years after redevelopment, despite higher rates of employment and higher earnings,
unemployment remains problematic, the average household income remains very low, and a high
proportion of the residents still depends heavily on government aid programs even though most
current residents are new tenants, not returnees. This being the case, can we say that concentrated
poverty no longer exists in this development? There are indications of lower levels of poverty in
the development but given the paucity of baseline information, it is not feasible to make that
conclusion. The social workers onsite advised that it was difficult to find householders because
many of them were at work. The survey results probably do not give an accurate representation of
the employment or poverty situation because of sampling limitations, but the Resident
Characteristics Report does not have that limitation since it covers almost every household in the
development. Nevertheless, study survey results compare favorably with the RCR results. It is
therefore fair to say extreme poverty remains a problem at this development in 2008.
6.1.3

Householders‟ Perceptions of Changes

To gauge residents‘ views, householders were asked several questions about their impressions of
the new development. Although McGuire Gardens has no owner-occupied housing, residents
were asked about mixing public housing and owner-occupied (private) housing together, as done
at nearby Baldwin‘s Run. Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 show the results. Most householders said they
were aware that Baldwin‘s Run had homeownership housing and thought that it was a good idea.
About 68 percent of them agreed with the assertion that mixing households with different levels
of income in the same development would improve the quality of life in a subsidized housing
development. However, nearly 18 percent disagreed. New householders appeared to be much
more sanguine about it than returnees because 75 percent of them agreed compared to 50 percent
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of returnees. Approximately 68 percent of householders who said mixing owner-occupied and
public housing would improve the quality of life in HOPE VI developments also said the
presence of homeowners would motivate renters to achieve more for themselves on their own. A
few residents also said it would motivate them to aspire to owning their own home as well. Most
others said income mixing was the right thing to do because communities and people should not
be separated based on income.
Table 6.4 Householder Support for Mixed-Tenure Housing
Response
Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Strongly Disagree
Incomplete
Don‘t Know

ALL (n=34)
56
12
18
6
9

Households
Original (n=10)
40
10
40
10
0

New (n=24)
54
21
15
4
8

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey

The householders who disagreed were emphatic in their opposition. They noted that there
was no shortage of housing for wealthier families but this was not so for low-income people and
so there was no need for homeownership housing. They also stated that owner-occupied housing
would reduce the number of housing units available to lower income people. Several of them
expressed concern that in mixed-tenure developments, homeowners may want to ―show-off‖.
When asked about the public and private housing mix they preferred, 50 percent of
respondents said they should be mixed equally, 24 percent said all units should be public housing,
and 15 percent said there should be more public housing units than private units. Nearly 50
percent of returnees said ―public housing only‖ or ―more public housing than private units‖ but
only 33 percent of new tenants agreed. In addition, while 40 percent of returnees said they
preferred an equal number of public and private housing units, more than 50 percent of new
tenants did so. Overall, new tenants showed a greater preference for mixing public and owneroccupied housing than did returnees.
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Table 6.5 Householders‘ Preferred Mix of Public and Private Housing
All (n=32)

Responses
Public Housing Only
Equally
More Public Housing
Don‘t Know
Incomplete

Original (n=23)

New (n=8)

30
40
20
0
10

21
54
13
8
4

24
50
15
6
6

Source: McGuire Gardens Household Survey

6.2

Baldwin‟s Run

Demolishing Westfield Acres apartments removed about 433 poor families from the site, which
automatically eliminated concentrated poverty from the site and reduced poverty in the
neighborhood. At its peak, Westfield Acres had about 1,800 residents but when HUD awarded
the HOPE VI grant in 2003 about 1,100 residents. Unlike McGuire Gardens where some residents
remained onsite during redevelopment, all Westfield Acres residents were relocated offsite to
facilitate redevelopment but the procedures used to deconcentrate poverty were the same. The
existing residents had the option of moving to another public housing development or accepting
vouchers to rent housing in the private market. Some residents were relocated to McGuire
Gardens and Ablett Village developments but the majority accepted vouchers to relocate to
private housing.
6.2.1

Redevelopment Goals and Strategies

Details of the actual relocation were not provided but the redevelopment plan indicates that the
housing authority had planned to move 161 households to other public housing developments in
the city and allocate housing vouchers to 208 households. Since the goal was to eliminate
concentrated poverty at the housing site, the housing authority only needed to relocate the
residents and demolish the buildings to accomplish that goal. However, the HA built new rental
and homeownership units on the site. Constructing both rental housing and owner-occupied
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housing was a part of the plan to avoid reconcentrating poverty in the new development. This is
unlike the strategy used at McGuire Gardens, where all units remain public housing after
redevelopment. The difference is in the financing arrangements. This project used mixed
financing, which began in 1996, two years after the 1994 award to McGuire Gardens where
HOPE VI funded the entire redevelopment.
To satisfy the requirements of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act, public
housing units are allocated based on income. To do so, the HA grouped applicants‘ household
incomes according to HUD‘s income limits as follows: less than 30 percent of AMI, 30 to 50
percent of AMI, 50 to 80 percent of AMI, and greater than 80 percent of AMI (Valentine 2008).
For each income category, a fixed percentage of units are for households with incomes in that
category. Figure 6.1 shows 197 total units, 119 private units, and 78 public units at a ratio of
almost 60 to 40. HUD requires new developments to maintain a minimum of 40 percent public
housing units. At Baldwin‘s Run, these figures represent reductions of 61 percent in total units
and 85 percent in public housing units from 514 public units. Household incomes from 80 to 120
percent of median qualify for private housing, and those earning up to 80 percent of median
income qualify for public housing. The initial redevelopment plan projected a 32 percent return
rate after redevelopment (HACC 2000) but the actual number that returned was not ascertained.
Additionally, very strict re-entry criteria requiring returnees to meet standards of personal
conduct, credit worthiness and employment standards act as a barrier to the redeveloped sites for
the lowest income families. HUD notes that relocated residents ―in good standing‖ have the
opportunity to move to new housing units when they are available. The new HACC rules require
returnees to complete new applications and satisfy stringent and intrusive income and credit
verification; criminal history, employment history, and rental history checks; home inspections,
and references (HACC 2005). These requirements keep low-income households out because they
are not realistic for low-income households who generally do not have good credit and many who
do not have jobs and have not had meaningful employment for long periods. Intended or not, the
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requirements are a deterrent to some residents returning. Some end up moving to other public
housing developments. The housing authority also said returning residents would get first
preference for the 78 public housing units, yet the new requirements effectively ruled many of
them out. The housing authority can easily use the new rules to deny HOPE VI housing to lower
income original tenants who have irregular rent payment histories. In fact, the 2000 CSS plan
indicates a preference for employed applicants with reliable incomes. The new procedures
effectively eliminated some householders who wanted to return. Additionally, the HACC plan
was for a return rate of 32 percent of original residents after redevelopment. The more restrictive
re-entry criteria came about primarily because of the profit-making desire of private
redevelopment partners, particularly mortgage lenders, for the public housing component of the
HOPE VI project to be self-supporting (Freeman 1998).
6.2.2

Impact on Residents: Changes in Poverty Indicators

6.2.2.1 Income and Poverty Levels. In the survey of 23 residents, the average household
income was higher than before redevelopment. This does not necessarily mean that returnees
have higher incomes. Based on the self-reported annual household incomes, the average
household income for survey participants was approximately $12,386. Based on a sample of 68
public housing households, the average annual household income in the RCR for June 30, 2007 to
September 30, 2008 was $16,431. In Table 6.6, which shows pre-redevelopment income, 90
percent of householders reported $15,000 or less in annual income. In the household survey, 55
percent of householders reported $15,000 or less in annual income and 46 percent reported more
than $15,000 in annual income in 2007/2008. The household survey figures show significant
improvements in income distribution over pre-HOPE VI household income because current
residents have somewhat higher incomes.

Percentage of Households
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Figure 6.1 The main sources of income reported by Baldwin‘s Run public
housing tenants for 2007 to 2008 based on a sample of 23 householders.

The household survey and RCR data suggest that the percentage of households with
earned income declined among public housing tenants. In the 2000 site revitalization plan, the
HACC reported that 37 percent of the households had earned income but in the household survey,
30 percent of participants reported earned income for 2007/2008 (36 percent the RCR) (Figure
6.1). Based on these results, the poverty deconcentration measures do not appear to have had the
anticipated impact. The evidence from the household survey and Resident Characteristics Report
suggests no improvement because poverty among first time public housing householders appears
to be marginally worse than that for the pre-HOPE VI householders. The new tenants appear to
be just as poor as the original tenants, even the federal government implemented the HOPE VI
program to improve living conditions for existing residents. Given these findings, the evidence
suggest that at Baldwin‘s Run, homeowners and first time public housing tenants are preferred to
original tenants who suffered through the years of distress.
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Table 6.6 Household Incomes for Westfield Acres and Baldwin‘s Run
Household Income
$0
$0 - $5,000
$5,001 - $10,000
$10,001 - $15,000
$15,001 - $20,000
$20,001 - $25,000
Above $25,000

Westfield Acres
(n=581)
2
28
46
15
7
3
1

2008 Survey
(n=23)
0
32
18
5
23
23
0

RCR 9/2008
(n=68)
1
3
26
22
16
12
19

Source: Westfield Acres 2003 Revitalization Plan, Resident Characteristics
Report at September 30, 2008, and Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey
Note: Due to rounding, totals may not all equal 100 percent.

Regarding changes in poverty levels, analysis of household income data shows that the
proportion of households reporting extremely low annual incomes of $15,000 or less declined
from nearly 90 percent before redevelopment to 50 percent and the proportion of households who
reported annual incomes above $15,000 increased from only 10 percent before redevelopment to
50 after redevelopment. Overall, 69 percent of the public housing tenants had ―extremely low
incomes,‖ while 25 percent had ―very low incomes‖, four percent had ―low incomes‖. Only two
percent of households reported annual incomes above the low income mark of 80 percent of
median income (Table 6.7). These are big improvements in income distribution from the preHOPE VI era but they are still very low incomes and therefore insufficient to lift tenants out of
extreme poverty.

Table 6.7 Poverty Levels for Public Housing Households at Baldwin‘s Run in 2007-2008
Poverty Level
Below 30% of Median
(extremely low income)
Below 50% of Median
(very low income)
Below 80% of Median
(low income)
Above 80% Median
(above low income)
Data Unavailable

All
(n=23)

Household Survey
Returnees New Households
(n=7)
(n=16)

RCR (9/2008)
(n=68)

74

86

69

69

22

14

25

25

0

0

0

4

0

0

0

1

4

0

6

0

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey and Resident Characteristics Report for 9/2008
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6.2.2.2 Dependence on Public Assistance. Overall, results from the household survey and the
Resident Characteristics Report indicate that despite having higher average incomes than preHOPE VI households have, public housing households in this HOPE VI development remain
heavily dependent on government economic assistance. About 65 percent said they received
public assistance in 2007-2008, including 70 percent of returnees and 64 percent of new
households. This 65 percent includes half of the new householders who had jobs but it does not
include the two employed returnees. The presence of large numbers of households with disabled
and elderly members who received public assistance such as disability income, childcare
assistance, social security, and pension helps to explain these outcomes. Given that 50 percent of
the new tenants in the household survey who were employed also received public assistance
suggests that they earn very low salaries and wages. The RCR, which covers 95 percent of the
households, showed a similarly high 65 percentage that received public assistance during the 15
month period ending September 30, 2008, as the study survey. Compared to the 56 percent of
pre-HOPE VI tenants who depended on public assistance, HOPE VI public housing tenants
appeared to be more reliant on public assistance in 2007-2008 than 1996 public housing tenants
did. One of the self-sufficiency goals is to reduce dependence on public aid programs but that
goal appeared to have missed in 2007-2008.
6.2.3

Householders‟ Perceptions of Changes

Survey participants were asked to assess the poverty deconcentration measures implemented.
Most agreed with the HOPE VI view that having public housing tenants and homeowners in the
same development improves the quality of life in the development (Table 6.8). About 61 percent
agreed (44 percent strongly agreed and 17 percent agree) whereas 31 percent disagreed (22
percent strongly disagree and nine percent disagreed). A slightly higher percentage of new
householders to returnees (63 percent) to 57 percent of returnees agreed but a bigger percentage
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of returnees (43 percent to 25 percent of new householders) disagreed. Although the majority
agreed, it was not a large majority.

Table 6.8 Income Mixing Improves Quality of Life: Householders Views
Response
Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Don‘t Know

ALL
(n=23)
44
17
4
9
22
4

Original
(n=7)
43
14
0
14
27
0

New
(n=16)
44
19
6
6
19
6

Source: HOPE VI study Household Survey

During the interviews, some new residents appeared reluctant to disagree with the
proposition but returnees were more emphatic in their disagreement. Most tenants who disagreed
said they did so because there was a greater need for low-income housing than for middle-income
housing. Some of them said they feared that income mixing would give homeowners the
opportunity to ―show off‖ or boast. In a June 2008 interview, a female householder who said she
strongly disagreed with the proposition also said she believed income mixing would help renters
make good decisions such as wanting to buy a house in the development. Although the majority
of interviewees said income mixing would improve the quality of life in the development, many
of them expressed concern that the existing income mixing arrangement did not benefit public
housing tenants much because homeowners received preferential treatment from the private
management firm and the housing authority. One householder said, ―mixing is ok if every
household has the same privileges but here at Baldwin‘s Run, homeowners have more privileges
than renters‖. Another new tenant agreed, saying:
Homeowners get to do whatever they want, plus they have screen doors and so when
people come here they can tell which ones are private and which ones are public. They
make it seem like they are better than us public housing people. Yes, it would help to
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keep the place but because they can have stuff and we can‘t, it cause separation, and
people (visitors) question about the difference.

Concurring with the above comments, a Westfield Acres returnee said:
Mixing takes away the stigma of public housing as ghetto and for the poor. It makes
people feel better about themselves and their surroundings, but the differences between
private and public housing homes are obvious, which defeats the purpose of HOPE VI.

When asked about to state the public/private housing mix they preferred, 65 percent of
respondents said they preferred an equal mix but 22 percent said all units should be public
housing. Nearly 71 percent of returnees and 63 percent of new tenants wanted and equal number
of public housing and private units but 14 percent of returnees and 25 percent of new tenants
wanted all units to be public housing in the development. These differences may not be
statistically significant but they show differences between returnees‘ and new tenants‘
perceptions of the income mixing and mixed-tenure arrangements. The results suggest that public
housing householders support income mixing but they were ambivalent about it due to the lack of
good quality low-income housing in the neighborhood. Given the small sample size however,
these results are only indicative.

Table 6.9 Baldwin‘s Run Householders Preferred Housing Mix
Response
ALL (n=23) Returnees (n=7) New (n=16)
Public Housing Only
22
14
25
Equally
65
71
63
More Public Housing
9
14
6
Don‘t Know
4
0
6
Source: Baldwin‘s Run 2007-2008 Household Survey
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Mixed-income housing proponents are of the view the construction of mixed-income
housing developments as necessary to eliminate concentrated poverty and to get lower-income
people to learn acceptable middle class values regarding work, family, and education (Brophy
and Smith 1997, Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997, Smith 2002). For that to happen however,
middle- and low- income residents need to interact with each other. To test this idea, survey
participants were asked about their relationship with their neighbors. The responses show very
limited interaction between public housing residents and homeowners but several close
relationships among tenants. Two householders said they knew and communicate with
homeowners but did not learn anything from them. Most others said they communicate regularly
with other public housing tenants. Householders believed that homeowners received preferential
treatment and that it was a source of tension between homeowners and tenants, which contrast
with the friendly relations observed between tenants while conducting interviews. Some even
stop by to say ―hello‖.
Several tenants described their relationship with neighbors as ―good‖ but when
questioned further, they described good to mean saying ―hello‖. Some residents said it meant the
absence of conflict and being polite to one another. A few householders said they were too busy
to maintain friendly relations with neighbors. Overall, the survey showed no evidence of values
transferring from homeowners to tenants that would benefit them.
In interviews, several householders said their new housing environment had impacted
their lives positively because their families were happier than before. Some householders said that
their children were a lot happier and that there were fewer sibling conflicts. Householders with
disabled/handicapped family members said they were very pleased to live in units that were
―handicap accessible‖ because they no longer climb stairs to get to their apartments.
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6.3
6.3.1

Roosevelt Manor

Redevelopment Goals and Strategies

The HOPE VI plan outlined the following poverty deconcentration goals for this project:
1) reduce the percentage of ―very low-income‖ households to 34 percent or less,
2) having at least 58 percent of households with earned income as primary income,
3) reduce to 34 percent or less the number of households with annual incomes of less than
50 percent of AMI,
4) fewer than 11 percent of households having TANF as primary income, and
5) reduce the share of households whose main income source is ―other than wages and
TANF‖ (HACC 2003a).
Poverty deconcentration strategies included relocation, demolition, and income mixing and very
strict re-entry criteria. Owner-occupied housing and LIHTC housing are mixed with public
housing to create a mixed-income development. The 2005 CSS plan outlined the criteria to obtain
HOPE VI housing. To be considered for HOPE VI housing, HACC requires original residents to
submit new applications and undergo a rigorous assessment. The assessment includes credit,
employment, and criminal history checks; employment and income verification; rent payment
history and home inspections. New tenants must also pass utility verification checks. All
household members age 17 and over must undergo criminal history background checks, which
must show no record of criminal activity that the HA deems threating to the development.
Applicants must show continuous employment for six consecutive months or demonstrate at least
one year participation in a CSS program and actively seeking employment. Returning residents
may not have housekeeping deficiencies for the past nine months. Some of these requirements are
unrealistic for some public housing residents but they are effective in keeping ―undesirable‖
tenants out of the new development. The HACC might not have intended the rules to be a poverty
deconcentration tool but that is the effect. The new rules effectively eliminate some households
on economic terms because they are just too poor to have good credit and other requirements.
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The April 2005 revised Community and Support Services plan noted that the 166 original
households would receive housing vouchers to rent a private market house or apartment or
relocated to other developments, unless they are evicted or if they move out voluntarily.
Relocation sites included neighboring Branch Village, which is itself visibly distressed and slated
for demolition as soon as possible. The number of residents who received vouchers to move to
private housing was not disclosed but the HOPE VI Coordinator said HUD awarded 166 Housing
Choice Vouchers for the development, which is one voucher per occupied unit. The 2003
redevelopment plan also mentioned that more than 50 percent of the original residents expressed
the desire to return after redevelopment but the CSS Coordinator said only 15 percent would
receive HOPE VI housing offsite and onsite (Pagan 2008).
The project incorporates Phase III of Chelton Terrace redevelopment. Using its own
funds and non-HOPE VI funds, the HACC demolished Chelton Terrace in 2005 and replaced 166
of the units in two phases, Phases I and II. Phase III will complete the rebuilding process. HUD
added 66 families from Chelton Terrace to the 166 from Roosevelt Manor to make 232 original
families eligible for HOPE VI benefits. The 232 families consisted of 701 persons; 41 percent
were adults 18 to 64 years, 56 percent were dependent children under age 18, and three percent
were seniors 65 and over.
To avoid poverty reconcentrating at the site, the new development will have Public
housing, owner-occupied, and LIHTC housing to satisfy different household income needs.
However, only 39 percent of the original 268 public housing are being replaced. That means no
more than 63 percent of the original would be able to return in the unlikely event that all public
units were awarded to returnees. The 95 or so public housing units to be built offsite will
compensate for some but not all of the reduction in onsite units. Ultimately, the goal is to have no
more than 34 percent ―very low-income‖ tenants (tenants with incomes less than 30 percent of
AMI). Homeownership and LIHTC units are for higher income households to ensure so that not
all tenants have very low incomes. Households earning up to 80 percent of AMI are eligible for
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public housing and households earning up to 120 percent of AMI qualify for the homeownership
units (HACC 2003). Table 6.11 shows the income guidelines the HACC uses in HOPE VI.
Table 6.10 Income Band used to Income Mixing
Type of Unit
Public Housing
Tax Credit Family/Senior
Section 8 Family/Senior
Owner Occupied

Income Requirement
Up to 80 percent of AMI
30 to 50 percent of AMI
Up to 50 percent of AMI
Up to 120 percent of AMI

Source: Roosevelt Manor 2003 HOPE VI Application

6.3.2

Changes in Poverty Indicators

Since there was no survey at this site, only data from the Residents Characteristics Reports for
Phase V and Phase VII, the completed sets of occupied public housing onsite. According to HUD
data on its website, the 2009 AMI for Camden area is $77,800. Thirty percent is $23,340 and the
RCR shows that almost 85 percent of Phase V households had incomes lower than 30 percent of
the AMI while about 15 percent had incomes above 30 percent of AMI (Table 6.11). Households
in Phase VII fared even worse since 89 percent of them had incomes lower than 30 percent the
AMI and only 11 percent had incomes above that figure. Since 98 percent of pre-demolition
households had incomes lower than 30 percent of AMI, the HOPE VI households had higher
incomes in 2009 to 2010 than the previous households but the HOPE VI households are still very
poor. In terms of income distribution, all household incomes were below $20,000 annually.
The number of returnees also appears to be well below the 15 percent the CSS
Coordination said the HACC had expected to return (Brown-Pagan interview, 10/2008). In the
Resident Characteristics Reports, 13 percent of Phase V householders and 2 percent in Phase VII
lived in public housing previously. Thus, of the 100 HOPE VI public housing households, 93
percent are new and 7 percent are returnees. The number of Roosevelt Manor returnees may even
be lower because the eight tenants may include tenants from other developments (the data does
not show origin). Because returnees are so few, most of the original families who endured the
distressed conditions before redevelopment and who wanted to return, did not return.
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Table 6.11 Poverty Levels for Roosevelt Manor Public Housing Households in 2009-2010
Income Level
Extremely Low Income
Very Low Income
Low Income
Above Low Income
Income Source:
Welfare
Pension\SS\SSI
Work

Percentage
(< 30% AMI)
(30% - 50% AMI)
(51% - 80% AMI)
(> 80% AMI)

Income
$23,340
$23,340 - $38,900
$38,900 - $62,240
$62,240+

Phase V
85
11
0
0

Phase VII
89
15
0
0

-

-

24
39
39

35
37
46

Source: Resident Characteristics Reports for 15 months ending December 2010

6.3.3

Impact on Residents

The Resident Characteristics Reports show higher percentages of residents at both locations who
receive public assistance. The RCRs show that 63 percent of Phase V households and 72 percent
of Phase VII households received public assistance payments as their main income in 2009.
Compared to the pre-HOPE VI figure of 58 percent, a higher proportion of current householders
received public assistance in 2009. This is a surprising outcome because one of the project goals
is to decrease dependency on public assistance and because nearly all the householders were new.
Public assistance includes welfare benefits and pension, social security (SS) and supplemental
security income (SSI) but the welfare portion of these totals were smaller than the pension\SS\SSI
contribution. Although the HOPE VI tenants had higher incomes than the pre-HOPE VI tenants
did, a higher percentage of HOPE VI tenants received public assistance in 2009 than the preHOPE VI tenants did.
HOPE VI impact on earned income was negligible among Phase V residents in 2009
because 39 percent of households had earned income as their main source of income. This is
marginally better than the 38 percent before of pre-HOPE VI residents who had earned income as
their main income source. Phase VII residents feared better as 46 percent of the households there
reported income from employment as their main source of income.
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Overall, HOPE VI households have higher incomes and poverty levels appear to be
somewhat lower since redevelopment. However, the average household income at both locations
remains about the same as before demolition. Improvements in income diversity appear to be the
reason for the poverty levels improving. Based on Table 6.12, just 10 percent of pre-HOPE VI
residents had annual household incomes exceeding $15,000 but about 37 percent of Phase V
residents and 43 percent of Phase VII households achieved that figure. Since the number of
returnees is so few, it is not clear why public assistance receipts were higher. These figures from
the RCRs indicate that the project‘s five poverty deconcentration goals mentioned earlier (Section
6.3) for 2009-2010 did not materialize.

Table 6.12 2009 Household Income Distribution and Income Category
Particulars
Household Income

RCR Phase V

RCR Phase VII

Percent of Households Percent of Households
(n=48)
(n=54)

$0
$1 - $5,000
$5,001 - $10,000
$10,001 - $15,000
$15,001 - $20,000
$20,001 - $25,000

0
11
24
22
15
17

0
7
30
26
11
11

Above $25,000

11

15

Poverty Category
Extremely low Income
Extremely low Income
Extremely low Income
Extremely low Income
Extremely low Income
Extremely low Income
to Very low income
Very Low income

Source: Roosevelt Manor 2003 Revitalization Plan and Resident Characteristics Reports for
Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Phases V and VII at April 30, 2010.

6.4

Summary of Findings

Based on the data shown, the three HOPE VI developments have less poverty and increased
income diversity. Each has a smaller proportion of public housing households with average
annual incomes of less than 50 percent of AMI and a higher proportion of households that have
incomes above 50 percent of AMI. The main strategies used to deconcentrate poverty were
relocation, demolition, and income mixing and original residents are replaced in the new onsite
units with higher income households. Residents had three relocation choices: 1) housing vouchers
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to rent private market housing, 2) move to a different public housing, or 3) leave federally public
housing altogether. Redevelopment strategies varied from one site to site. Whereas most units at
McGuire Gardens were rehabilitated, the two later developments were completely demolished
and replaced with new housing. In addition to income mixing, the housing authority uses incometiering to diversify the population mix to avoid reconcentrating poverty. Income tiering was used
mainly at McGuire Gardens where all the units are public housing. Income targeting does not
appear to be consequential however because poverty remains very high.
Except for Roosevelt Manor, the poverty deconcentration goals were unclear. It is
therefore difficult to assess poverty deconcentration at Baldwin‘s Run and McGuire Gardens.
Most of the public housing residents are new to public housing and only a few original tenants
returned. The return rate was higher at the rehabilitated site than at the mixed-income sites. At the
rehabilitated site, all units are public housing and the onsite relocation ensured that not all original
tenants were relocated. The redevelopment strategies at the mixed-income sites were different
and required the HA to apply higher selection standards to appease the private homeowners at
those sites and the private investors. At the rehabilitated site, the HA did not have those demands
to contend with. Deconcentration addressed concentrated poverty at the HOPE VI site but ignored
it in the communities that received relocated residents. In none of the projects did the poverty
deconcentration strategies involve reducing concentrated poverty in the wider neighborhood. The
focus was always the housing site. If the wider neighborhoods were involved, it is not evident.

CHAPTER 7
RESIDENT SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Having my own bills helps me to budget better and teaches me how to be responsible
with my finances.
(New tenant at McGuire Gardens in 2008)
The absence of economic resources among and assistance to public housing residents is a
consistent, pervasive, and inexorably destructive contributor to distress.
(NCSDPH 1992, p. 3)
The statement above by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing
describes the situation that confronted residents at the three study developments before
redevelopment. Many residents were desperately poor and depended heavily on public assistance
programs. Whether or not residents intend to return after revitalization, HOPE VI revitalization
grants fund supportive services to the original residents and new residents to enable them to make
progress towards achieving economic self-sufficiency and leave assisted housing eventually (U.S.
Government Accountability Office 2003).
Self-sufficiency support is related to poverty deconcentration since the goal is to increase
employment and income and reduce dependence on government. According to the HACC
website, the self-sufficiency mission is to provide employment, education, entrepreneurship, and
healthcare opportunities to residents to increase economic self-sufficiency and reduce dependency
on government.15 The supportive services provided at each site ranged from a few initiatives at
McGuire Gardens to several programs at Roosevelt Manor. The list of services include vocational
skills training, language training; childcare, youth, family, and senior services; and case
management services. Case managers assess the needs of each family and make referrals where
necessary to the appropriate service provider(s).

15

The HACC web address is http://www.camdenhousing.org/Departments/HOPEVI/tabid/88/Default.aspx

176

177
The HACC does not have specific measures to assess residents‘ self-sufficiency progress
and the service/program ends when the HOPE VI project end or earlier if funds the run out. The
study uses the level of dependency on public assistance, employment and unemployment levels,
average household income, and poverty status to assess self-sufficiency outcomes among at each
HOPE VI site. The self-sufficiency questions in the householder survey addressed employment,
income, education, and training to understand the impact of the services.

7.1

McGuire Gardens

A survey by Abt Associates in 1996 noted that some residents were self-starters and extremely
capable of helping themselves but most had few skills and lacked self-motivation. Virtually all
residents lacked the experience of doing things for themselves (Holin, et al. 2003) and therefore
needed much self-help assistance. Nevertheless, before HOPE VI, the HACC had no program in
place to assist poor residents escape poverty and dependency on public assistance. Despite
lacking the experience and the in-house capacity to provide social services to residents, the HOPE
VI contract required the HACC to develop and implement community support and selfsufficiency programs to move residents towards greater economic independence.
7.1.1

Goals

The full list of self-sufficiency initiatives implemented at McGuire Gardens during
redevelopment is not clear because the HOPE VI officials did not provide answers to repeated
requests for information about the actual programs implemented. Inquiries to three key HOPE VI
officials did not reveal any information about the programs implemented or their outcomes. After
one senior officer promised to supply the requested information, another officer emailed to say
the HA had no more information to provide. Information about the self-programs implemented at
this site and used in this study came from the 1996 HOPE VI Baseline Assessment, the Interim
Assessment of the HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report, and residents‘ comments.
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Holin, et al (2003) reported that the HA prepared an elaborate self-sufficiency plan but its
implementation was problematic and hampered by numerous delays that forced the HACC to
drop most of the initial proposals. The initial CSS plan proposed life and occupational skills
training, small business ownership opportunities, and several initiatives to help lift residents out
of poverty and dependency.
The revised CSS plan included case management services to help families formulate
strategies to move from poverty and dependency to economic self-sufficiency and training in
occupational and entrepreneurial skills (Holin, et al. 2003). Abt Associates (1996) noted that Case
Management‖ was the core resident service proposed in the Community and Supportive Services
plan. Case managers were supposed to help families create family plans to guide them towards
economic self-sufficiency. Other services planned included parenting seminars, budget and credit
counseling, medical services, homemaking and life-skill workshops, and educational
opportunities such as GED classes and English language training for non-native speakers. The
HACC even planned to facilitate small resident-owned business start-ups. Unfortunately, few
services were available to help residents make the transition to better housing and greater selfsufficiency while the site underwent rehabilitation (Holin, et al. 2003) and few residents reported
receiving any services. Only three services were said to be available to residents during
redevelopment, namely: a drug prevention program, an after-school program that the Residents‘
Council operated, and a referral service that operated out of the tenant relations office (Holin, et
al. 2003, Abt Associates, et al. 1996). Original residents reported that they also participated in
family counseling and parenting classes.
Despite the revision, additional implementation problems forced the housing authority to
enter into contractual arrangements with social service providers in Camden for limited services
that the HA provided. In the end, despite the lengthy redevelopment period and several changes,
residents received few self-sufficiency services during redevelopment (Holin, et al. 2003). Since
reoccupation of the site however, residents have had opportunities to participate in other
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programs and services arranged by the management office. HOPE VI Coordinator, Chuck
Valentine, explained that the problems experienced were typical of early HOPE VI projects that
had implementation problems because no one knew what to do (Valentine 2008).
As the management problems at the HACC worsened the implementation delays
continued, HUD assumed control of the housing authority (Holin, et al. 2003). The management
problems included frequent changes in senior management personnel. In the two years before site
rehabilitation began, the HA changed its Executive Director three times. McGuire Gardens
qualified for a HOPE VI grant in 1994 because the HA was on HUD‘s ―troubled housing
authority‖ list. Because HUD took control of the housing authority, the redevelopment was
implemented under HUD‘s direct supervision. Rehabilitation began five years after the HACC
received the HOPE VI award and was completed within three years (Holin, et al. 2003).
After redevelopment, the private management company‘s onsite social service office
assumed responsibility for implementing most self-sufficiency services at the site. The office has
two trained social workers who have initiated several social programs. Implemented programs
have included a six-week computer training course for all residents, a weeklong art and craft class
for senior residents, and an orientation class for new tenants in 2008. For completing the
computer course, participants received certificates of completion. Participants said they learned
new skills that could help them get jobs in the future. Participants in the art and craft and
computer classes said they appreciated the opportunities. Several senior residents in the art and
craft class said the class allowed them to meet other seniors, share with them, and stay active.
Participants who were required to perform community services used these activities to fulfill
those requirements. At the orientation session, new householders were informed about the selfsufficiency programs and services available and how to access them.
The social work office also arranges and conducts other activities to promote selfsufficiency among residents such as parenting seminars, GED classes, and even higher education
courses or training program through external agencies such as Camden County College. The
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annual summer program for pre-teen and young teenage residents give older teens opportunities
to gain valuable leadership skills and earn money as counselors. Participants learn positive work
habits, leadership and management skills, responsibility, and other valuable life skills.
7.1.2

Self-Sufficiency Outcomes

This section presents the results of the analysis of self-sufficiency outcomes at this site showing
changes in employment, income, and dependence on government assistance for 2008 and five
years since redevelopment. The analysis used data from the household survey and the Resident
Characteristics Report (RCR) for the site for the 15-month period from June 30, 2007 to
September 30, 2008. The householder survey and RCR results were compared with resident
characteristics information from 1996. Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 show residents‘ employment and
income status in 2008. Table 7.1 shows household survey data and Table 7.2 shows the findings
from the household survey and the Resident Characteristics Report.
Thirty-five householders were interviewed but two are incomplete. One of them was an
original tenant who abruptly stopped the interview to ask for payment and refused to continue
when reminded that there was no compensation. The other tenant interrupted the interview half
way through to get ready for work and asked the interviewer to return the next day. However,
when the interviewer returned at the agreed time, she did not respond to the call at the door but
the interviewer heard her talking inside. Ten interviewees were original tenants and 25 were new
tenants. Not every interviewee answered all the income questions and so the total responses vary
depending on the question posed. Table 7.2 shows self-sufficiency outcomes.
7.1.2.1 Employment and Income. Disability and illness greatly affected employment and
income in this development. Of the 30 householders (88 percent) who provided employment
information, 33 percent said they were employed (80 percent employed full time and 20 percent
employed part-time) and 20 percent said they were unemployed. Nearly 37 percent were
ill/disabled or had childcare needs that prevented them from working and 10 percent were retired
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or in college studying full-time. They were not considered unemployed because they were not in
the labor force. The most frequently cited reasons for not working were disability and/or illness,
childcare demands, and lack of jobs. Nearly 55 percent said they were unable to work due to one
of these factors. Some households were themselves ill or disabled or they had disabled or severely
ill children. In one case, a motor vehicle accident left a young female tenant paralyzed,
wheelchair-bound, and completely dependent on public aid. Returnees were 20 percent of the
employed tenants; the others were new tenants. Ten percent of the returnees said they could not
find work while 60 percent said they were disabled, ill, or retired. The results revealed continued
reliance on government assistance, particularly among households with children, disabled, and
chronically ill members. Among current residents, employment was somewhat higher than before
redevelopment but only because of higher employment among new tenants. Table 7.1 shows the
employment figures for survey participants in 2007-2008.

Table 7.1 McGuire Gardens HOPE VI Houlseholders‘ Employment Status, Sept. 2008
Working
Full
Time
Returnees (n=10)
2
New (n=20)
6
All(n=30)
8
Households
Type

*

Not
Part
Totals Disability
Working
Time
/Illness
0
8
5
10
2
12
6
20
2
20
30
11

Reason Not Working
No job
No
Retired
Study
available childcare
1
1
0
1
1
5
5*
0
2
6
5*
1

Included under ―disability/illness‖ and ―no jobs‖ when respondents chose more than one option

Regarding income, estimates from the household survey indicate that the average
household income for 2008 was about $12,250. This is almost 68 percent higher than the $7,300
for 1996 reported in Chapter 4. HOPE VI householders reported higher average household
incomes than 1996 householders did. Interestingly, the average annual household income for
returnees was higher than that for new households. This is unusual because the reverse normally
occurs. In this case, however, two householders with incomes exceeding $20,000 and $40,000
skewed the overall results substantially. One of the original householders with the high income
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had a bachelor‘s degree and worked full time and the other was a two-adult household with both
adults having full time jobs. Of the three new householders with annual incomes exceeding
$20,000, none exceeded $30,000. Given that there were only eight original tenants in the survey,
the two high incomes had a large impact on the results.
From a 94 percent sample, the Resident Characteristics Report showed a higher average
household income of $13,884 for returnees. Comparing the survey results with the RCR results
suggests that the survey did not include some of the higher income households. Conversations
with the onsite social workers indicate that several employed householders either refused to
participate in the study or were unavailable.
The main income sources for HOPE VI householders were employment (earned income),
government assistance. In this study, government assistance includes Social Security,
Supplemental Security Income, Pension, TANF/Welfare. ‗Other‖ income such as unemployment
benefits and child support payments also contributed greatly to overall income. Before relocation,
15 percent of householders depended on earned income for support in 1996 (U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development 1996) but 30 percent of HOPE VI householders depended on
earned income. RCR figures show 42 percent of householders depending on earned income.
Since a key self-sufficiency goal was to improve earned income, this outcome showed that the
goal was achieved.
The percentage of householders who received public assistance was expected to decrease
but the survey results indicate the reverse. Instead of being lower, the percentage of HOPE VI
residents who said they received public assistance in 2008 was higher, at 65 percent, than the 56
percent who reported public assistance as their main income in 1995/96. Some caution is needed
here however. This 65 percent represents all householders with government economic assistance,
not only those for whom it is the main source of income. HOPE VI tenants said they received
social security/supplemental security income (SS/SSI), TANF/welfare, disability income,
unemployment income, and food stamps. Children and disabled persons appeared to have
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received the most government aid but 50 percent of employed new householders also received
public assistance in 2008.

Table 7.2 McGuire Gardens. 2008 HOPE VI Household Income Characteristics
Household Characteristics
Households (n)
Average size
Average income
Income
Distribution of Income ($):
0 - $5,000
$5,000 - $10,000
$10,000 - $15,000
$15,000 - $20,000
>$20,000
Income Sources:
Earned Income
Public Assistance1
 Welfare (TANF)
 SSI/SS/Pension
Other Income

Household Survey (2007-2008)
RCR (9/2008)
1996 Income
All
New
Returning All Households
30
3.3
$12,250

22
3.4
$11,023

Percent

Percent

23
26
19
13
19

23
27
27
9
14

8
3.2
$15,625
Percent

236
3.1
$13,884
Percent

287
3.4
$7,300
Percent

25
25
0
25
25

16
30
17
14
24

22
59
0
17
2

42
64

15
56
59

30
*165

40
*64

20
*70

-

-

-

21
43
32

Source: Residents Survey, Residents Characteristics Report for September 30, 2008.
Notes: *This figure includes food stamp
Due to rounding, some totals may not equal 100% exactly

7.1.2.3 Education and Training. Despite the existence of a detailed CSS plan, no education or
work-related training program actually existed during redevelopment (Holin, et al 2003).
Responses in the study survey seem to confirm this. None of the survey respondents said they
participated in any HOPE VI-sponsored education or other training program during
redevelopment. Fifteen householders (44 percent) said they had participated in one or more selfsufficiency program since redevelopment. Five started GED classes (two completed, one in
progress, and two dropped out); two obtained job skills training; two attended parenting seminars;
one received welfare-to-work training; one received household management training; and one
obtained family counseling. Six residents took the computer course at the Neighborhood Network
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center but it was not a HOPE VI program. Fifteen interviewees said they received self-sufficiency
assistance after moving to the site.
Table 7.3 lists the benefits that respondents said they obtained from their participation in
the different programs. Only two householders or seven percent of the survey participants, said
the self-sufficiency training helped them to get jobs and increase their income. One participant
said HOPE VI allowed her to get the job that she wanted. She could not afford to pay the cost of
nursing studies and the HOPE VI program financed her training. She said she liked her job as a
nurse assistant. Other respondents reported intangible benefits such as improved self-esteem and
motivation (Table 7.3). Residents who completed the computer training received certificates and
said the training would help them get jobs in the future.

Table 7.3 McGuire Gardens Household Self-Sufficiency
Benefits Reported
Self-sufficiency Benefits
Employment
Increased Earnings
Computer literacy
Typing skills
Resume preparation
Intangible benefits:
Becoming smarter
Motivation
Improved self-esteem

7.1.3

Householders
(n=15)
2
2
1
2
2

Percent

4
2
1

12
6
3

6
6
3
6
6

Householders‟ Perceptions

Notwithstanding the strong impacts of the physical improvements on residents, improving selfsufficiency is likely to have the most important and lasting effects on residents‘ lives.
Consequently, residents are likely to view self-sufficiency improvements as the most significant
measure of HOPE VI success. However, the survey results show self-sufficiency as having the
worst outcomes. Householders‘ perceptions can explain some of the reasons for the poor results.
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Many survey participants who said they received no self-sufficiency support also said
they did not know the services were available. When told about some of the post redevelopment
services that housing authority officials and the social workers said were available to residents,
respondents often said ―I did not know about it‖ or ―I was not aware of that.‖ Of the 46 percent
who received assistance, 48 percent were the new householders and 40 percent were returnees.
Householders were asked whether they believed the HACC had done enough to help
residents improve their lives, how satisfied they were with the self-sufficiency programs
available, and how much the quality of their lives had improved with the self-sufficiency
programs implemented. About 54 percent said the HA was doing enough to assist residents
become self-sufficient but 20 percent disagreed and 26 percent said they did not know. Less than
half of the returnees (45%) and about 55 percent of new tenants expressed satisfaction with the
HA‘s self-sufficiency efforts to help residents. Meanwhile, 45 percent of new householders and
27 percent of returnees said the HA was not doing enough to help residents. These results show
that a significant proportion of residents believed that the HA should do more to help residents
become more self-sufficient.
Regarding programs that the HA implemented to help residents become more selfsufficient, approximately 88 percent of the participants responded and about 84 percent said they
were satisfied while 16 percent said they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied or did not know.
At the same time, 72 percent also said the HA should do more to help residents and cited the
types of programs they felt were needed. The suggestions emphasized youth and skills focused
programs, GED training, parenting skills, and money management counseling.
Regarding changes in the quality of their lives attributable to HOPE VI, most respondents
mentioned intangible changes relating to family well-being. They responded with statements such
as ―my children are happier now and don‘t fight a lot anymore.‖ ―I am not as stressed out as
before.‖ ―I have fewer headaches now‖. One new resident said her life had turned around since
she moved to McGuire Gardens from a private housing development in south Camden. She
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stressed that before moving, she was very depressed by her housing situation and did not want to
do anything, not even to get a job. Her three children were also very unhappy and frequently
argued and fought. She then excitedly emphasized that her current home was much better than her
previous home and that the change in housing quality brought a massive turnaround in her life.
She and her children were very happy to live in a decent home so much so that she felt motivated
to get a summer job, and the children did not fight as much. Other householders also mentioned
positive changes in their lives but this was one of the most moving. It demonstrates that HOPE VI
has had positive impacts in some resident‘s lives.
In summary then, five plus years after redevelopment, the evidence indicates some
progress towards improved self-sufficiency among residents but those improvements were very
small. Compared to the pre HOPE VI era, in 2008, HOPE VI residents had slightly lower levels
of joblessness, a higher percentage of wage-related income, higher household incomes overall,
and household income was more diversified. However, dependency on government assistance
was higher than in 1996. Given the small number of householders who participated in the survey,
some of the results may not accurately reflect residents‘ actual self-sufficiency status. If
dependency on government assistance were, in fact, higher than before HOPE VI, as the survey
suggests, it would be due to the large number of elderly and disabled residents who received
pension and social security and the large number of children with TANF and food stamp benefits.
The survey might have also oversampled the non-working population. Based on
information from the social work office, several working householders did not participate in the
survey either because they refused to participate or because they were not available. It is not clear
to what extent over-sampling skewed the outcomes towards greater dependence on government
assistance. The RCR, which represents over 90 percent of the households showed a higher level
of dependency on government aid as well. Consequently, the evidence does show that in 2007
and 2008, a higher percentage of residents received government assistance than in 1996. Readers
should bear in mind that the higher average income does not mean residents are economic status
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improved because it does not include inflationary effects and most residents still have extremely
low incomes.

7.2

Baldwin‟s Run

To learn about the self-sufficiency programs implemented and their outcomes at Baldwin‘s Run,
this analysis used data from the 2004 CSS Final Monitoring Report by Rutgers University,
Camden and face-to-face interviews with the HOPE VI CSS Coordinator and Baldwin‘s Run
residents.
7.2.1

Goals

For this development, the main goal was to provide services that help families become
economically self-reliant. The main self-sufficiency goals were to increase employment and
income and reduce welfare dependency (HACC 2000). Table 7.4 shows the programs and
services used to achieve these goals, the specific targets and outcomes.
Specific goals included removing all 175 welfare recipients from the public dole by
getting them into full-time, unsubsidized employment paying at least $10 per hour within three
years of project startup. Another specific goal was to increase the earned income of at least 80 of
the 205 residents who already had jobs from an average of $11,062 per year to $20,000 per year
within three years of project start-up. Other goals included training 150 residents in technical,
vocational, and professional skills; in resume writing, interviewing and job search; and create a
computerized job/skills database to match residents to jobs. These goals were intend to increase
the proportion of the original households with earned income as their main income from 35
percent to 57 percent, reduce TANF/Welfare recipients to just 8 percent, and keep income from
―other‖ sources at 35 percent by the completion of the redevelopment.
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Table 7.4 Westfield Acres Self-Sufficiency Goals and Outcomes
Goals
Family plans prepared
Employment
Full time jobs at $10/hour or more
40 Part time jobs
Increased earnings to $10,000/ year
>/=6 months continuous employment
20 transitional jobs
New Employment
Job loss
Education
Skills training: Number enrolled
: Number completed
Obtained GED
ESL Training
Entrepreneurial training
Homeownership
Counseling: enrolled
: completed
Purchased House

Target

Outcomes (12/2004)
CSS Evaluation

Achieved
Target

433 families

Unknown

60 persons
40 persons
30 persons
134 persons
20 persons
Unknown
none

60 persons
23 persons
All1
199 persons
32 total
65 persons2
23 jobs lost

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Unknown
No

149 persons
76 persons
47 persons
11 persons

51 persons
47 persons
13 or 14
3 persons
14 enrolled
2 complete

No
No
No
No
No
No

19 persons
15 persons
4 persons

No
No
No

42 persons
144 persons
80 persons
26 persons

Don‘t know

Sources: Housing Authority of the City of Camden Westfield Acres 2001 Redevelopment Plan, and
Wise 2005, Baldwin‘s Run CSS Final Evaluation Report.
1

New Jersey minimum wage increased to $5.25 per hour
Previously unemployed residents

2

Regarding education, the plan was to assist 47 persons to obtain GEDs, provide English
language training to 11 Spanish-speaking residents and life skills training such as parenting,
financial management, safety and community protection, and self-esteem to 100 residents within
three years of project start. About 149 residents were to receive technical, vocational, and
professional skills training with 76 expecting to complete the training in 4 years of startup.
The planned entrepreneurship program was to promote self-employment. The main goals
were to train 40 persons in entrepreneurial skills within 24 months of program startup, create a
revolving loan fund within 12 months of program start to provide business start-up assistance and
to facilitate startup of five resident-owned businesses. The Latin American Economic
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Development Association, Rowan University, and Rutgers University were to provide business
development services to participants.
The homeownership program was intended to provide homeownership opportunities to
30 Westfield Acres families through homeownership counseling in areas such as the home buying
process, home loans and mortgages, and encouraging Westfield Acres and other public housing
residents to buy homes in the new development. The purchase target was 26 of the original
residents. There was also a plan to provide drug rehabilitation and treatment, family and youth
counseling, childcare services, mental and physical health services for families, after-school and
weekend educational and recreational activities, and transport services for seniors (HACC 2000).
Case managers were to play a key role in the delivery of supportive services. They were
to help families develop family plans that outline steps towards self-sufficiency; act as
intermediaries between residents, the housing authority and service providers; provide counseling
services; and help residents with job search, application and employment preparation. Some of
the services were available in-house but most were contracted out to external agencies. For
example, Camden County College provided GED classes and Camden County Bureau of Social
Services provided child-care and medical assistance to TANF-eligible families.
7.2.2

Services and Outcomes

Table 7.5 shows that the HA achieved some employment targets but most other outcomes fell
well short of projections (Wise 2004). For example, 60 persons out of 60 obtained full time
employment that paid at least $10.00 per hour but most of the other activities were less
successful. The Final Monitoring Report noted that there were successes in job training and
placement but not in job retention. The report noted that many residents failed to sign up for the
various self-sufficiency programs available and many of those who signed up failed to complete
the programs.
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In the household survey, just 13 percent (3 respondents) said they participated in any
HOPE VI self-sufficiency program but 30 percent said they participated in self-sufficiency
programs not explicitly connected to HOPE VI. The vast majority said they received no
assistance whatsoever and did not know that the housing authority provided self-sufficiency
assistance to residents through HOPE VI. Based on conversations between this author and HOPE
VI officials and survey responses, some householders appeared to have been somewhat confused
about HOPE VI programs and non-HOPE VI program because the HA did not always make that
distinction clear. For example, the computer class at McGuire Gardens was available to any
public housing resident, not only HOPE VI residents, but resident from other developments did
not appear to know. Only two householders said they receive job skills training, two attended
computer appreciation classes (one at McGuire Gardens‘ Neighborhood Network center, five
took GED classes, and two said they attended parenting seminars (Table 7.5).

Table 7.5 Householder Reported Self-Sufficiency Services Received
Self-Sufficiency Support
Computer training
GED
Job skills training
Parenting
Household Management
Family Counseling
Welfare-to-work

Householders (n=23)
2
5
2
2
1
1
1

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey

The household survey results differ from some of the results reported in the CSS
Evaluation. One reason for the different results is that the CSS evaluation reported results for all
residents--returnees, non-returnees, and new tenants--and the household survey showed outcomes
for onsite tenants only and the majority of original tenants did not return after redevelopment.
Given the low level use of HOPE VI self-sufficiency services, it would appear that either the
household survey missed most of Baldwin‘s Run householders who participated in HOPE VI
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self-sufficiency programs or few Baldwin‘s Run householders overall participated in the selfsufficiency programs or services that were available. Given that less than 33 percent of residents
participated in the survey, the former is possible. If the latter is accurate, then the positive
employment results that the evaluation report cited do not apply to current onsite residents.
Nonetheless, the study found little evidence of improved self-sufficiency among existing public
housing tenants in 2008. The Resident Characteristics Report findings support these results.
The two householders who participated in job training programs were the only ones who
gained jobs and increased their income through HOPE VI. Others reported non-monetary benefits
such as improved self-confidence, improved communication and leadership skills. One person
obtained computing certification. These outcomes did not produce jobs or higher incomes but
they build character and put each household in better position to get and keep jobs in the future.
Residents said their non-participation has to do with not knowing about the programs,
which indicate there was a communication problem between the HA and residents about the
redevelopment. It is quite possible that the HA did not adequately inform residents about the selfsufficiency programs, although the redevelopment plan documented several meetings with
residents. Maybe some householders did not respond to information from the HA or mistrusted
the HA‘s plans. A few householders admitted that they were aware of some programs and chose
not to enroll. However, most householders said if they had known about the services available to
them they would have used the opportunities to improve their employment prospects. Another
likely reason for the low participation may be the requirements for participation. Participation in
government aid programs often requires residents to divulge private information and some
residents probably were not comfortable doing so.
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Table 7.6 Benefits Householders Reported from Self-Sufficiency Services
Benefit
Employment
Increased Earnings
Computer literacy
Communicating skills
Leadership skills

Householders (n=23)
2
2
2
1
1

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey

7.2.3

Self-Sufficiency Outcomes

This section uses data from the household survey, the Final Monitoring and Evaluation Report for
the Community and Supportive Services component of the HOPE VI project, and the Resident
Characteristics Report for July 2007 to September 30, 2008. Despite the implementation of
programs/services to reduce employment barriers, increase employment, and otherwise help
residents achieve self-sufficiency, the study found little difference between current public housing
tenants and pre-HOPE VI public housing tenants in measures of self-sufficiency and dependency.
7.2.3.1 Employment and Income. Table 7.7 shows that 10 of the 23 survey participants were
employed, one was retired, and 12 were not employed. Eight householders had full-time jobs and
two had part-time jobs. One household had two adults with full time jobs.

Based on these

figures, more than 45 percent of respondents were employed. Before redevelopment, nearly 54
percent of Westfield Acres householders had employment income as their main income. Only the
eight Baldwin‘s Run householders with full-time jobs had their main income from employment.
The situation is less clear for the two householders with part-time jobs however. Even if all 10
had most of their income from employment, it would still be lower than the 54 percent at
Westfield Acres.
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Table 7.7 Baldwin‘s Run Public Housing Residents‘ Employment Status for 2008
Households
Returnees
New
All

Working
Full Part
Time Time
1
1
7
1
8
2

Not
Reason Not Working/Not Working FT
Working Total Disability /
Lack of
No
Retired
Study
Illness
jobs
Childcare
5
5
0
7
8
6
1
16
13
23
7
2
3
7*
1

*

Part of ―Disability/Illness‖ and ―No Jobs‖. Some participant chose more than one option

Employed and unemployed householders cited disability, illness and lacking childcare as
the main impediments to employment. Some of them cited both illness and disability and some
reported disability and family or childcare demands. Thirty percent of them said a family
disability or serious illness and 30 percent said lack of childcare assistance limited their
employment opportunities. The problem is quite widespread as 54 percent of those without work
said they stopped looking for work for these reasons. Only two of the 12 unemployed tenants said
they could not find work.
Although fewer householders appear to be employed, the householder survey and the
Resident Characteristics Report both show that 2008 public housing tenants had higher average
annual household incomes than pre-HOPE VI householders at Westfield Acres. The householder
survey shows a little less than $12,400 in average household income and the RCR shows more
than $16,400. In comparison, 90 percent of pre-HOPE VI average household income at Westfield
Acres in 2000 was less than $15,000. Despite the apparent increase, the majority of public
housing households still have very low incomes as unemployment is still very high. Considering
the housing authority‘s efforts to improve employment, these results are disappointing. These
results are consistent with similar efforts that other HOPE VI studies reported at other sites.
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Table 7.8 Baldwin Run 2008 Household Self-Sufficiency Characteristics
Household Characteristic
Households (n)
Average Annual Household Income
Income Distribution
$0 - $5,000
$5,000 - $10,000
$10,000 - $15,000
$15,000 - $20,000
> $20,000
Source of Income:
Wage
Public Assistance
Welfare
Other

Household Survey
All Households
New
Returning
Households Households
23
$12,386

16
$13,167

7
$10,714

RCR
(Sept. „08)
68
$16,431

32%
18%
5%
23%
23%

27%
20%
7%
20%
27%

43%
14%
0
29%
14%

4%
26%
22%
16%
31%

35%
65%
-

36%
64
-

38%
63%
-

46%
16%
56%
41%

Sources: Wise 2005. Baldwin‘s Run CSS Final Monitoring and Evaluation Report, and Baldwin‘s Run
Resident Characteristics Report, 9/2008, Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey, 2008-2009.

7.2.3.2 Education and Training. The HA fell well short of its goals to provide English as
Second Language (ESL) training to 11 residents and assist 47 to obtain the GED by 2004. The
Final Monitoring Report noted that only three persons undertook ESL training and 13 or 14
residents actually pursued GED by December 2004. In contrast, the HA had noteworthy success
in job skills training as 51 residents enrolled and 47 completed the training, including two
participants in the household survey in this study. However, the goal was to train 149 persons
with 76 completions. The outcome was 34 percent enrollment of target and completion was 62
percent of target.
7.2.4

Householders‟ Perceptions

When asked if they believed the HACC had done enough to help residents improve their lives and
if the HA had done enough for residents, householders, as indicated in Table 7.9, said the HA had
not done enough. About 43 percent said the HA had done enough to help residents but 52 percent
disagreed. Returnees were much more dissatisfied than new tenants. About 29 percent said the
HA had done enough to help residents compared to 50 percent of new tenants. This outcome
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probably reflects the fact that not all the supportive services that the HA promised were
implemented or most returnees experienced no improvement in their economic circumstances.

Table 7.9 Householders‘ Satisfaction with the HACC Efforts to Assist Residents
Survey Question

Household Type

Has the HACC done enough
to assist residents?

Returnee (7)
New (16)
All (23)

Percent of Household Responses
Yes
No
Don‟t know

29
50
43

57
50
52

14
0
6

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey, 2008-2009

Table 7.10 shows residents‘ satisfaction with the self-sufficiency support services that
they knew about. The majority (61 percent) said they were satisfied but a sizeable minority of 26
percent said they had no opinion because they did not know anything about the services available.
Interestingly, a much higher percentage of new tenants than returnees said they did not know.
One explanation for the difference between returning and new tenants is the higher percentage of
new tenants who were employed and saw no need to get involved in a self-sufficiency program.
Another possibility is that the HA promoted the supportive services less among new tenants.

Table 7.10 Householders‘ Satisfaction with the Self-sufficiency Support Available
Householder
Returnees (n=7)
New (n=16)
All (n=23)

Very
Satisfied
0
38
26

Percent of Households Responding
A Little
A Little
Very
Neither
Satisfied
Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
57
0
29
0
25
0
0
6
35
0
9
4

Don‟t
know
14
31
26

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey, 2008-2009

Although the majority of survey participants expressed satisfaction with the supportive
services that were available to them, a substantially large 87 percent also said there was need for
additional support, particularly youth-focused programs. Householders expressed a strong need
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for youth recreational and skills training programs, parenting and money management counseling.
Figure 7.1 shows the most common types of supportive services residents mentioned.

Programs/Services Needed
Rent-to-Own opportunities
Onsite Support services
Money Management Counseling
Job training
Youth Recreation and Skills
Home Management
GED
Homeownership counseling
Householders

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Figure 7.1 Other types of services Baldwin‘s Run public housing residents need.

While acknowledging that their economic situation remained substantially unchanged, 91
percent of the respondents said their living situation had improved in some way since they moved
to Baldwin‘s Run (Table 7.11). An even larger majority (100 percent returning and 94 percent
new residents) expressed satisfaction with the overall quality of life in in the new development
(Table 7.12).

Table 7.11 Percent of Householders with Improved Living Situation
Response
Yes
No
Don‘t Know

All (n=23)
91
9
4

Percent of Householders
Returnees(n=7)
New(n=16)
100
81
0
13
0
0

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey, 2008-2009
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Returning and new tenants alike said Baldwin‘s Run looked a lot better and was much
safer than Westfield Acres. Even tenants who moved from private single-family homes said their
HOPE VI units were better than their family homes. Some said they liked the development
because it was quiet and neighborly. Some returnees said life at Baldwin‘s Run was a lot better
than at Westfield Acres because they experienced less interference from outsiders.

Table 7.12 Householders‘ Satisfaction with Quality of Life at Baldwin‘s Run
Level of Satisfaction
Very satisfied
A little satisfied
Not satisfied nor dissatisfied
A little dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied

All (n=23)
70
26
4
0
0

Percent of Householders
Returnees (n=16) New (n=7)
71
69
29
25
0.0
6
0
0
0
0

Source: Baldwin‘s Run Household Survey, 2008-2009

The survey results show clear improvements in quality of life indices based on
householders‘ perspectives. However, there is not much to show that self-sufficiency has
improved among returnees and there is no information available to assess progress among new
tenants. Although the sample size used might be small, when the survey results are compared to
the Resident Characteristics Report, which over 90 percent of the households, the results are
remarkably similar. The conclusion that can be drawn is that although improved housing quality
has had significant impacts on residents‘ well-being, it has not and cannot change their economic
circumstances. The results also indicate that supportive services for short periods are not
sufficient to effect substantial changes in residents‘ economic well-being. Better results may be
achieved over longer periods.
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7.3

Roosevelt Manor

The self-sufficiency plan for this project is similar to the self-sufficiency plan used previously at
Westfield Acres HOPE VI project. Roosevelt Manor‘s goals are more explicit however. The
primary overall objective was to help HOPE VI beneficiaries obtain long-term employment and
earn at least $10 per hour. However, the self-sufficiency plan noted that there was a great need to
reduce barriers to employment, especially in education and skills training, employment
preparation and family support. As a result, the ongoing self-sufficiency program attempts to
increase employment among the original residents (HACC 2003). The services implemented
included employment preparation and placement, vocational skills training, and English language
training, and sponsoring GED and High School Diplomas classes. Family support services
included substance abuse counseling and treatment, family counseling, transportation, healthcare,
childcare, and various youth and senior services (HACC 2003a).
Regarding income, 38 percent of the 232 households had earned income as their main
income, 24 percent had TANF and General Assistance payments as main income, and 30 percent
had Social Security/Supplemental Security/pension as primary income.
7.3.1

Programs and Goals

The HACC said that prior to relocation, a resident needs survey was done and the results used in
developing the self-sufficiency plan. This survey identified unemployment, inadequate job
training, low technical and vocational skills, poor education, low computer knowledge, poor
money management skills, lack of community-based healthcare services, and inadequate
childcare services as the main issues that limit residents‘ ability to become self-sufficient (HACC
2003a). Programs were implemented to increase employment and income and provide supportive
services to enhance residents‘ employment potentials. Other programs implemented included
credit and homeownership counseling, technical and vocational skills training, educational and
childcare services, computing technology assistance, and neighborhood-based health care. Table
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7.13 shows the main self-sufficiency programs implemented, the number of residents projected to
register for each program, the number of completion projected per program, and the number of
residents who actual registered for and complete each program through 2007.

Table 7.13 Projected and Actual Enrolments in Self-Sufficiency Services at Roosevelt Manor
2004-2007 Goals
Project
Enrollment Goals Enrolment Completion
Job preparation & placement
100
30
No data
Vocational skills training
80
No data
No data
Section 3 job placement
75
16
High School Diploma or GED
35
5
No data
English language training
17
5
No data
Family Literacy Workshops
6
2
No data
Entrepreneurship Training
28
8
No data
Resident–owned business startups
3
2
No data
General Counseling
No data
No data
No data
Substance Abuse Counseling
No data
2?
No data
Homeownership: Counseling
88
25
No data
Purchase
1
Youth Initiatives:
Afterschool homework & life-skill
No data
50
No data
Internship Program
No data
30
No data
50
25
No data
Eye Care Services
100
20
Youth Health Services
250
60
Childcare Services
60
20
Adult healthcare
200
?
Ride-to-Work Bus Voucher
No data
30
Self-Sufficiency Program

Actual Outcomes
2007
2004-2007
13
No data
No data
39
6
No data
5
8
0
No data
0
No data
8
4
0
2
44
0
10
4
45
10
225
240
25
20
60
25
?
34

No data
No data
No data
No data
No data
No data
60
135

Sources: Housing Authority of the City of Camden Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Quarterly Report, and
Roosevelt Manor CSS Plan, 12/2005.

The HA provided some services directly through the CSS office and other services
through partnerships with social services agencies serving the area. Leading partner agencies
include CamCare, Camden County Workforce Investment Board, Camden County College, Save
Our Waterfront, and American Community Partnership as (Table 7.14). The HA uses the case
management approach so each family has a case manager who assesses the family‘s needs, help
the family set self-sufficiency goals and obtain the services required to meet their goals. Case
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Managers are trained social workers. Table 7.15 summarizes the main service goals and outcomes
reported in the CSS plan and December 2007 HOPE VI CSS Quarterly Progress Report.

Table 7.14 CSS Providers and Services Provided to Roosevelt Manor Residents
Service Provider
Workforce Investment Board
CamCare
Camden County College
Save Our Waterfront
American Community Partnership
HACC

Service Provided
Job search and job readiness training, retention and supportive
services
Hiring and training of residents in health care, clerical and as
pharmaceutical technicians
GED training and other education goals
Credit and homeownership counseling
Construction skills training
- Case management services
- Youth Build program providing apprenticeship (on-the-job)
training for youths 16-21 years old

Source: HACC Community and Supportive Services 2005 Plan for December 2005.

7.3.2

Outcomes

Because no household survey was done at this site, this review is based on information in the
2007 HOPE VI Progress Report and December 14 Final Community and Supportive Services
Plan that the CSS Coordinator supplied. Table 7.13 and Table 7.15 show outcomes reported in the
CSS plan and the Quarterly progress report. Although HOPE VI officials provided documentation
about the self-sufficiency programs already implemented and those yet to be implemented,
getting information about enrollment targets and outcomes proved elusive, as the many
―unknowns‖ in Table 7.13 indicate. The nearly two-year delay in project startup and lack of
information from the housing authority also affected the analysis of outcomes. For example, upto-date information about the annual goals/targets in the CSS plan were not provided and so only
aggregate data from the 2007 status report could be used. The 2007 report was the only report
provided and it had numerous data gaps.
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Overall, 13 residents enrolled in and completed job search coaching, job skills training,
and job retention coaching by December 2007. A successful HOPE VI internship program
boosted participation in 2007 and ensured that the employment targets were achieved.

Table 7.15 Successful Completion of Self-Sufficiency Services at 12/2007
Self-Sufficiency Services
Jobs Skills Training:
- construction, professional, office
skills, and pre-apprentice training
High School Diploma /GED
New job placements
Entrepreneurial training
Homeownership counseling
Homebuyer counseling
Home Purchase

Target Actual

Comments

12

10

Four persons placed in jobs

3
18
2
15
0
0

2
10
6
4
3
1

Two persons obtained GEDs
Goal not met
Goal exceeded
Four enrolled
3 residents completed program, and
One former tenant purchased a house

Source: HACC Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI 2007 Quarterly Report to HUD, HACC 2008.

7.3.2.1 Education Outcomes. Education programs allow residents to pursue GED or even
college level courses. Residents have the opportunity to pursue English as a Second Language
(ESL) course without charge to the resident. Based on needs assessment done in 2002, in the CSS
plan, the HA anticipated five enrolments in High School Diploma or GED classes and five in
ESL courses. At the end of 2007, the education goals for Baldwin‘s Run had not been achieved.
Five persons enrolled in high school or equivalency education but no one registered for ESL
training.
7.3.2.2 Employment Outcomes. Given the limited employment data that the HA provided,
employment levels could not be determined accurately. However, using the March 30, 2010
Resident Characteristic Reports for Phases V and VII, the employment rates were estimated to be
at least 39 percent for Phase V and 46 percent for Phase VII. These estimates are based on the
percentage of residents who had earned income as main income source. The figures are only
slightly higher than the 38 percent employment rate prior to redevelopment. The reader should
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bear in mind that this data is for the employment levels among public housing residents before
and after redevelopment. It does not refer to homeowners in the new development. Lack of
information about non-returnees made it impossible to examine outcomes for them. While the 80
percent target was not achieved, it may be too early to draw conclusions because of the start-up
delays and because the project is ongoing. Eighty percent was the overall goal, not an
intermediary goal. Nevertheless, in the worst economy in the state, 80 percent employment
appears to be an unrealistic employment goal for public housing residents.
7.3.2.3 Income Outcomes. Based on the Resident Characteristics Reports, average annual
household incomes for public housing tenants remain roughly the same as pre-redevelopment.
Compared to less than $15,000 for 90 percent of residents before redevelopment, Phase V and
Phase VII residents reported average annual household incomes of $14,889 and $14,736
respectively. Income diversity appeared to be better however. Table 7.16 shows the distribution
of household income in Phases V and VII and it shows 63 percent of Phase V households having
annual household incomes of $15,000 or less and 37 percent had in excess of $15,000 in annual
income. At Phase VII, 57 percent of the households had annual household incomes of $15,000 or
less and 43 percent reported income in excess of $15,000. About 72 percent of Phase V
households and 74 percent of Phase VII households had incomes of $20,000 or less, and only 11
percent of Phase V and 15 percent of Phase VII households had incomes above $25,000. Before
demolition, 90 percent of households reported average incomes of $15,000 and less, so the
average annual income improved by more than percent in both Phase V and Phase VII. Similarly,
only 10 percent of pre-HOPE VI residents had annual household income in excess of $15,000,
but 37 percent of Phase V residents and 43 percent of Phase VII residents did so. Notwithstanding
these improvements, poverty remains widespread and there is no sign of improved selfsufficiency but that could improve in the near future. The biggest unknown issue however
concerns the housing and neighborhood outcomes of original residents who have not returned.
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Table 7.16 Post Redevelopment Household Economic Characteristics at Roosevelt Manor
Household Information
Households
Average Household Income
Income Distribution:
$0 - $5,000
$5,000 - $10,000
$10,000 - $15000
$15,000 - $20,000
$20,000 - $25,000
Above $25,000
Income Sources:
Wages
Welfare Payments
SS/SSI/Pension
Other Sources
With no income

Projected
Percent

Phase V (n=54)
Number
Percent

Phase VII (n=48)
Number
Percent

54/57
$14,736

97
100

46/48
$14,889

96
100

unknown

4
16
14
6
6
8

7
30
26
11
11
15

5
11
10
7
8
5

11
24
22
15
17
11

80
26
60
-

21
13
21
19
0

39
24
39
35
0

21
18
15
16
0

46
39
33
35
0

Source: Resident Characteristics Reports for Roosevelt Manor Phases V & VII at March 31, 2010.

7.3.2.4 Other Self-Sufficiency Outcomes. Six residents completed entrepreneurship training but
none had started a business because they did not have the resources to do so. The HACC
quarterly report cited problems in executing this aspect of the plan because fewer residents than
anticipated participated in the program and because the job developer position was vacant until
June 2007 because the previous job developer moved to another agency.
Regarding homeownership, the HA targeted 25 householders for training through
December 31, 2007 but only 4 householders enrolled by then. Three of the four completed the
training. The HACC reported that 16 householders with stable employment and income above
$16,000 would be encouraged to purchase offsite homeownership units and that original residents
would be given priority for the 86 homeownership units on the site. Eligible residents must
complete the homeownership training. At the end of 2007, one householder had purchased a
home elsewhere and did so without assistance from the housing authority. It was not clear if any
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of the original residents who undertook the homeownership training actually bought homes in the
Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI development.
Family support services provided included family health and counseling, adult mental
health, optical services, youth primary health care, health services for seniors, family health
literacy workshops, and childcare services. Except mental health services, enrollment and
completion targets were met for the other service in 2007 (HOPE VI Quarterly Progress Report
for December 2007). The Quarterly Progress Report noted that this failure to achieve mental
health targets was due to residents‘ reluctance or unwillingness to accept mental health
interventions. The HACC employed a certified drug and alcohol counselor and provided a facility
where residents with substance abuse problems can have confidential meetings with the counselor
but that did not motivate any HOPE VI beneficiary. The HA provided this service even though
the needs survey did not identify any resident with a substance abuse problem.

7.4

Summary

The overall outcome for all three sites suggests little progress towards economic self-sufficiency
for the majority of public housing residents, but particularly for returnees. The results indicate
weaknesses in the self-sufficiency plans such as placing too much emphasis on work related
training, wrong assumptions about the availability of decent paying jobs in the Camden area, and
not accounting sufficiently for resident participation in the programs or services provided. Not all
residents lack employment because of education or skills deficits that adult education and job
preparation and skills training can fix. Some residents experience barriers that none of these
things can remedy. In such cases, programs to increase employment and income such as English
language courses, GED or high school diploma classes, or job preparation classes are not for
them. At Baldwin‘s Run for example, the majority of non-working tenants cited poor health,
disability, and child/family-care demands as the three main reasons for not working. Job training
skills is not their main concern. In several HOPE VI studies, the Urban Institute address this
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issue. Popkin (2009) noted that due to poor health and disability, many residents are ―hard-tohouse‖ and need self-sufficiency services tailored to their special circumstances. Job-related
training does not address the particular issues that keep them unemployment.
The poor health of the Camden area economy is another issue that appears to undermine
self-sufficiency results. Poorly performing local and regional labor markets are likely to limit
employment and income opportunities for residents and HOPE VI self-sufficiency goals. With
unemployment hovering around 36 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) since the industrial
economy collapsed, Camden is the poorest city in New Jersey (Legal Services of New Jersey
Poverty Research Institute 2007). Finding employment in this poor economy is extremely
difficult. Skills training may need to target the growth sectors in the economy and train residents
in those areas to give them a realistic chance of getting and keeping jobs. The HACC probably
may need to work closely with agencies such as Camden County Workforce Development Board
to target the growth sectors of the economy and to ensure that residents get the training needed.
The housing authority could use the weak self-sufficiency results to assess areas of weakness in
the self-sufficiency plans and adjust them accordingly.
The 2004 Final Evaluation Community and Supportive Services Report for the Westfield
Acres HOPE VI redevelopment project by Rutgers University (Camden) noted that the program
achieved early success in getting residents into full-time jobs but many of them were unable to
keep the jobs. Although the report did not give reasons for the job losses, the CSS plan indicated
that some were temporary jobs (e.g., construction jobs). The city‘s declining economy most likely
played a major role as well. Understanding the reasons for the job losses is an important
evaluation step towards improving the quality of the services provided. A possible explanation for
the poor self-sufficiency outcomes is the non-participation of large numbers of residents in the
available programs or services available. Even residents who participated in self-sufficiency
improvement programs experienced little or no change in self-sufficiency and employed tenants
do not earn enough to lift them out of poverty and dependency. These results show that
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redevelopment has not effected the improvements in the socioeconomic status of original
residents expected. Despite higher employment and income, the main benefits that residents
experienced from the self-sufficiency program are improvements in self-esteem and motivation.
Self-esteem and motivation are not readily are not measurable in monetary terms but they
important factors in achieving success.
Inadequate information about the actual self-sufficiency initiatives implemented, and the
outcomes of those initiatives, made assessing self-sufficiency outcomes time consuming. In the
case of McGuire Gardens, the HA provided no self-sufficiency information about the site despite
repeated requests and the site information in the HOPE VI Baseline Assessment report was
inconsistent.

CHAPTER 8
DISCUSSION

This research was an as an inquiry into the HOPE VI program but especially its impact on
residents‘ lives. HOPE VI not only replaces the physical structures at ―severely distressed‖ public
housing sites with housing solutions to satisfy a diversity of household incomes but also provides
opportunities for the families who endured the terrible conditions in the distressed developments
to improve their economic well-being by moving to better housing in new or rehabilitated
developments or move to housing in less poor and less stressed neighborhoods (Popkin, Levy and
Buron 2009). Housing officials expect redeveloped sites to have substantially less poverty and
improved site and housing conditions. Positive results from the Gautreaux program had led
housing officials to believe that dispersal and income-mixing initiatives would improve the
economic and social circumstances of residents of severely distressed developments (Goetz 2004,
Goetz 2010, Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009, Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010, Steinberg 2009).
The program‘s assumptions and goals are based on the ―neighborhood effects‖ literature,
which hypothesizes that neighborhood conditions strongly influence residents‘ social and
economic circumstances (Brooks-Gunn and Duncan 1997, Ellen and Turner 1997, Goetz 2010,
Jargowsky 1996, Wilson 1987). Poor distressed neighborhood conditions tend to deepen or
prolong poverty and the better physical and social conditions in non-poor neighborhoods have the
opposite effect on residents. HUD officials used this argument to conclude that public housing
distress resulted from concentrated poverty and HOPE VI proponents assume that moving
residents from concentrated poverty neighborhoods to non-poor or ―better neighborhoods‖ will
improve their lives (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). This assumption gives the impression that
leaving public housing for low-poverty neighborhoods, n and of itself, improves the economic
circumstances of the relocated residents but that is not the case.
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The overall results showed that redevelopment improved the housing and site conditions
substantially and reduced concentrated poverty drastically but had little effect on resident selfsufficiency. The most positive outcomes found resulted from the improvements to the housing
quality and site conditions and from reductions in concentrated poverty.
Apparently, the physical improvements led to substantial psychosocial benefits for
residents because they said their families were happier and they were feeling more self-confident
because they were satisfied with their housing. This outcome shows that the quality of the
physical environment in which residents live is very important to their psychological and social
well-being. The psychosocial impact of the physical improvements is one of the profound
findings of this study. Meanwhile, the study found no evidence that income mixing was having
the transformative effect at the redeveloped sites as HOPE VI officials had predicted. There was
no indication that public housing residents at Baldwin‘s Run, a mixed-income site, received the
benefits HOPE VI officials assumed would accrue to them from living in the same development
as homeowners with higher levels of income.

8.1

Physical Improvements

Even though social scientists now believe that poor public housing families need additional social
and economic support beyond a quality housing unit, the HOPE VI program still concentrates
heavily on physical design and appearance. The three sites therefore underwent extensive
physical redevelopment and so it not surprising that the study found the physical improvements to
be the aspect of the project that residents benefitted from the most. Baldwin‘s Run physical
transformation is so dramatic that the site received two ―outstanding architectural design‖ awards.
At McGuire Gardens, some units were built on new foundations and some were
rehabilitated on existing foundations. This site therefore has rehabilitated and new housing but the
development retains the basic design of the original units. In contrast, all units at the new
Baldwin‘s Run and Roosevelt Manor developments are completely new and bear no resemblance
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to the original units. HUD shifted HOPE VI‘s focus from rehabilitation to complete demolition
and replacement and from public financing only to public-private financing to facilitate the
increased focus on mixed-income housing. It is a rule change that makes HOPE VI a
redevelopment catalyst since leveraged funding now exceeds HOPE VI funding substantially.
Given that HOPE VI emphasizes building mixed-income developments in place of strictly public
housing developments, an observer might expect significant differences in resident outcomes
between the earlier HOPE VI developments, where all the units are public housing, and the newer
mixed-income developments that have both public and non-public units. That is not the case
however because the study found only slight variation in residents‘ satisfaction with the physical
improvements at the two completed sites, with Baldwin‘s Run residents being somewhat more
satisfied than McGuire Gardens residents. Approximately 97 percent of the interviewees from
McGuire Gardens and 100 percent of those from Baldwin‘s Run expressed satisfaction with the
physical improvements. These results indicate that the different redevelopment strategies used at
the rehabilitated site and the mixed-income site where interviews were done did not produce
substantially different outcomes.
8.1.1

Site and Building Design Changes

All three developments underwent radical design changes, but at McGuire Gardens, the changes
were less radical compared to those at the two mixed-income sites. However, certain site and
housing design features are common to all sites irrespective of the redevelopment strategy used.
Reducing density was an important goal as was site security, integrating the development into the
neighborhood fabric, and providing community amenities. All the sites therefore incorporated
features that improved living conditions substantially. The changes emphasized these features:


single-family dwellings designed based on a narrow selection of architectural styles in
surrounding neighborhoods



a street network that resembles and ties into the surrounding street system



outdoor space with demarcated public, private, and semi-private zones
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fewer total and fewer public housing units and lower unit density



a multi-purpose community building,



small front porches, private entrances, individual street numbers, small semi-private front
yards and shared backyard space, larger interior space, and central air-conditioning.
These changes eliminated superblock design, which architects and social scientists

believe failed because it helped to isolate public housing from the surroundings and induced
crime and disorder. Eliminating superblocks improved site security, enabled local streets to be
restored, and facilitated smaller-scale developments to fit the architectural character of the local
community. HOPE VI planners assumed that building houses instead of apartments and making
the housed look similar to regular neighborhood houses would dispel negative perceptions about
public housing design. Interview results indicate that the negative perceptions have largely
disappeared but these new developments look different from their surroundings, which make
them stand out. One reason for the distinctive appearance is that the housing at the HOPE VI
developments is newer than the housing in the surrounding communities. Another reason is that
the housing designs do not vary as much as the neighborhood housing.
HUD did not want HOPE VI housing to look distinctive in their locality; the
developments were supposed to blend into the neighborhood fabric and look like regular hoses.
However, selecting New Urbanism as the only design paradigm produces developments that look
similar. This may not be a problem in the short or medium term but could become problematic
later in the same way that previous developments became problematic. Now, as new housing, the
distinctiveness is attractive.
An important physical redevelopment goal was to reduce the density at each site in line
with the average density in each neighborhood to make the housing more attractive to potential
buyers (HACC 2000, HACC 2003a). At the three sites studied, the original densities ranged from
16 to 21 units per acre, which were not particularly high densities to begin with and did not differ
substantially from the densities in the surrounding areas. These densities were typical for multi-
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family developments of their size and type (Newman 1980). At Baldwin‘s Run, the main
motivation for the drastic reduction in density from 21 units per acre to eight units per acre
appears to be a desire to build single-family houses and to attract middle-income homebuyers.
The motivation does not appear to have been a desire to improve public housing for public
housing residents since only 78 are on that site when there were 514 before. For the other sites,
the motives are less obvious.
Considering the substantial emphasis given to redeveloping the physical environment
plus a long history of undertaking bricks and mortar reform, it should be no surprise that physical
redevelopment has been the most successful aspect of HOPE VI. However, the pre-occupation
with physical appearance detracts attention from effective relocation and residents‘ selfsufficiency services. Good quality living space is critical, no doubt, but it is not the only
important aspect of the redevelopment. Physical redevelopment does not solve the main problem
with distressed public housing as HOPE VI framed it--concentrated poverty. Physical
redevelopment is merely one of the critical areas of redevelopment. Trying to create suburbia, in
the inner-city does little, if anything, to improve residents economic well-being or poverty.
Preoccupation with the physical appearance of the redeveloped sites means not enough attention
and resources are devoted to other aspects of the redevelopment.
A hotly debated aspect of large public housing developments and evidenced at the three
study sites before redevelopment was the palpable confusion between public and non-public
space and the security risks involved (Newman 1996, 1980). HOPE VI addressed this issue by
using real and symbolic barriers, as Defensible Space principles suggest, to delineate outdoor
areas into public, private, and semi-private zones. Each of the three HOPE VI sites therefore
exhibits several Defensible Space features but the findings indicate that the most important
ingredient in a Defensible Space program—residents‘ control of the space surrounding their
dwellings—is severely missing. Newman stated clearly that Defensible Space does not end by
creating physical or symbolic barriers. For Defensible Space to be effective, residents must be
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able to exercise care and control of the spaces around their homes (Newman 1996, Newman
1973). The study found that at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s Run residents lack any kind of
control because their leases and instructions from the private management firm restrict their use
of the space around their dwellings. Residents said they were satisfied with the physical changes
to the site but very dissatisfied with the numerous restrictions on their use of the facilities. Some
residents said they liked their homes but expressed apathy towards their development. This is
unfortunate, because the restrictions defeat the whole purpose for having a Defensible Space
program in the first place (Newman 1996). Residents at both sites complained about the
restrictions but there were more complaints from residents at McGuire Gardens than from
residents at Baldwin‘s Run. Since a different firm manages each site, different management styles
appears to be a factor in the restrictions imposed. Additionally, at Baldwin‘s Run, the restrictions
on public housing residents do not apply to homeowners. Site observations show many private
homes that are nicely decorated with flowers while the public housing units are not. Some private
homes even have backyard pools and perimeter fences, including picket fences but public housing
tenants are not allowed these privileges. These management practices undermine the spirit and
intent of Defensible Space.
Additionally, at Baldwin‘s Run, the site configuration does not promote community
building or facilitate interaction between tenants and homeowners even though as a mixedincome site, it is supposed to encourage interaction between homeowners and tenants.
Another issue is that despite the impressive physical improvements in the development,
the communities surrounding the two HOPE VI developments in East Camden remain physically
distressed. The redeveloped properties, especially Baldwin‘s Run, are like little islands of HOPE
in a sea of despair. HOPE VI promised neighborhood-wide improvements but there is little
evidence of neighborhood-wide redevelopment to date. McGuire Gardens‘ redevelopment was
completed six years ago in 2003 yet the only noteworthy neighborhood improvement activity
observed was the construction of a new community elementary school a short distance from
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Baldwin‘s Run. Vacant lands and dilapidated and abandoned residential buildings otherwise
surround this development. Similarly, the only neighborhood improvement project observed in
the Baldwin‘s Run vicinity was a new community school with a Boys and Girls Club built on
Westfield Avenue nearby. A Camden County plan to convert the abandoned private housing
complex on the southern border of Baldwin‘s Run into a park is yet to begin. In its current
abandoned state, the site is vulnerable to illicit activities. Poverty, vacant buildings, poor roads,
and violence are prevalent in the area. Several residents even expressed fear of surrounding
communities.
8.1.2

Impact at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‟s Run Residents

The biggest impact of the physical redevelopment on new and returning residents at McGuire
Gardens and Westfield Acres appears to be mostly psychological in nature. A majority of
respondents from both sites mentioned psychosocial benefits more than any other benefit. More
than 50 percent said the physical improvements improved their mental and emotional well-being
overall. They felt better about themselves, their self-confidence and self-esteem improved, they
felt and acted more responsibly, they felt safer, and less anxious, and the children were happier
and had fewer conflicts. Other than acting more responsibly, the extent to which these
psychosocial benefits translate to actual behavioral changes and improvements in employment,
income, and economic self-sufficiency is uncertain. The fact that employment remains low and
poverty is still rife is cause for concern. Changes in environmental conditions alone are not likely
to produce consistently positive outcomes, as Goetz (2010) explained. Improvements in economic
self-sufficiency involve a complex interaction of several variables at different levels of which the
residential environment is just one variable. Perceptions of self, exogenous environmental factors
such as job availability, racial and class discrimination, employees‘ willingness to hire public
housing residents, and individual attributes like education and training, language, health status,
and social contacts all contribute to life outcomes for public housing residents. Similarly, social
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capital formation, one of the ideals on which HOPE VI is predicated, depends on a varied mix of
system variables and not just on changes in the physical environment (Goetz 2010).
Safety was a very important issue to returnees and new tenants because, prior to
redevelopment, crime and violence were big problems at all three sites, which made the residents
fearful and tense. One report said McGuire Gardens experienced some of the worst violence in
public housing in Camden. In the case of Westfield Acres, newspaper reports, residents, and the
HOPE VI redevelopment plan noted that the development was over-run by crime and violence
prior to demolition (HACC 2000, Courier News). At Baldwin‘s Run, most householders said
problems still exist but safety was not a big concern to them anymore. A few residents expressed
concern about drug activities and vandalism but most said they felt safe. Returning and new
tenants who are familiar with the former Westfield Acres said Baldwin‘s Run was very safe
compared to Westfield Acres. Householders said they were not afraid to sit on their porches at
night anymore or allowing their children to play outdoors. These activities original residents
feared doing at Westfield Acres. New residents expressed similar sentiments about their previous
neighborhoods as well. A large percentage of new tenants said crime and violence in their
previous communities made them fear for the safety of their families but experienced much less
fear and anxiety at Baldwin‘s Run.
McGuire Gardens‘ householders were more concerned about safety in the development.
Despite the big improvements in safety, some residents felt that the development was unsafe due
to violence and illicit drug activities. There were two shootings incidents in the developments
during the survey period. One shooting caused the death of a young man the night before one of
my visits to the site. After that shooting, the Camden police maintained a 24-hour presence in the
development for an entire week but disappeared thereafter. Several times before and after those
incidents, residents advised me to stay away after dusk. During interviews, several residents were
even reluctant to speak about safety issues. Some of them said the section of the development
where they lived was safe but they could not speak about safety in the entire development. Others
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were not so coy; they explicitly said crime and illicit drug activities were still present in the
development but had declined significantly since redevelopment. Overall, interviewees said that
since redevelopment McGuire Gardens was a lot safer and attributed most of the improvements in
safety to the physical improvements. It appears then that the physical redevelopment not only
improved housing quality and site appearance substantially but also contributed to declines in
crime and fear of crime in both developments. The result is that resident‘s overall psychological
and social well-being improved.
8.1.3

Householders‟ Satisfaction

Large majorities said they were satisfied with their HOPE VI housing because it was better than
their previous housing. Tenants at both McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s Run said they were
satisfied with the design changes but complained about restrictions on their use of the spaces
around their units. Despite substantial design differences and one site being mixed-income and
the other being public housing only, residents‘ responses suggest no major difference in overall
satisfaction in housing quality between Baldwin‘s Run and McGuire Gardens.

8.2

Changes in Concentrated Poverty

In the mid-1990s, as HOPE VI increasingly stressed poverty deconcentration, HUD increasingly
pushed PHAs to implement strategies to deconcentrate poverty. Relocation and income mixing
became the centerpieces of that strategy. The HACC used a combination of relocation,
demolition, and income integration strategies to deconcentrate poverty. The findings suggest that
these strategies may be too simplistic to address the complexities of severely distressed public
housing adequately. This approach to deconcentrating poverty is simplistic because it fails to take
into account other housing developments, communities, and neighborhoods that relocation
affected. By definition, deconcentrating poverty means moving people from one area to another
and that means the receiving areas are negatively affected. The program does not appear to have
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planned for this reality however and as a result, relocated families often end up in other poor
communities.
The HACC used a push-pull strategy of relocation and income mixing to deconcentrate
poverty at the HOPE VI sites. On the one hand, relocation is used to push poor households from
the distressed sites to reduce poverty and income mixing is used to pull comparatively higherincome families into redeveloped sites to avoid reconcentrating poverty. As explained in Chapter
4, the theory underlying poverty deconcentration and relocation holds that extreme neighborhood
poverty leads to neighborhood distress because it has negative effects on residents‘ social and
economic well-being, social behavior, and neighborhood quality (Brooks-Gunn and Duncan
1997, South and Crowder 1999, Ellen and Turner 1997, Jencks and Mayer 1990, Wilson 1987).
Conceptualizing the problem in this way leads to the assumption that the economic and social
well-being of poor public housing residents depends on them adopting middle-class values and
means living among and interacting with middle-income households. The HACC used this
assumption to pursue relocation and mixed-income housing as key redevelopment strategies
because income mixing would give poor households better opportunities to improve their lives in
non-poor neighborhoods. However, this paternalistic idea did not work before and there is no
evidence of it working now. A 1999 article from the Shimberg Center for Affordable Housing
noted that this idea assumes that poor families can be taught how to behave like good middleclass citizens by putting them in good housing in middle-class type neighborhoods and that this
will produce ―good citizens‖. It gives the impression that poor residents in distressed public
housing have values that perpetuate poverty. It is an idea that has elements of both the
conservative ―culture of poverty‖ ideology that blames the poor for being poor and liberal
ideologies that view structural factors like distressed public housing as impediments to economic
independence and self-sufficiency. Interestingly, results from the householder survey in this study
suggest that a sizeable share of respondents support economic integration in public housing on the
assertion that public housing tenants would learn positive values from middle-income households.
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The findings from Baldwin‘s Run, the mixed-income site where householders were
interviewed, show that relocation lessened onsite poverty levels substantially, which was the goal
but the low-income public housing residents have not benefited from income mixing.
Householders say public housing residents and homeowners rarely interact with each other. Only
two public housing tenants interviewed acknowledged knowing any homeowners but nearly
everyone knew and interacted with other public housing residents. Contrary to HOPE VI‘s
prediction, positive interactions have not taken place between public housing tenants and
homeowners.
Deconcentration works in other ways as well. The HOPE VI developments have
populations that are certainly more economically diverse than before revitalization because
current tenants have a wider range of incomes. Returnees are few because only a small percentage
was allowed to return. Most received vouchers to relocate to private housing. The result is that the
majority of current public housing tenants at the three HOPE VI sites are new to public housing.
This is one of the major problems with poverty deconcentration. The proportion of returnees is so
small that one has to wonder if HOPE VI was intended for them.
8.2.1

Relocation Was Not Enough

Relocation is based on the assumption that moving to a ―better‖ neighborhood will boost
economic outcomes (Massey and Denton 1993, Wilson 1987). Relocation proponents also argue
that relocation to non-poor neighborhoods will improve social capital because non-poor
neighborhoods provide opportunities for making new contacts. By itself, moving to new
neighborhoods does not make poor people less poor. Relocation outcomes depend on several
personal and non-personal factors. Thus, emptying public housing of its poor residents is not
likely to affect movers‘ fortunes much since it does not change the obstacles to employment such
as low education and skills, lack of work experience, poor health, disability, and racial and class
prejudice. Additionally, movers still have difficulties accessing affordable healthcare, childcare,
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and transportation services, even when these services are available. Relocation programs often
incorrectly assume that poor public housing families can move to low-poverty neighborhoods as
easily as middle-income families. The limited economic means of poor families make relocation
less attractive and make it difficult to maintain established support networks (Venkatesh and
Celimli 2004).
Housing vouchers serve as a government rent subsidy for relocation to private housing for
original residents. Vouchering may well be a great option for some residents but voucher holders
frequently experience the problem of lack of suitable affordable housing because of tight housing
markets and reluctance of landlords to rent to voucher holders. Vouchering succeeds when the
housing market is receptive to voucher holders. The HACC even acknowledged that there were
problems with deconcentrating poverty using vouchers because many residents from McGuire
Gardens and Westfield Acres could not find housing at acceptable standards (HACC 2003a). The
HACC noted, ―Redistributing low-income families to date has only served to reconcentrate
poverty in other neighborhoods, so the vouchers approach in Camden has not provided for the
community building effect desired by residents, HACC, and the City‖ (HACC 2003a, p. 90).
Vouchering is not valid in all housing markets. In economies like that of Camden, poverty is
widespread throughout the city. As a result, low-poverty neighborhoods are almost non-existent.
Census 2000 data poverty in excess of 20 percent in 20 of Camden‘s 21 principal neighborhoods
and poverty was as high as 51 percent in at least one neighborhood (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).
Additionally, a large portion of the city‘s housing stock is severely deteriorated. Under those
conditions, the poor results of the voucher relocation process that the HACC reported should
surprise no one.
This issue is not unique to the HACC or to Camden. Studies of other HOPE VI
developments reported similar outcomes (Kingsley, Johnson and Pettit 2003). Relocation plans
that ended with residents returning to high-poverty neighborhoods, as the HACC indicated,
suggest shortsightedness in planning and implementation. The relocation plans may not have
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adequately accounted for market conditions or the impact of deconcentration on receiving
communities. It is also clear that relocation was focused solely on reducing poverty onsite
although it is clear that moving poor residents from a public housing site negatively affects
poverty in the receiving neighborhoods.
8.2.2

Income Mixing Has Not Shown the Predicted Results

Former HUD Secretary, Henry Cisneros said: ―When public housing residents are integrated into
mixed-income communities, those communities can fulfill multiple roles that are crucial to the
urban workforce, to the housing mission of cities, and to the metropolitan economy (Cisneros
2009, p. 13). This statement shows the remarkable faith HOPE VI leaders placed in the untested
(there is little empirical evidence to support the claims) mixed-income public housing arena.
Conventional thinking assumes that low-income residents will benefit from living in proximity to
higher-income residents such as homeowners. However, homeowner‘s earnings may be as low as
80 percent of the area median income, which is the upper income limit for public housing. While
the mixed-income idea sounds good, its viability is certainly not free from risk (Abravanel, Levy
and McFarland 2009). At Camden‘s two mixed-income HOPE VI developments, the non-public
housing includes low-income tax credit rentals and homeownership units. To prevent
concentrated poverty in HOPE VI developments and to help residents achieve economic selfsufficiency, since 1996, HOPE VI has pursued a mixed-income housing policy (Brophy and
Smith 1997, Goetz 2003, Popkin, Harris, et al. 2002, Zhang 2004). Policymakers and public
housing authority officials embraced income mixing as a strategy to deconcentrate poverty based
on the NCSDPH‘s critical report about distressed public housing and scholarly research
indicating that concentrated poverty is the main contributing factor. On the face of it, greater
income mixing seems to be the way to achieve income diversity and avoid a preponderance of
low-income households in HOPE VI developments. However, at the mixed-income site where

220
householders were interviewed, the study found no impact on residents‘ economic well-being or
the behavior of public housing families because of income mixing.
Neither the HACC nor HUD appears to have a blueprint for creating successful mixedincome developments. Furthermore, even though income mixing is a top priority in HOPE VI, no
one knows what works and what does not work in mixed-income developments that include
public housing (Brophy and Smith 1997, Joseph 2010, Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn 1998,
Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997). A common perception is that mixed-income and mixed-tenure
arrangements in HOPE VI were conceived to facilitate private financing and details regarding
long-term social and cost implications were not well thought out (Abravanel, Levy and
McFarland 2009). Brophy and Smith (1997) and Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997) suggested
several ways for HOPE VI to create mixed-income developments that include public housing
units, such as combining the public and non-public units in equal numbers, having more public
housing units than non-public housing units, or having a greater number of non-public units than
public units. Camden‘s two mixed-income developments used the latter. Respondents viewed
income mixing positively but differed from the housing authority about the proportion of public
housing units the HOPE VI developments should have. Most of the householders suggested equal
numbers of public and homeownership units. None suggested more homeownership units than
public housing units. The reality however is that both mixed-income developments have more
homeownership units than public units. Brophy and Smith (1997) and Schwartz and Tajbakhsh
(1997) said it was also important to make rental and owner-occupied units indistinguishable to the
outside observer. Based on physical revitalization plans, conversations with the HOPE VI
Coordinator, and site observations, public housing and non-public housing units were designed
similarly and to the same standards.
While HACC has embraced the mixed-income housing concept and has applied some
mixed-income ideas, we still do not know important information such as the level of income
mixing that must be reached, if any, for the quality of life in the mixed-income development to
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improve and the poor families to experience upward mobility. It is equally important to know
what the most effective policy interventions are for creating the appropriate housing mix.
Despite similar design characteristics, site observations at Baldwin‘s Run show clear
differences in appearance between rental units and owner-occupied units. Owner-occupied units
had decorations and amenities such as pools, perimeter fences, and gates but the public housing
units do not have external amenities or decorations. Survey participants reported that the private
management firm treated renters and homeowners differently, which resulted in the differences in
the appearance between public units and owner-occupied units that visitors often ask about. The
issue is that homeowners can amend and decorate their homes as they see fit but tenants are not
allowed such privileges. They are not even allowed to use the outside water pipes. With this
decision, one has to question the reason for putting the pipes there in the first place.
One of the most influential arguments for income mixing is that low-income
householders will benefit from the presence of higher-income residents. Proponents argue that the
higher-income residents will attract high-quality services such as high-quality management and
private and public neighborhood services that would benefit the poor households. Advocates of
mixed-income housing also assume that mixed-income projects can help low-income residents
become self-sufficient because it encourages upward mobility and ―good‖ personal conduct and
give them opportunities to form influential social ties. Peter Calthorpe, a founding member of the
New Urbanism movement, noted that children would have role models living next door to them
and social experiences that are often missing from public housing projects (Calthorpe 2001).
Much less patronizing, Mark Joseph (2010), a Case Western Reserve University professor, noted
that good behavior depends more on good quality management, ongoing social service
provisions, and residents‘ level of engagement in the development than on the income mix of the
residents. In addition to mixing incomes and good management, upward mobility of low-income
households in HOPE VI developments requires comprehensive and ongoing social services that
address barriers to self-sufficiency such as low educational achievement and lack of employment
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skills. In addition, he suggested that social ties might be overrated. If true, this may help to
explain the poor self-sufficiency outcomes found at Camden‘s two mixed income sites.
Most of the public housing tenants interviewed agreed that providing public and private
housing in the same development was a positive step but were concerned the reduction in lowincome housing. This concern is valid because that is exactly what has happened. Householders
who supported mixing public housing with non-public housing said it could force public housing
tenants to take better care of their homes and encourage them to work harder to buy their own
homes in the future. Interestingly, the potential benefits householders cited were similar to those
that mixed-income housing proponents also assumed, including the assumption that public
housing tenants would adopt middle-class values of good conduct.
Survey participants reported few interactions between renters and homeowners and that
they had not learnt anything from homeowners. The reasons are not clear but clustering of units
by tenure may be one reason because most public units have other public units as neighbors. The
physical distance between most public housing units and most non-public housing units may be
another reason. Another factor appears to be the preferential treatment (perceived or real) that
public housing tenant said homeowners received. A few tenants said they resented the restrictions
on them while homeowners were free to do anything they wanted. Without meaningful
interaction between renters and homeowners, the transfer of values from higher income to lower
income residents that housing mobility advocates assumed would take place in mixed-income
housing developments is not likely to take place.
Although relocation and income mixing reduced concentrated poverty in all three HOPE
VI developments, poverty remains very high among public housing households. There is
recognition in the HOPE VI program that concentrated poverty by itself does not cause distress
but its acceptance appears to be weak. Supportive services help residents deal with personal
issues like poor health and disability, but substance abuse counseling, family counseling, long
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term job and skills training, and education need greater financial support over the long term
because short term fixes are not nearly enough for ―hard to house‖ tenants.
8.2.3

HOPE for Whom?

Research by the Governmental Accounting Office (GAO) suggests that the proportion of original
residents that returned to redeveloped sites varied considerably from about 10 percent to 100
percent (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003). Other research suggests a narrower range
of 10 percent to 75 percent, with the largest numbers returning to rehabilitated sites rather than to
sites that were demolished completely and rebuilt (Comey June 2007). Based on estimates in the
HOPE VI redevelopment plans for McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres and interviews with
HOPE VI officers, 15 percent of original residents from Roosevelt Manor and about 32 percent
from Westfield Acres returned after redevelopment. No data was available for McGuire Gardens
but given that some residents remained onsite during redevelopment, more than 32 percent
appeared to have returned initially but many of them have since moved out. The picture that
emerges here is that for most original residents, HOPE VI has meant relocating to private housing
rather than moving to improved housing in a HOPE VI development (Popkin, Levy and Buron
2009, Comey June 2007). HOPE VI officials made the decision for them to live elsewhere despite
the fact that the majority of them wanted to return. The evidence suggests that the HA and the
private management firms preferred to deal with new tenants even when they are as poor as the
original tenants. Results from the householder survey indicate that most HOPE VI families were
first time tenants and very poor. Most had annual incomes of less than $10,000.
At all sites, original tenants who endured the distressed living conditions for years and
whom HOPE VI promised improved living environments benefited the least from HOPE VI.
Those who benefitted had to meet restrictive and somewhat unrealistic (for public housing
families) selection criteria. Interestingly, per HUD requirements, original householders in ―good
standing‖ who desired to return were promised HOPE VI housing. However, considering that the
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HA had planned to replace just 64 percent of original public housing units in all three
developments and 43 percent in the mixed-income developments, achieving that goal was highly
unlikely. Theoretically, given the limited availability of public housing units, the HA might have
denied improved housing to tenants in good standing. At Baldwin‘s Run for example, if more
than 78 original tenants met the ―good standing‖ criteria, some would have had to obtain housing
elsewhere because the site has only 78 public housing units. Noting the irony, a December 1998
report by HUD‘s Office of Inspector General stated that the very people whose living conditions
made distressed developments eligible for HOPE VI funding were not the ones who benefitted
most from HOPE VI grants (Pitcoff 1999).

8.3

Self-Sufficiency Outcomes

Study results suggest that the HACC provided several different supportive services to residents
from the three sites but the services varied by site. From the limited information received, some
services appear to have yielded some positive results but the overall impact on resident selfsufficiency has been small. The different redevelopment strategies and increases in the quantity of
services at successive sites do not appear to have had much differential impact on resident selfsufficiency outcomes. The sharp differences in support services to original residents at Westfield
Acres and McGuire Gardens during redevelopment were expected to produce notable differences
in self-sufficiency outcomes between the two developments but that is not what the results show.
Overall, at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s Run, employment and average household
income among HOPE VI public housing residents were higher in 2008 than for pre-HOPE VI
residents. The differences vary by site and generally not substantial. Inflation appears to have
played a substantial part in the higher incomes reported but additional research is required to
determine the actual inflationary impact. While the average household income for returnees at
McGuire Gardens was higher than the average household income for new residents at Baldwin‘s
Run, new tenants had a higher average household income than returnees in 2008.
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HOPE VI residents also had higher levels of employment than pre-HOPE VI residents
but the differences were small. Dependency on government assistance also varied between the
sites. The big picture shows lower unemployment but the decreases were due primarily to the
replacement of original tenants with new tenants having higher levels of employment and income,
even at McGuire Gardens where the higher than average annual incomes of two returnees skewed
the average income in favor of original tenants. Otherwise, the majority of returnees at this site
had lower incomes than new tenants. Most of the improvements shown at all sites resulted from
population changes, not improvements in the actual economic well-being of original residents.
Interestingly, although the data show slightly better averages, residents‘ overall economic
circumstances have not improved. That means HOPE VI has not yet met its goals to improve
resident self-sufficiency. There are mitigating factors however, such as the fact that Camden has a
very poor and struggling economy and jobs are very scarce. With jobs scarce, even skilled
residents have difficulties finding employment.
The study also indicates that most public housing residents who are not employed have
special needs that job training and employment preparation will not fix. A large proportion of
householders have disability, healthcare, and child-care needs that prevent them from working
outside their homes. Some are long-term dependents on government assistance. Long-term
dependents on government programs require a lot of support to become truly independent of
government aid. The HA probably should do more to target self-sufficiency services to these
needs in order to improve economic self-sufficiency. As Ellen and Turner (1997) explained, the
housing environment does not affect everyone in the same way. Popkin, Levy and Buron (2009)
previously advised that for ―hard to house‖16 residents, relocation and supportive services alone
would not reduce employment substantially because they have special needs such as healthcare,
disability, childcare, or criminal history. Employment focused self-sufficiency programs have
16

The ‗hard to house‘ are residents with complex problems such as mental illness, severe physical illness, substance
abuse, weak labor-market histories, criminal records, and families with large numbers of young children (Popkin, Levy
and Buron 2009).
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little impact on the disabled and residents with chronic health problems and critical childcare
needs.
The self-sufficiency plans reviewed for Baldwin‘s Run and Roosevelt Manor focused on
increasing employment and income because public housing residents usually have problems
getting and maintaining employment and decent income. Even the best plan depends on the local
economy to succeed. Given the poor self-sufficiency outcomes at redeveloped sites, it may be that
the CSS plans did not sufficiently account for the poorly performing local labor market and
economy. The local officials assumed that once trained, residents would get jobs and reduce their
dependency on public assistance. In declining economies such as Camden‘s, substantial
improvements in the key self-sufficiency variables may not be a realistic option for distressed
public housing residents over the life of a HOPE VI project.
8.3.1

Impact on Residents

Study results indicate that through succeeding HOPE VI projects, the HACC became more adept
at the provision of supportive services to residents. Thus, while McGuire Gardens‘ residents
received few self-sufficiency services during the redevelopment, Westfield Acres and Roosevelt
Manor residents had several supportive services options. The Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act, improved monitoring of HOPE VI projects by HUD, and the HACC
becoming more adept in the HOPE VI process all played major roles in the improvements. The
QHWRA made self-sufficiency services a HOPE VI requirement so the HACC had no choice but
to provide said services.
This improvement in services to increase employment and income appear to have had
few successes however. Survey results indicate little progress towards economic self-sufficiency
and reduction in barriers to self-sufficiency among public housing residents at the redeveloped
sites. Between McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s Run, only four of the householders interviewed,
two from each site, attributed gains in either employment or income to HOPE VI. One likely
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reason for this lack of self-sufficiency progress by the majority is the large proportion of residents
who did not participate in any self-sufficiency initiative. Forty-two percent of the respondents
from McGuire Gardens and twelve percent from Baldwin‘s Run acknowledged receiving selfsufficiency assistance during or after redevelopment. Most of the others said they did not know
about the services. Additionally, household dependence on government assistance showed no
decline in the review period. Without more than the initial self-sufficiency plans and the
information householders provided in the survey, the reasons for the poor self-sufficiency impacts
are not clear. One possibility is a need to change the way resident services are administered.
Communication appears to be one area that needs to improve substantially. One possible reason
for the low participation may be inadequate or ineffective communication between the HA and
residents about the HOPE VI redevelopment. Another reason may be residents‘ own failure to act
upon information received from the housing authority, and a third possibility is that the majority
of interviewees were new tenants who did not know that they too were eligible for HOPE VI selfsufficiency assistance. If so, the HA might not have promoted its self-sufficiency services among
new tenant as much as it did with original tenants. Another possible reason is that many tenants
who obtained self-sufficiency benefits did not participate in the survey. Although HAs may use
up to 20 percent of HOPE VI grants for CSS activities (McCarty 2005), the amount available is
usually much less and woefully inadequate to satisfy needs and are exhausted soon after reoccupancy (Holin, et al. 2003). To meet the HOPE VI economic self-sufficiency goals, HUD and
the HACC should devote more funding to self-sufficiency programs, develop services that target
residents‘ needs, not only the desires of HUD, HOPE VI or the HA to make the developments
financially.
Poor self-sufficiency outcomes are not uncommon in HOPE VI projects. Several studies
reported similarly poor self-sufficiency outcomes at other HOPE VI developments. For example,
recent findings from the five HOPE VI Panel Study sites showed no gain in employment (Popkin
et al. (2009). Goetz (2010 and 2005) pointed to research consistently showing that dispersed
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HOPE VI households did not benefit from relocation in terms of employment or income. Given
that several HOPE VI studies also reported poor self-sufficiency outcomes, it may be that the
policy assumptions and program level interventions in HOPE VI underestimated (or
misdiagnosed) the complexity of the social and economic issues confronting distressed public
housing residents and have prevented them from achieving economic self-sufficiency (ClampetLundquist and Massey 2008, Levy and Wolley 2007, Goetz 2010). Is it also possible that HOPE
VI policy assumptions are premature conclusions from the neighborhood effects literature? As
Ellen and Turner (1997) reasoned, with so many unknown variables, policy prescriptions based
on neighborhood effects theory have strong possibilities of underestimating or overestimating the
effects of concentrated poverty on public housing residents, for example. Policymakers, policy
analysts, HOPE VI officials and advocates can learn much from the excellent analysis of the
neighborhood effects literature by Ellen and Turner (1997).
Despite the poor self-sufficiency outcomes, householders reported positive psychosocial
benefits from living in HOPE VI developments. When asked about the benefits of HOPE VI to
them, the overwhelming majority of comments expressed increases in self-confidence, less family
tension and improvements in tenant and family emotional well-being. The most frequent
comments were: ―I feel better about myself‖. ―I have a more positive outlook on life‖. ―I feel
more confident about my family‘s future and myself‖. ―I am less depressed‖. ―I am not anxious
anymore‖. ―I feel safe‖. ―My children can play outside now without me worrying.‖ Tenants said
these benefits came from finally living in decent housing and developments where they felt a lot
safer than before. They mentioned housing quality and design, having adequate interior space for
their families, quietness, and safety in the developments as important facets that made them
comfortable. While all householders pointed to positive benefits from the physical improvements,
two householders from McGuire Gardens and two from Baldwin‘s run cited self-sufficiency
services as major benefits to them. One tenant at McGuire Gardens said she used her improved
motivation to find new employment and an improved path towards self-sufficiency.
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There is no doubt that HOPE VI transformed the physical and demographic environment
at the three formerly distressed housing developments such that poverty is less concentrated now
and living conditions are much better than before. There is also no doubt that HOPE VI
developments are safer than the distressed developments they replaced. The physical and safety
improvements have reduced anxiety among residents and have helped to improve their selfconfidence. However, if the extremely poor living conditions in the distressed developments
resulted from concentrated poverty, then physical improvements alone or combined with poverty
deconcentrating initiatives like relocation, will not make residents less poor. Site conditions may
improve but that will not reduce dependency, improve literacy, reduce unemployment, or increase
income among public housing tenants. The HA can easily replace extremely low-income tenants
with higher-income tenants but unless the economic well-being of the extremely low-income and
very low-income returnees improves, poverty and dependency on government will remain high
and economic self-sufficiency elusive. Resident needs must receive no less attention than the
physical environment or poverty deconcentration initiatives (NCSDPH 1992).
Given the poor state of the Camden‘s economy, the high levels of poverty, and the poor
housing and neighborhood conditions, improving resident self-sufficiency is a considerable
challenge for the HACC. The 2008 sufficiency standards for a three-person household with an
adult (mother) and two school age children in Camden County, which is the typical HOPE VI
public housing family unit in Camden city, ranged from $23,233 to $48,867, and 34 percent to 72
percent of the Area Median Income. The average household income for residents across all three
sites is approximately $13,000. These figures do not point to any easy path to decreasing
dependency and improving self-sufficiency among tenants.

8.4

Summary

HOPE VI began by promising meaningful changes to the physical, social and economic
environment at severely distressed public housing developments, including residents‘ lives
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(Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Positive outcomes from the Gautreaux program in Chicago had
convinced HOPE VI advocates that a nationwide program similar to the Gautreaux program
would reap positive benefits as well.
While nearly all tenants who were interviewed experienced improvements in the quality
of lives, the improvements were due to the changes to the physical environment. A few tenants
cited self-sufficiency benefits but most said HOPE VI made them feel better about themselves.
The quality of life improvements reported were related to the physical improvements, not to any
gain in employment or income or less dependence on government assistance. Among onsite
public housing households, HOPE VI has had little impact on self-sufficiency.

However,

interviews repeatedly stressed that their children were a lot happier, that fighting had declined,
and that they now play outside safely for the first time. Householders reported that they
experienced less stress and were much less nervous too. Residents reported fewer headaches
because they were less fearful about their families‘ safety and living conditions. Other than
improvements to the physical environment and lowering poverty levels at distressed sites, the
findings indicate that HOPE VI also helped to improve residents‘ emotional well-being. The
HOPE VI literature has not sufficiently acknowledged this achievement however. The
psychosocial benefits that residents reported had the biggest impact on their lives. One previous
HOPE VI study reported similar findings. Boston (2005) reported that a significant number of
former residents from Harris Homes in Atlanta attributed positive social-psychological behavioral
changes to relocation out of public housing. Those residents cited improved self-esteem, feeling
stronger, being more responsible, and substance abuse treatment and recovery as the biggest
changes in their lives (Boston 2005, p. 405).
Despite the methodological shortcomings and the many data gaps in this study, a
powerful lesson learnt is that HOPE VI successes so far have been mostly place-based such as
transforming the physical environment, providing decent housing, and reducing the concentration
of poverty on the site. People-based outcomes such as improvements in residents‘ socioeconomic
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well-being have eluded HOPE VI at the three sites studied. These results are not limited to the
three developments studied however; they are a consistent feature of HOPE VI developments
nationwide. Consequently, although HOPE VI was created to improve the lives of residents of
severely distressed public housing, the most consistently positive outcomes from redevelopment
are the improvements to the physical environment and reductions in concentrated poverty at
HOPE VI sites. When it comes to the people side of HOPE VI, a large percentage of original
residents has not yet benefited from redevelopment (Goetz 2005).

CHAPTER 9
IMPLICATIONS

HUD launched the HOPE VI program in 1993 amidst despair and concern about appalling
conditions in federal housing. The program‘s key provisions are based on the recommendations
of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1992. Since then, HOPE
VI has become the main tool used to re-engineer severely distressed federal public housing. The
program‘s articulated aims are to transform the physical environment, end the isolation of
residents from the wider urban environment that resulted from concentrated poverty, and foster
upward mobility by providing opportunities for residents to live among more prosperous
neighbors who can put them in contact with employment opportunities.
This study explored how HOPE VI redevelopment projects in Camden impacted the lives
of the public housing residents at three HOPE VI sites and found results consistent with previous
research. The physical changes improved site and housing conditions markedly and contributed
substantially to improving residents‘ psychosocial, personal, and family well-being. Nearly all
householders spoke about personal growth or improvement in personal and family well-being
from living in decent housing and housing that they like. Concentrated poverty onsite declined as
well. Regarding resident self-sufficiency, the study found few signs of real progress as more than
90 percent of interviewees said their economic circumstances had not improved under HOPE VI.
There were some undesirable consequences as well, such as reductions in the number of public
housing units at each site and displacement of residents. The Camden housing authority also
reported that problems in the relocation process forced many voucher holders from McGuire
Gardens and the former Westfield Acres developments to return to similar or worse housing and
neighborhood conditions as before relocation.

232

233
9.1

Research Implications

Several study results point to a need for more empirical research to deepen understanding of
HOPE VI affects the lives of original and new public housing residents at HOPE VI sites and the
lives of original residents who moved to private housing. Housing and neighborhood outcomes
for displaced families are two of the unknown issues in HOPE VI that need exploration. Knowing
how former tenants fare after received vouchers to move to private housing or after they stop
receiving federal housing assistance is important to understanding the program‘s overall impact.
Like many other housing authorities, the HACC is not able to account for former
residents from McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres who no longer receive subsidized housing
benefits. This issue is common in HOPE VI, particularly among grant recipients in the 1990s.
Several HOPE VI studies documented concerns regarding the whereabouts of displaced residents
(Kingsley, Johnson and Pettit 2003). It is also unclear what percentage of original residents who
were moved to other public housing developments to facilitate redevelopment have since moved
on to better housing, what percentage remains in public housing, and if their economic well-being
improved. The fact that the housing and economic outcomes of many former tenants that HOPE
VI projects displaced are unknown should be of serious concern to HOPE VI administrators
(Kingsley, Johnson and Pettit 2003). Because relocation is such an integral part of HOPE VI, the
housing and economic circumstances of displaced residents are important to understanding HOPE
VI‘s full impact and critical to the effectiveness of future policy interventions.
Relocation is the primary means of deconcentrating poverty in HOPE VI. Some original
residents moved to private housing and some were moved to other public housing developments,
even though those moves did nothing to improve their housing or economic circumstances. This
study did not research outcomes for permanent relocatees, yet their HOPE VI experiences are
also crucial to understanding HOPE VI‘s overall impact. Housing authority data indicate that the
largest group of relocatees received vouchers to rent private market housing (HACC 2000, HACC
2003a). The HACC also reported that voucher relocation did not work well for residents from the
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first two HOPE VI sites, McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres, because many voucher holders
were forced to return to poor housing in distressed communities (HACC 2003a). Since HOPE VI
seeks to deconcentrate poverty, reconcentration of poverty elsewhere contradicts the program‘s
intent. Future HOPE VI research should examine voucher relocation.
Homeowners, who account for 60 percent of the householders at Baldwin‘s Run and
almost 38 percent at Roosevelt Manor, were not included in this study, but they are very
important to deconcentrating poverty. Since perceived benefits from income integration were key
HOPE VI assumptions, homeowners‘ experiences are also important to HOPE VI‘s overall
impact. Research about homeowners is therefore needed to learn about the success or otherwise
of providing public and private housing on the same site. The mixed-income experiences at one
site can provide valuable lessons to help guide future planning interventions. Finally, further
research is needed to understand why dependency on government assistance increased amidst
increasing income diversity.

9.2

Policy Implications

Study results have several policy implications. To the public housing residents, the housing and
site improvements have had the biggest effects on them to date. These physical improvements
contributed substantially to improving the health and psychological well-being of HOPE VI
residents. Imagine living in a house in a location where your children can play safely outside and
which satisfies your family‘s needs, for the very first time. That is the HOPE VI experience for
several households who were interviewed. This finding is significant because it reinforces the
importance of good quality housing to people‘s mental well-being and signals to housing officials
the need to maintain housing quality to ensure that HOPE VI housing is sustainable.
Despite talk about PHA flexibility in the HOPE VI redevelopment process, HUD failed
to realize that the lack of alternative design ideas to New Urbanism in HOPE VI developments
does not engender local flexibility in design. The public therefore does not know if alternatives to
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New Urbanism would have produced better outcomes than those that New Urbanism produced.
To encourage local ingenuity, HUD should reconsider this ―one size fits all‖ policy in future
programs. Openness stimulates creativity in design and encourages HAs to create housing
developments that have genuinely diverse housing types and housing styles. A truly diverse urban
housing development would have a mix of multi-family and single-family housing; detached,
semi-detached houses and townhouses; low-rise and mid-rise housing types; housing for the
elderly and non-elderly; and low-income and middle-income housing. After all, that is the way
most urban neighborhoods are. That would be the best way to make the HOPE VI developments
fit the character of their neighborhoods, instead of them merely having units designed to resemble
selected housing styles from the surrounding areas.
One of the most controversial HOPE VI outcomes is the small percentage of original
residents that returned to HOPE VI developments (Cunningham 2004). HOPE VI was set up to
improve the living environment in public housing for residents but in Camden, few original
residents received either new or rehabilitated HOPE VI housing. At Baldwin‘s Run, less than 32
percent returned and at Roosevelt Manor, a mere 15 percent are expected to return, yet in both
instances, most tenants wanted to return. The HACC should reconsider its re-entry policy to allow
a larger percentage of original residents to return after redevelopment. Re-entry rules that require
tenants to have good credit, continuous employment, and no record of rent and utility delinquency
are prohibitive and somewhat unrealistic at best. Simply taking the ―best‖ tenants while and
excluding very disadvantaged families with children, for example, is counterproductive to public
housing mission. Reviewing the re-entry policy is particularly important considering that the
HACC said relocating original families to private housing did not produce the desired results
because a large number of families from the first two sites were forced to return to high-poverty
environments. Having endured the poor living conditions in the distressed projects, these
residents, who are unfamiliar with the private housing market that failed them in the first place,
should not end up in similar or worse housing conditions as the ones they moved from earlier.
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HOPE VI administrators ought to bear in mind that the fundamental mission of the public
housing program is to serve low income families that the private housing market does not serve.
The HACC should also revise its HOPE VI relocation policy to avoid the problems that
prevented residents from finding suitable housing in better neighborhoods. Vouchers are not for
everyone, especially ―hard-to-house‖ tenants or those with special housing needs (Popkin, Levy
and Buron 2009). Families with several children, families with disability needs, and families
having members with questionable backgrounds and credit problems do not do well in housing
voucher programs (Martens 2010) and therefore need special attention during relocation.
The majority of original residents received little or no economic benefit from living in
new or renovated housing and upgraded sites even though the HOPE VI program was created to
benefit them. That means self-sufficiency outcomes lagged well behind other outcomes.
Consequently, HOPE VI overall results are not as positive as expected. Self-sufficiency plans
need to be developed based on actual conditions in the local and regional economies, including
the housing market, so that realistic projections can be made. Optimistic projections about higher
employment and income potentials in a poorly performing economy such as Camden‘s are of
little value or comfort to residents. Economic self-sufficiency outcomes are often based on factors
outside the control of HOPE VI or the housing authority but linked intimately to the labor market
and the performance of the local and regional economies (Cunningham 2004). At times, the
HOPE VI literature gives the impression that relocation alone would improve economic prospects
for relocatees but that is not the case. Even if the job market happens to be robust, that does not
automatically translate to jobs and improved self-sufficiency for public housing residents, as adult
residents know well. The fact is that public housing residents face formidable employment
barriers based on their status as public housing tenants, plus other barriers based on personal
circumstances such as lack of employment skills or transportation, and poor education.
Additionally, in very poor economies such as Camden‘s, employment opportunities are scarce for
most residents but more scarce for low-skilled public housing residents.
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Poverty deconcentration plans need to include potential negative impacts of relocation on
receiving neighborhoods. Even though relocating most of the poor residents from the distressed
housing affects the site positively, the effects on receiving neighborhoods are negative. HOPE VI
deconcentration plans should therefore take into consideration, the impacts of deconcentration on
receiving communities to avoid serious consequences in those areas. A well-planned and
carefully managed relocation program ensures that relocation does not result in poverty
reconcentrating elsewhere or tip other already poor neighborhoods into higher poverty brackets.
This is critical for cities like Camden where virtually all neighborhoods are already poor. HUD‘s
role is not housing only; it also has an urban development role. When HOPE VI shifts poverty
from one neighborhood to another or from one part of a neighborhood to another, HUD still has
the responsibility to address the problem. Poverty appears to have consolidated in other areas in
Camden as some displaced residents with vouchers experienced difficulties finding suitable
alternative housing (HACC 2003a). In that case, can the housing authorities realistically claim
success in deconcentrating poverty when families who were forced to move cannot find housing?
Relocation may move some families into better housing and better neighborhoods but
that does not automatically change their economic circumstances. Unless their economic
circumstances improve, residents will continue to face problems due to their low levels of
education, skills, and work experience, poor health and disabilities, and racial discrimination. It
depends on where relocated families end up. Programs that provide self-sufficiency support
beyond the project life along with relocation are more likely to produce positive outcomes. At the
same time, relocation may unintentionally spread poverty to other areas.
Self-sufficiency goals are not well articulated. The absence of outcome goals and
confusion about the meaning of self-sufficiency and poverty deconcentration require attention.
The False HOPE (2002) study suggested that this issue requires attention. It is not clear if selfsufficiency means independence from all forms of public assistance or merely independence from
welfare assistance. It is also not clear what poverty threshold(s) HAs should use to assess
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progress towards eradicating concentrated poverty. None of the two redevelopment plans
examined or interviews with HOPE VI officials provided poverty benchmarks to assess progress
in deconcentrating poverty. If the goal is simply to reduce poverty to less than 40 percent, it is not
clearly stated. With no clear guidance from HUD, HOPE VI goals differ from project to project,
which makes program evaluation difficult because, in effect, several HOPE VI programs exist.
Redevelopment should also preserve the existing levels of public housing for needy
families. At two of Camden‘s three HOPE VI developments, there was a net reduction of 342
public housing units from 892 units to 550 units, and this in a city with severe housing
deficiencies and long waiting lists for public housing and Section 8 housing. At the minimum,
redevelopment should preserve the existing stock of low-income housing. HAs often ignores
vacant units to paint a more palatable picture and allow them to abandon units to make the site
more attractive for redevelopment.
The findings of this study suggest that the HACC‘s redevelopment goals were focused on
inputs instead of outcomes and this may well be one reason for the poor self-sufficiency
outcomes. Program policies should emphasize outcomes, not inputs so that HAs do not
emphasize what they did but what they achieved instead. No longer would they be able to only
point to the number of units demolished or the self-sufficiency programs implemented or to the
number of residents whom they relocated as meaning success. Instead, they would point to the
number of replacement units, to specific self-sufficiency achievements such as the number of
residents whom the program placed in jobs or higher education, and to the percentage of families
who now live in better housing and neighborhood conditions.
Wilson (1987) emphasized the need for policy initiatives to improve human capital
among the poor but HOPE VI emphasizes physical transformation and mixing tenure and income.
As discussed earlier, physical redevelopment is important to improving living conditions but in
the absence of substantially more resources and time devoted to human capital improvements, the
HOPE VI projects are going to be hard-pressed to have any meaningful impact on the
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socioeconomic circumstances of families affected by the program. Residents need long term
support to reach greater economic self-sufficiency. The HACC needs to devote more resources to
this effort and do so beyond the life of a project. Additionally, it seems clear that self-sufficiency
means more than just having a job and earning just enough income to be weaned from public
assistance. For example, some residents may be skilled but are unable to hold decent paying jobs
due to drugs use, family problems, or lack of childcare assistance. They need assistance beyond
job intensive training programs to get them on the road to self-sufficiency. Furthermore, too many
residents, particularly at Baldwin‘s Run, claimed ignorance about the availability of selfsufficiency services and therefore not benefiting from the programs offered. It is not clear where
the problem lies but it is something that the HACC needs to address promptly. The HACC‘s
biggest challenge may well be the fact that virtually all of Camden‘s neighborhoods are poor,
which makes plans to move public housing residents to low-poverty neighborhoods meaningless.
For the new Choice Neighborhood Program that is to replace HOPE VI, HUD needs to
establish a clear definition for self-sufficiency and set performance standards. The standards
should be based on outcomes not inputs and apply to program goals and HOPE VI awards. A
built-in reward system to encourage superior performance would also help to improve HA
performance. Clear performance standards facilitate evaluation across projects and the HOPE VI
program. Greater investments in self-sufficiency and other supportive services would help
residents find better housing and adjust to their new housing (Fraser and Nelson 2008).
Negative outcomes indicate weaknesses in the program. After 17 years, the $6.5 billion
invested has reduced the low-income housing stock substantially but improved housing
conditions for selected tenants only. Reducing the low-income housing stock makes it more
difficult for low-income people to find safe and decent housing that they can afford. A core
objective was to improve self-sufficiency but results show employment, income and dependence
on government assistance that are similar to the pre-redevelopment period. Could the $6 billion
achieve more? If done differently, could it have improved the distressed public housing and
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simultaneously expanded the affordable housing stock? Would more housing developments have
benefited? The questions highlight a need to rethink HOPE VI approaches to:


The provision of self-sufficiency services to ensure that initiatives implemented actually
match residents‘ needs, including barriers to meaningful employment such as disability
and child/family care needs;



Allocation of funding for self-sufficiency improvements to give more emphasis to
improving residents‘ well-being, as the NCSDPH recommended;



Developing mixed-income housing to create real neighborhoods by expanding the mix of
building and units types at each site such that there are low and mid-rise apartment
buildings in addition to the detached and semi-detached single-family units;



Poverty alleviation for poor families to give it as much priority as building mixed-income
developments to attract higher-income householders.

9.3

Research Limitations

The study has limited generalizability since all three research sites are in the same city, controlled
by the same PHA, and given the small sample sizes used, the outcomes are not representative of
most HOPE VI projects. Camden‘s political, social, and economic environment is not
representative of most cities in the United States. The city is so physically and economically
distressed, it is reputed to be the poorest city in New Jersey and one of the poorest cities in the
country (Morgan Quitno Press 2005, Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute
2007). Even a casual observation of the city‘s physical condition reveals widespread poverty.
Despite these limitations, some of the findings are similar to findings that other studies
found at other HOPE VI sites around the country (Boston 2005, Goetz 2010, Holin, et al. 2003,
Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). One example is poor self-sufficiency outcomes among original
householders. Most reported psychosocial or perceptual type benefits. Boston (2005) reported
similar outcomes in Atlanta.
Several issues limit the scope and depth of the research, including the following:


A lack of information about relocation outcomes for voucher recipients



A lack of information about the number of voucher recipients

241


A lack of information about relocation to other public housing developments



Not enough information about the number of returnees



Insufficient information about the self-sufficiency services implemented



Non-participation of a large number of householders in the household survey due to
inability to speak English well, lack of interest, and their unavailability

There were problems with getting important information from the HACC about the three
HOPE VI developments. HOPE VI officials provided no information and only partial information
in some other instances. For all three projects, some of the information in the redevelopment
plans that the housing authority provided were outdated and conflicting. In the case of McGuire
Gardens, since the housing authority did not provide the redevelopment plan and the information
about the site in the 1996 HOPE VI Baseline Assessment report was used but the information was
inconsistent.
The two revitalization plans received appeared to have been the original plans, which
contained a great deal of information that varied significantly from the actual plan implemented.
Revitalization plan statistics were often inconsistent and incomplete and the HACC HOPE VI
personnel did not provide all the necessary clarifications. The lack of insufficient or outdated
information made it impossible to continue pursuing the original study objectives and restricted
assessment of impact on resident characteristics. For example, changes in poverty levels at each
site could not be determined because the relevant pre-redevelopment poverty information was not
provided. Similarly, despite repeated requests, HOPE VI officials did not provide any information
about self-sufficiency services at McGuire Gardens during redevelopment or about the selfsufficiency programs implemented at Baldwin‘s Run. For Roosevelt Manor, the main setbacks
concerned the late start to construction and re-occupancy, sketchy and incomplete data regarding
poverty, employment and income, and enrolments and completions in self-sufficiency programs.
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The study also suffered from a dearth of pre-HOPE VI resident characteristics data for
each development to facilitate formulation of cogent profiles of residents‘ social and economic
characteristics at the start of the HOPE VI process. The resident characteristics information in the
two revitalization plans that the HACC provided was not consistent and lacked several pieces of
valuable information. The revitalization plan for Roosevelt Manor contained more details about
residents and conditions in the development prior to HOPE VI than the Westfield Acres
revitalization plan but still lacked key baseline data. This improvement appears to show the
HACCs growing knowledge of the HOPE VI process and increased competency in preparing
HOPE VI redevelopment plans.

9.4

Conclusion

Housing is one of life‘s necessities and housing quality is a key indicator of social standing
because it contributes to fixing one‘s place in society. Living in substandard housing and
neighborhoods tends to lead to restricted employment, education, public service, and other life
opportunities. HOPE VI‘s primary mission is to eliminate severely distressed public housing units
from the public housing stock and improve the overall living conditions in distressed
developments. The main goals have changed since the program began and especially away from
the most severely distressed developments to distressed developments that are more amenable to
private investment (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003). The three redeveloped
properties in Camden were among the worst in Camden and redevelopment was necessary.
Camden‘s HOPE VI experiences provide several lessons. One is that with the right
commitment, positive change can take place in public housing, even in one of the poorest cities in
the country. Another is that shifting poverty to other parts of a neighborhood or to other
neighborhoods and replacing poor original tenants with higher income tenants may dilute poverty
but does not, by itself, improves the relocated tenants‘ economic circumstances. The results also
show that relocation needs very thoughtful planning and implementation. It is not enough to
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simply return some of the original residents to new or rehabilitated housing and expect
transformation in their economic circumstances. Neither is fixing the distressed housing sufficient
to make residents self-sufficient. Some families need employment-focused assistance and some
need assistance in other areas in order to move from dependence to self-sufficiency.
Employment-related training alone does not result in improved economic self-sufficiency for all
households. HACC needs a more effective communication strategy with residents before, during,
and after redevelopment to inform residents about HOPE VI‘s benefits and the ways to access
those benefits. Another lesson is that improvements in housing conditions impact residents‘
psychological well-being and hence their general welfare.
Addressing the distressed public housing problem requires much more attention to the
issues that lead to the distress in the first place. Physical deterioration is one part of the equation
but giving priority attention to this part fails to recognize and accept the full impact of economics
and racial discrimination. Physical revitalization is very important but so is human development.
Residents‘ needs should receive the highest redevelopment priority (NCSDPH 1992). Bricks and
mortar focused redevelopment has been tried before yet the problems remain. When the people
whose lives the program was meant to improve experience little or no material improvements,
HOPE VI has not fulfilled its mission. Program success ultimately depends on improvements in
the economic well-being of residents. With self-sufficiency secured, residents can escape
dependency on public housing.
In the nation that considers itself the most generous in the world, is it not ironic that the
largest transfer of federal aid to housing annually (about $84 billion in 2004) to homeowners in
the form of mortgage interest deductions raises little dissent but assistance to low-income tenants,
which is four times smaller (Bratt, Stone and Hartman 2006) is contentious? The biggest
challenge that public housing faces is not concentrated poverty or deteriorated units. The biggest
problem appears to be the conflict between people who believe in government promoting the
general societal welfare and people who assert that the best way to achieve general welfare is
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through everyone pursuing their own self-interest through the private market and government
doing as little as possible (Bratt, Stone and Hartman 2006). The latter argument fails to realize
that the consequences of inaction, such as homelessness and crime, are greater than the cost of
government intervention (Turner, Popkin and Kingsley, et al. 2005).
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APPENDIX A
SCHEMATIC OF ROOSEVELT MANOR HOUSING MODELS
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APPENDIX B
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED
Particulars

McGuire Gardens (2008)

Baldwin‟s Run (2008)

Households

Percent

Households

Percent

Number of housing units
Eligible households
Householders interviewed

253

100

Total household members
Average household size

108
3.3

%
100
-

78
72
23
%
82
3.6

40
96
33
%
100
-

$12,250

100

$14,200

100

7
8
6
4
4
0

27%
20%
13%
13%
3%
-

8
4
1
5
5
-

35%
17%
4%
22%
22%
-

11
-

33%
%

40%
50%

0
3
27

00%
10%
90%

21%
97%
75%

27
8
9
4
15
7
25
33
25

77%
23%
26%
11%
43%
20%
71%
94%
71%
16%

5
18
4
1
16 (5+11)
2
19
23
19
8%

22%
78%
17%
4%
70%
9%
83%
100%
83%

8
18
4
0
2
3

23%
51%
11%
0
6%
9%

4
7
5
0
0
7

17%
30%
22%
0%
0%
30%

35

Household Income:
Average household income
Less than $5,000
$5,001 - $10,000
$10,001 - $15,000
$15,001 - $20,000
$20,001 - $30,000
Above $30,000
Source:
Wage as major income
Welfare as major income
SS/SSI/Pension as major income
―Other‖ major income
Income Distribution:
51 - 80 percent of median income
30 - 49 percent of median income
Below 30 percent of median income
Household Composition:
Two or more adults in household
One Adult in household
1 Person in household
2 Persons in household
3-4 Persons in household
5+ Persons in household
Households with children
Female Head of household
Female householder with children
Householder has a disability
Education
No high school diploma
High school diploma or equivalent
Attended college
Have Associate degree
Have bachelor degree or higher
Unknown
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Particulars

McGuire Gardens (2008)

Baldwin‟s Run (2008)

Households

Percent

Households

Percent

15
50
25
4
4

14%
46%

11
26
19
2
2

83%
9%
9%

19
3
13
16
19

54%
9%
37%
46%
54%

10
1
12
14
9

43%
4%
52%
61%
39%

7
9
14
2

22%
28%
44%
06%

1
7
13
2

4%
30%
57%
9%

Age:
Mean Age of householder
Householder members under age 6
Household members ages 6-17
Household members ages 18 – 50
Household members ages 51 – 61
Household members ages 62 -82
Race/Ethnicity
Percentage Black
Percentage Caucasian
Mixed
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
Bedrooms:
1 bedroom
2 bedroom
3 bedrooms
4 bedrooms

APPENDIX C
HOUSEHOLDERS‟ SURVEY SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

HOPE VI PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS‘ SURVEY
BALDWIN‘S RUN
(Camden, NJ)
2007/2008
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Date: ___/___/2007
Introduction
Hello, my name is Michael Brown, from New Jersey Institute of Technology and I am following
up on a letter concerning a research that I am doing about the HOPE VI program. I am here to
talk with the head of the house about his/her of living in a HOPE VI development
Are you the household head?

Yes
[Go to next question]

No
If no, when respondent arrives read:
Hello. I am doing a survey about HOPE VI, the program that fixes up distressed public housing
developments like the one that Baldwin‘s Run replaces, and I talk with you about your
experiences with HOPE VI. This will take about 45 minutes of your time.
The study is for public housing families only. Are you a public housing resident?

Yes
[Go to next question A1]

No
[Go to Closing]
You do not have to take part but your participation is important to the study. Taking part will not
affect your current or future housing situation or benefits in this or other housing program in any
way whatsoever. In addition, your identity and the answers you give will be kept confidential.
This means that your name will not be given to anyone.
A1.



Do you agree to participate in the study?
Yes
[Ask householder to read and sign consent form, then go to A2]
No
[Go to Closing]

If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them for you.
A2.
Do you have any questions at this time?

No
[Go to A3]

Yes
[Address questions then go to A3]
A3. May we begin now?

Yes
[Go to Q 1]

No
[Go back]
(Start) ___:___

(End) ___:___

Previous Housing
I am going to start with a few questions about your previous housing situation.
1. Where did you live before you moved here?
 Another public housing development (State name) ____________________
 The old housing development on this site
 Private housing development
 Private single family home
2. How long did you live there?

 ______ years, ______ months
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3. Why did you move?
 Given notice to move
 Renovation work
 Poor living conditions
 To live in a better neighborhood
 I needed a bigger place
 Crime and violence in area
 Other reason(s): ____________________________________________
 Refused to answer
4. In total, how long have you lived in public housing?
 Less than 1 year
 1-2 Years
 2-4 Years
 Don‘t know
 Refused
5. As an adult, have you ever lived in a private apartment or house?
 Yes
 No
 Don‘t know
 Refused
Current Housing
Now I will talk about the design of the house/apartment that you live in now.
6. How long have you lived in this apartment/house
 Less than 1 year
 1-2 years
 Don‘t know
 Refused
7. What is the size of your apartment/house?
 1-bedroom
 2-bedrooms
 5-bedrooms

 2-3 years

 3-bedrooms

 3-4 years

 4-bedrooms

8. How satisfied are you with this size apartment/house?
 Very satisfied
 Satisfied
 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 Dissatisfied
 Very dissatisfied
 Don’t Know
 Refused
9. How do you feel about the change from high-rise apartments at Westfield Acres to singlefamily houses here at Baldwin‘s Run. Would you say the decision was:
 Very good
 Somewhat bad
 Refused [Go to Q10]

 Somewhat good
 Very bad

 Neither good nor bad
 Don‘t know [Go to Q10]

9b. Why do you feel that way?
 __________________________________________________
 _____________________________________________________
 ______________________________________________________
10. How important are the following to your family?
Very
Important
a. Having own private entrance
to your home
b. Having own private mailing
address
c. Backyard fenced off

Somewhat
Important

Undecided

Somewhat
Unimportant

Not
Important

Refused
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11. Rank these things about your HOPE VI home from most important to least important. Use
one (1) for the most important and seven (7) for least important.
 The number of bedrooms in the apartment
 The size of the rooms
 Having my own private mailing address  Having own private entrance
 Having a front yard
 Having a backyard
 Air conditioning unit in home
 Don‘t know
 Refused
12. What do you like most about your HOPE VI home?
 The number of bedrooms
 The size of the rooms
 Having my own private mailing address  Having own private entrance
 Having a front yard
 Having a backyard
 Having own air conditioner
 Backyard is fenced off
 Don‘t know
 Refused
13. What do you dislike the most about your HOPE VI home?
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
 Don‘t know
14. Overall, how do you feel about the design of your HOPE VI home? Are you:
 Very satisfied
 A little satisfied
 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 A little dissatisfied
 Very dissatisfied
 Don‘t know
 Refused
15. Would you say that the place you live in now is better than what you had before?
 Yes, much better
 Yes, a little better
 No, about the same
 No, a little worse
 No, much worse
 Don‘t know
 Refused
15a. Please explain why you feel that way.
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
HOPE VI Development
I will now ask you about [INSERT DEVELOPMENT NAME].
16. What were your main reasons for moving to ……………………? [DEVELOPMENT
NAME]
 To be near family/friends
 Had no choice: this is what the Housing Authority gave me
 The opportunity to live in a new home
 The houses are better than what I had before
 It had better support services for residents
 Liked the way the houses are designed/built
 Wanted to live in a mixed-income housing development
 The neighborhood is safer and more secure than where I was living
 The development looks nice
 Other (Specify): ____________________________________________
 Don‘t know
 Refused
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17. What are the five things that you like most about your development?
 Each home has a private entrance and a private mailing address
 Has both public housing and private housing together
 Each home has a backyard for children to play
 No elevator needed to get to my home
 Not as crowded as the projects were
 I feel safe here
 Residents look out for each other
 Other: ___________________________________________________
 Do not know

Refused
18. What are the five things that you dislike most about this development?
 It is too open to neighborhoods outside
 Backyards not fenced off
 No children‘s playground
 It has more private housing than public housing
 Private housing and public housing are separated from each other
 Too many speeding cars
 Too much crime - I do not feel safe here
 Public housing residences have no screen doors but the private residences have.
 Not permitted to change anything about my home
 Don‘t know
 Other _______________________________________________
19. What is the main thing you would like to have changed about the development?
 ________________________________________________________
 Don‘t know

Refused
20. Do you notice any difference in the way the private housing and the public housing look?
 Yes, major difference
 Yes, small difference  No difference [Skip toQ21]
 Refused [Skip to Q21]
20a. If yes, how are they different?
 ___________________________________________________
 ___________________________________________________
 ________________________________________________________
21. How would you describe the racial or ethnic make-up of the people in the development?
Would you say most residents are of one race or ethnic group or from several races and ethnic
groups?
 Almost entirely of one race or ethnic group
 A mixture of races and ethnic groups
 Don‘t know
 Refused
22. Which is the most common racial/ethnic group in the development?
 Black/African-American
 White/Caucasian
 Asian
 Hispanic
 Non-Hispanic
 Other: __________________________________
 Don‘t know
 Refused
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23. How satisfied are you about this racial/ethnic makeup?
 Very satisfied  Somewhat satisfied
 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 Somewhat dissatisfied
 Very dissatisfied
 Don‘t know
 Refused
23a. Why do you feel this way?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
24. How safe do you feel living in this development compared to where you lived before?
 A lot safer
 A little safer  About the same
 A little less safe  A lot less safe
 don‘t know
 Refused
24a. Please explain the reasons for your answer.
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________________________
The Surrounding Neighborhood and Services
Now, please think about the neighborhood immediately outside of Baldwins Run.
25. How would you rate the safety of the neighborhood outside the development since moving
here? Would you say :
 Very safe
 Somewhat safe
 Neither safe nor unsafe
 Somewhat unsafe
 Very unsafe  Don‘t know
 Refused
26. How satisfied are you with the following services in the neighborhood?
(a) Health care:
 Very satisfied
 A little satisfied
 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 Dissatisfied
 Very dissatisfied
 Refused
(b) Childcare services
 Very satisfied
 Dissatisfied

 A little satisfied
 Very dissatisfied

 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 Refused

(c) Public Transportation
 Very satisfied
 Dissatisfied

 A little satisfied
 Very dissatisfied

 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 Refused

27. Which of these do you see as big problems in the surrounding neighborhood?
 Unemployment
 Use of drugs  People just hanging out
 Robbery
 Gangs
 Shootings and violence
 Garbage collection
 Graffiti
 Policing
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28. Mixing Income and Neighbors
Most HOPE VI developments have a mix of both public housing and private housing. Private
housing households are homeowners.
29. How do you feel about this mixing of public housing households and homeowners in the
same housing development?
 Strongly agree
 Somewhat agree
 Neither agree nor disagree
 Somewhat disagree
 Strongly disagree
 Don‘t know [Skip to Q28c]
 Refused [Skip to Q28]
30. Why do you feel that way?
 ________________________________________________________
 ________________________________________________________
31. Which of these statements would you agree with? HOPE VI developments should have:
 More public housing than private housing
 More private housing than public housing
 Equal number of public housing and private housing
 Only public housing
 Only Private housing
 Don‘t know
 Refused
32. How often do you stop to chat with a neighbor?
 Almost every day
 About once a week
 About once a month
 A few times
 Once [Go to Q33]
 Never [Go to Q33]
 Don‘t know [Go to Q33]
 Refused [Go to Q33]

33. Whom do you chat with most, your public housing neighbors or private housing neighbors?

Public housing neighbors

Private housing neighbors

Neither one

Don‘t know [Skip to Q33]

Refused [Skip to Q33]
34. Why is that?
 _____________________________________________________
 ____________________________________________________
35. Since moving here, how often do you or any other person from your household have a meal
or refreshments like coffee or tea with a neighbor?
 Almost every day
 About once per week  About once per month
 Once in a while
 Once [Skip to Q35]
 Never [Skip to Q35]
 Don‘t know
 Refused [Skip to Q35]
36. Whom do you do this kind of thing with more; would you say:
 Public housing tenants
 homeowners
 Don‘t know [Go to Q33]
 Refused [Go to Q33]

 None
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37. Why is that?
 ________________________________________________________
 ________________________________________________________
37. How would you describe your relationship with your immediate neighbors? Would you say
…
 Very good [Go to Q36]  Good [Go to Q36]
 Poor
 Very poor
 Don‘t know
 Refused
38. Are there problems between homeowners and public housing tenants?
 Yes, many problems
 Some problems
 A few problems
 No problem at all
 Don‘t know
 Refused
39. Please describe the overall relationship between public housing residents and homeowners in
your development.
 Very good [Go to Q36]
 Good [Go to Q36]
 Neutral
 Poor
 Very poor
 Don‘t know
 Refused
40. Why do you feel that way?
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
41. Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the statements in the box below.
Strongly Somewhat
Somewhat Strongly
Undecided
Agree
Agree
Disagree Disagree
a. Both public housing residents and
private housing residents in ……………
value education highly?
b. Both public housing residents and
private housing residents in
……………. have high family values?
a. Both public housing residents and
private housing residents in ……… put
a high value on work?

Self-Sufficiency
These next questions are about programs that help residents become self-sufficient.
42. Have you or any other householder completed any program to help public housing residents
improve their lives such as job training, computer training or parenting skill?
 Yes
 No [Go to Q41]
 Don‘t know [Go to Q41]
 Refused [Go to Q41]
43. If yes, what programs did you or other householder complete? [Read options to householder].
 Adult education (GED)
 Household management
 Job training and placement
 Household management
 Vocational/Skills training
 Child care services
 Computer literacy skills training
 General counseling

Refused
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 Drug or Alcohol prevention
 Parenting training
 Drug or Alcohol treatment
 Youth Sports or after school programs
 Other (specify: ____________________________________________)
44. In the past 12 months, which welfare-to-work training program or class have you or other
adult household member participated in? [Give program name(s)].
 _______________________________________________________
 ______________________________________________________
 None
 No comment
45. How has the training you receive help you?
 ________________________________________________________
 ________________________________________________________
 _______________________________________________________
 ________________________________________________________
46. Do you think that Camden Housing Authority has done enough to help public housing
residents improve their lives?
 Yes
 No
 Don‘t know
 Refused
47. Overall, how satisfied are you with the programs offered?
 Very satisfied
 A little satisfied
 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 Dissatisfied
 Very dissatisfied
 Refused
48. What other types of programs would you like to see available to residents?
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
Relocation Process (ORIGINAL RESIDENTS ONLY)
I want to ask you about the relocation process
49. How would you describe the process? Would you say it was …
 Very difficult
 Somewhat difficult  Neither difficult nor simple
 Somewhat simple
 Very simple
 Don‘t know
 Refused
50. Do you think that the selection process was fair to the original public housing residents?
 Yes
 No
 Don‘t know
 Refused
51. How satisfied are you with the methods used to select residents?
 Very satisfied
 A little satisfied
 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 Dissatisfied
 Very dissatisfied
 Refused
52. Where did you live during the renovation period?
 In another public housing development
 Private family housing
 Private apartment/house
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Employment Situation
Now I want to ask you a few questions about work.
53. Do you have a job now?
 Yes
 Don‘t know (Skip to Q51)
 No (Skip to Q50)
 Refused
54. Including part time work, how many jobs do you have?
 Number of jobs __________
 Refused
55. How many hours do you normally work per week?
 Under 20 hours per week
 20 - 35 hours per week
 Over 35 hours per week
 Don‘t know
 Refused
56. Is your (main) job in your neighborhood, in the city, in the suburbs, or elsewhere?
 In my neighborhood
 In the city
 In the suburbs
 Elsewhere
 Don‘t know
 Refused
57. If no job, why are you not working? Would you say …..
 Illness
 Disability
 Retired
 Studying  Taking care of home/family  Cannot find work
 Other: ___________________
 Don‘t know
 Refused
58. Have you ever worked for pay?
 Yes
 No (Skip to Q53)

 Don‘t know  Refused (Skip to Q53)

59. When was the last time you had a job?
 Less than one year ago
 More than one year ago
 Don‘t know
 Refused

 Never

60. Have you looked for work at any time during the last 12 months?
 Yes
 No
 Don‘t know
 Refused
61. Which of the following makes it difficultly for you to find work or to keep a job?
 Lack of working experience
 Not having child care service
 Lack of transportation
 Not speaking English well
 Disability
 Having a criminal record
 Drug or alcohol problem
 Lack of jobs in the neighborhood
 Racial or gender discrimination (specify): ____________________
 Other: __________________________________________________
 None of the above
 Don‘t know
 Refused
62. Does any other adult householder have a job?
 Yes
 No (Skip to Q59)
 Don‘t know (Skip to Q59)
 Refused (Skip to Q59)
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63. How many hours per week does that person work? [Record data for each person that works].
 Under 20 hours per week
 20 - 35 hours per week
 Over 35 hours per week  Don‘t know
 Refused
64. Other than housing, do you currently get welfare support such as TANF, social security
income, unemployment, disability income or any other form of public assistance?
 Yes
 No
 Don‘t know
 Refused
65. Have you had any difficulty paying your rent since moving here?
 Yes
 No
 Don‘t know
 Refused
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
I will close with a few background questions.
66. In what year were you born?
 [Record 4-digit year] __ __ __ __
 Refused



Don‘t know

67. What is the best estimate of your total household income before taxes for 2006? (Please
include income from all jobs, public assistance, or social security).
 Under $10,000
 $10,000 - $20,000
 $20,000 - $30,000
 $30,000 - $40,000
 more than $40,000  Don‘t know
 Refused
68. What is your racial and/or ethnic background?
 Black/African-American
 White /Caucasian
 Native American /Alaskan Native
 Hispanic
 Other: ______________________

 Asian (________)
 Non-Hispanic

69. What is the highest grade or year of schooling did you complete?
 Elementary/Middle School (grades 1-6)
 Bachelors degree
 Junior High School

Graduate/professional degree
 High School

Other: ____________________
 Some College, but no degree

Don‘t know
 Associate degree

Refused
Family Status/Family Structure
70. What is your marital status?
 Single
 Married
 Divorced
 Separated
 Don‘t know
 Refused

 Widowed
 Domestic partnership

71. Including yourself, how many adults over age 18 live with you?
 ____________  Don‘t know
 Refused
72. How many children ages 6 to 18 live with you?
 Number of children 6-18 ___ ___
 Don‘t know

 Refused
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How many children under age 6 live with you?
 Number of children < 6 ___ ___


Don‘t know



Refused

73. Record gender of respondent (if unsure, ask householder)
 Male

Female
We have come to the end. Would you like to add any comments at this time?
 Yes [Continue to comments]

No
[Go to closing]

Comments:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
(Continue on separate sheet if necessary).
CLOSING
Please confirm your address in case I need to follow-up with you regarding this interview.
If a follow-up interview is needed you will be informed by mail and a telephone call.
Confirm address with address in database
Street Address: __________________________ Apartment/Bldg. No.:_____
Development: ________________
Camden
Telephone #: __________
Record Time: ___:___
In closing, I want to say thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this survey.

APPENDIX D
INTERVIEW GUIDE: HACC HOPE VI COORDINATOR
Physical Redevelopment
1. Tell me about the physical redevelopment at each HOPE VI site.
2. HOPE VI goals accomplished?
3. HOPE VI goals not accomplished?
4. Public housing residents view about the HOPE VI changes?
5. Residents‘ and Community‘s views about HOPE VI changes?
6. Are there sufficient replacement public housing units for all original residents?
7. Proportion of new and proportion of rehabilitated units at McGuire Gardens?
8. Total number of housing units at Baldwin‘s Run?
9. Total number of public housing units at Baldwin‘s Run?
10. Location of off-site replacement housing for mixed-income developments?
11. Are off-site housing situated in mixed-income neighborhoods?
12. Proportion of original households that returned to McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s Run
13. Status of the Roosevelt Manor redevelopment?
14. Relationship between public housing residents and homeowners?
15. Proportion of HOPE VI households at each site who have earned income?
16. Proportion of households in previous developments with earned income?
17. Proportion of households receiving public assistance?
Community Centers
18. Are residents allowed to use the community center?
19. Are neighborhood residents allowed to use the community center?
Property Management
20. How are property management firms selected?
21. What role does the HACC have in management of HOPE VI developments?
22. Do tenants participate in management of HOPE VI developments?
Tenant Selection
23. Role of HACC in tenant selection
24. Role of the property management firm in tenant selection?
25. Vacancy rates?
26. HACC‘s role in lease preparation and enforcement?
Evictions
27. Number of crime-related evictions?
28. Number of other evictions?
Site Safety
29. How has the incidence of illicit activities in developments changed since redevelopment?
30. What is the crime situation in each development since redevelopment?
31. What is the crime situation in adjacent communities since redevelopment?
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APPENDIX E
INTERVIEW GUIDE: HOPE VI CSS COORDINATOR
Questions about Self-Sufficiency Services
1. What is the HACC‘s definition of ―self-sufficiency‖?
2. Types of self-sufficiency services available to residents?
3. Services are offered onsite?
4. Services are offered off-site?
5. Services that the HACC provides and services that outside agencies provide?
6. General eligibility rules for participants in self-sufficiency programs and services?
7. Length of time for each SS programs and services?
8. Method(s) used to inform householders about services offered?
Services Offered Onsite to HOPE VI Residents
9. Targeted number of persons to be served by self-sufficiency programs/services?
10. Number of persons who enrolled in self-sufficiency programs/services?
11. Number of householders that graduated from all self-sufficiency programs/services?
12. Participation rates for each program/project?
13. Number of existing programs expanded? Number of new programs created?
14. Education levels of residents participating (by program and total)?
Services Offered Off-site to HOPE VI Residents
15. What types of self-sufficiency services are available to HOPE VI residents off-site?
16. Number of residents who enrolled in self-sufficiency programs and services?
17. Number of residents completing self-sufficiency programs and services?
18. Retention rates?
Impact of Services
19. Residents currently employed?
20. Number of residents who gained employment after CSS/self-sufficiency intervention?
21. What types of job skills do residents typically need?
22. How are residents‘ CSS needs determined?
23. Number of households that achieved self-sufficiency and moved out of public housing?
24. Number of residents who participated in education programs
25. Number or percentage of residents having earned-income after self-sufficiency training?
26. Change in social security or welfare dependency since implementation of HOPE VI?
27. Obstacles to residents achieving self-sufficiency?
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APPENDIX F
IRB APPROVAL LETTER

NJIT

NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Institutional Review Board: MIS FWA 00003246
Notice of Approval
IRB Protocol Number: E103-07
Principal Investigators:

Michael Brown and Karen Franck
Urban Systems

Title:

Learning from HOPE IV: Revityalizing Distressed Housing in
Camden, New Jersey

Performance Site(s): Off Campus
Type of Review:

FULL [ ]

Type of Approval: NEW [X]

Sponsor Protocol Number (if applicable):
EXPEDITED [X]
RENEWAL.

Approval Date: September 27, 2007

MINOR REVISION [

]

Expiration Date: September 26, 200g

1. ADVERSE EVENTS: Any adverse event(s) or unexpected event(s) that occur in
conjunction with this study must be reported to the IRB Office immediately (973) 6427616.
2. RENEWAL: Approval is valid until the expiration date on the protocol_ You are
required to apply to the IRB for a renewal prior to your expiration date for as long as the
study is active. It is your responsibility to ensure that you receive and submit the renewal
in a timely manner
3. CONSENT: All subjects must receive a copy of the consent form as submitted_ Copies
of the signed consent forms must be kept on file with the principal investigator
4. SUBJECTS: Number of subjects approved: 150_
5. The investigator s) did not participate in the review, discussion, or vote of this protocol.
(

6. APPROVAL IS GRANTED ON THE CONDITION THAT ANY DEVIATION
FROM THE PROTOCOL Will BE SUBMITTED, IN WRITING, T43 THE IRB
FOR SEPARATE REVIEW AND APPROVAL.
Dawn Hall Apgar, PhD_ LSW, ACSW, Chair IRB
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September 27, 2007

APPENDIX G
LETTER TO PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS

January 9, 2007

Dear Householder
During the next 4-6 months, I will be undertaking a research study of the HOPE VI program in
the HOPE VI developments of McGuire Gardens and Baldwin‘s Run. I write to you because I
need your help to understand how HOPE VI has affected public housing families, like yours, that
live in these developments. Your household was one of those randomly selected to participate in
the study.
The research includes a residents‘ survey where I interview heads of households like you
about their HOPE VI experiences. Questions in the survey cover (a) residents‘ satisfaction with
their units, (b) improvements in living conditions, (c) services that the housing authority provides
to public housing residents, and neighborhood conditions and services. The interview will take
about 45 minutes.
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and will not affect your current or
future housing benefits in any way. Although you do not have to participate, your participation is
very important for the study to succeed and will be greatly appreciated. The study findings may
even help the Housing Authority to improve its services in the future. Both your identity and the
answers you give will be kept strictly confidential. Your personal information will therefore not
be given to anyone or used in any publication without your written consent.
Within the next two weeks, I will contact you to arrange a date for the interview. If you
prefer, you may also call me at 973-596-6277 to set up a date for the interview. I look forward to
and welcome your participation in this study, which I am doing as part of my studies towards a
Ph.D. degree at the New Jersey Institute of Technology.
Thank you very much for your time.
Sincerely,

Michael Brown
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APPENDIX H
LETTER OF APPROVAL FROM THE HACC

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF CAMDEN
2021 WATSON STREET, CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY 08105
TELEPHONE: (856) 968-2775
FAX: (856) 968-2754

Deborah Person-Polk
Board of Commissioners
Chairperson

Maria Marquez, Ph.D.

Executive Director

Deborah Keys
Commissioner

Andres Camacho
Commissioner

Mike Brown
The School of Architecture
New Jersey Institute of Technology
University Heights
Newark, NJ 07102

Scot McCray
Commissioner

September 4, 2007
Alan Miller
Commissioner

Meishka Ruiz
Commissioner

Dear Mr. Brown:
This letter is to acknowledge that the Housing Authority of the City of Camden
is aware of the HOPE VI research that you intend to conduct with the residents
of McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres.
Although the Housing Authority is prohibited from disclosing to you any names
or other information about public housing residents, without the consent of
these residents, we understand that you will be notifying the residents yourself
and may be interviewing those residents who agree voluntarily to participate in
your research.
We wish you the best in your endeavor.
Sincerely,

Charles Valentine
Director Modernization Department
Cc:

Maria Marquez — Executive Director
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APPENDIX I
HUD‟S RESIDENT CHARACTERISTICS REPORTS
Resident Characteristics Report
As Of March 31 2010
PHASE V
Program Type:
Public Housing
Level Of Information:
Project within State and Housing Agency NJ010
Effective Dates Included:
December 01 2008 through March 31 2010
NOTE:
Percentages in each area may not total 100 percent due to rounding.
UNITS CATEGORY
Project
ACC Units
50058 Required 50058 Received
NJ010
1718
1535
1438
NJ010000008
57
54
54
INCOME CATEGORY
Distribution of Average Annual Income as a % of 50058 Received
Project
Extremely Low Income
Very Low Income
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
NJ010
530556
55
165029
NJ010000008
0
0
0

17
0

Low Income
Count
Percent
70198
0

7
0

Above Low Income
Count
Percent
25480
0

3
0

Unavailable Income
Count
Percent
179269
18
54
100

Average Annual Income ($)
Project
Average Annual Income
NJ010
13414
NJ010000008
14889
Distribution of Annual Income as a % of 50058 Received
Project
$0 $1-$5000
$5001-$10000
$10001-$15000 $15001-$20000$20001-$25000 Above $25000
NJ010
5
13
34
20
11
6
11
NJ010000008
0
7
30
26
11
11
15
Distribution of Source of Income as a % of 50058 Received ** Some families have multiple sources of income **
Project
With Any Wages With Any Welfare With Any SSI/SS/Pension
With Other Income
With No Income
NJ010
32
29
55
22
2
NJ010000008
39
24
39
35
0
TTP / FAMILY TYPE CATEGORY
Distribution of Total Tenant Payment as a % of 50058 Received
Project
$0 $1-$25
$26-$50
NJ010
0
4
NJ010000008
0
0

$51-$100
8
6

$101-$200
6
2

$201-$350
23
15

$351-$500
32
39

Above $501
13
15

15
24

Average Monthly TTP ($)
Project
Average Monthly TTP
NJ010
315
NJ010000008
355
Distribution of Family Type as a % of 50058 Received

Project
NJ010
NJ010000008

Non-Elderly No Children Non- Non-Elderly With Children Non- Elderly No Children Elderly With Children
Non-Elderly No
Non-Elderly With
Female Headed Household
Elderly No Children Non-Disabled Elderly With Children Non-Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Children Disabled
Children Disabled
with Children
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent Count
Percent Count
Percent Count
Percent
Count
Percent
161214
17
6205
1
131643
14
339092
35 122700
13
6374
1 160162
17
43142
4
353932
36
2
4
0
0
7
13
33
61
0
0
0
0
8
15
4
7
35
65

Average TTP By Family Type($)
Project
Elderly No ChildrenElderly
Non-Disabled
With Children
Non-Elderly
Non-Disabled
No Children
Non-Elderly
Non-Disabled
With Children
Elderly NoNon-Disabled
Children
Elderly
Disabled
With Children
Non-Elderly
DisabledNo Children
Non-Elderly
Disabled
WithFemale
Children
Headed
Disabled
Household with Children
NJ010
346
568
375
300
297
452
256
345
293
NJ010000008
242
0
265
387
0
0
233
552
394
FAMILY RACE/ETHNICITY CATEGORY
Distribution by Head of Household's Race as a % of 50058 Received
Project
White Only
Black / African American
American
OnlyIndian Or Alaska
Asian Only
Native OnlyNative Hawaiin/Other
White Pacific
American
Islander
Indian
White
Only
/Black
Alaska
/ African
Native
WhiteAmerican
Only
Asian Only
Only
All Other Combinations
NJ010
51
45
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
NJ010000008
0
98
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
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Resident Characteristics Report
As Of March 31 2010
Program Type:
Level Of Information:
Effective Dates Included:
NOTE:

PHASE VII
Public Housing
Project within State and Housing Agency NJ010
December 01 2008 through March 31 2010
Percentages in each area may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

UNITS CATEGORY
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011

50058
50058
ACC Units
Required Received
1718
1535
1438
48
46
46

INCOME CATEGORY
Distribution of Average Annual Income as a % of 50058
Received
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011

Extremely Low Income
Very Low Income
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
530556
55
165029
0
0
0

Average Annual Income ($)
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011

Average Annual Income
13414
14736

Low Income
Percent

Count
17
0

70198
0

7
0

Above Low Income
Count
Percent
25480
0

3
0

Unavailable Income
Count
Percent
179269
18
46
100

Distribution of Annual Income as a % of 50058 Received
$10001$0 $1-$5000 $5001-$10000 $15000
5
13
34
0
11
24

Project
NJ010
NJ010000011

$15001$20000

$20001$25000

20
22

11
15

Above
$25000
6
17

11
11

Distribution of Source of Income as a % of 50058
Received ** Some families have multiple sources of
income **

Project
NJ010
NJ010000011

With Any
Wages
32
46

With Any With Any
With Other With No
Welfare
SSI/SS/Pension Income
Income
29
55
22
39
33
35

2
0

TTP / FAMILY TYPE CATEGORY
Distribution of Total Tenant Payment as a % of 50058
Received
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011
Average Monthly TTP ($)
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011

$0 $1-$25
$26-$50
0
4
0
0

$51-$100

$101-$200

8
4

6
9

$201-$350
23
17

$351-$500
32
26

13
20

Above $501
15
24

Average Monthly TTP
315
347

Average TTP By Family Type($)
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011
FAMILY RACE/ETHNICITY CATEGORY
Distribution by Head of Household's Race as a % of
50058 Received
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011
Distribution by Head of Household's Ethnicity as a % of
50058 Received
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011
HOUSEHOLD CATEGORY
Distribution by Household Members Age as a % of Total
Number of Household Members
Project

Elderly No Children
Elderly
Non-Disabled
WithNon-Elderly
Children Non-Disabled
No Children
Non-Elderly
Non-Disabled
With
Elderly
Children
No Children
Non-Disabled
Elderly
Disabled
With Children
Non-Elderly
Disabled
NoNon-Elderly
Children Disabled
With
Female
Children
Headed
Disabled
Household with Children
346
304

568
332

375
284

300
371

297
0

452
472

256
240

345
190

293
357

White Only
Black / African
American
American
Indian
Only
Asian
Or Alaska
Only Native
Native
OnlyHawaiin/Other
White American
Pacific Islander
White
IndianOnly
Black
/ Alaska
/ African
White
NativeAmerican
Asian
Only Only
All
Only
Other Combinations
51
45
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
98
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Hispanic or Latino
Non-Hispanic or Latino
24
22

76
78

NJ010
NJ010000011
Age 0-5 years
Age 6-17 years
Distribution by Household Size as a % of 50058 Received Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Project
305049
14
519166
NJ010
20
15
48
NJ010000011
Total Household Members and Average Size
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011
Distribution by Number of Bedrooms as a % of 50058
Received
Project
NJ010
NJ010000011
STAY PERIOD CATEGORY
Distribution by Length of Stay as a % of 50058 Received
(currently assisted families)
Project

1 person
47
11

2 persons 3 persons
21
26

25
36

4 persons
15
35

Age 18-50 years
Count
Percent
743161
52

5 persons
10
15

35
39

6 persons

Age 51-61 years
Count
Percent
212771
8

7 persons

5
13

2
0

10
6

8 persons
1
0

Age 62-8 2years
Age 83+ years
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
275710
13
49767
2
6
4
1
1

9 persons
0
0

0
0

10+ persons
0
0

Total Number ofAverage
Household
Household
Total
Members
Number
Size of Households
2105648
2.2
970532
135
2.9
46

0 Bedrooms

1 Bedroom 2 Bedrooms
7
0

34
11

3 Bedrooms
31
46

4 Bedrooms

23
39

5+ Bedrooms
5
4

1
0

NJ010
NJ010000011
Moved In Past Year
Count
Percent
Count
273
19
45
98

1+ to 2 years
Percent
169
0

Count
12
0

2+ to 5years
Percent
243
1

Count
17
2

5+ to 10 years
Percent
366
0

25
0

10+ to 20 years
Over 20 years
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
305
21
82
6
0
0
0
0

APPENDIX J
WESTFIELD ACRES HOPE VI GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT

Representative Robert E. Andrews New Jersey —
First Congressional District Message of the Day
REP. ANDREWS ANNOUNCES $35 MILLION FEDERAL GRANT TO HELP REVITALIZE
HOUSING FOR LOW INCOME FAMILIES IN CAMDEN
December 11, 2002
I am pleased to announce that the City of Camden has received a $35 million federal grant to help
revitalize low income homes the Baldwin Run, where 281 public housing units will be integrated
with 235 rental, mixed income and market rate homes. This federal grant will help fund the $100
million Baldwin Run development project. Public and private agencies are funding the $65
million balance. The first phase of the $100 million Baldwin Run development project is already
completed, where 49 homes with front yards and porches have replaced the dangerous and
crumbling Westfield Acres public housing. This federal grant will also help ensure that residents
now live safely in areas where drugs and violence often dominated the housing development. I
believe that every American should have a safe, clean and decent place to live. I am proud to
have worked with Camden Housing Authority, City of Camden and Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) officials to help bring this funding to Camden.
While this funding is great news for the City of Camden, more work needs to be done. The
Camden Housing Authority has developed a $125 million plan to rebuild Roosevelt Manor. The
Authority has applied for a $20 million federal grant from the Hope VI program to help with
funding for the Roosevelt Manor project. Hope VI Homeownership and Opportunity for People
Everywhere emerged from a national commission report on severely distressed public housing in
the early 1990s. The report found that there were nearly 100,000 units of "severely distressed"
public housing units in the United States. The Hope VI program works with cities to eradicate
distressed public housing units, and deconcentrate the poverty by redeveloping them into mixedincome communities. If Roosevelt Manor were successful in securing a Hope VI grant, this
would be the 3rd Hope VI grant that the City of Camden would have received since 1993. I
helped McGuire Gardens secure a $42 million Hope VI grant in 1994, and Westfield Acres secure
a $35 million Hope VI grant in 2000. My office is presently working with Camden Housing
Authority and Camden City officials to help secure a Hope VI grant for Roosevelt Manor. I
wrote a letter of support on behalf of Camden City to Housing and Urban Development Secretary
Mel Martinez earlier this month to support Roosevelt Manor's Hope VI application. I remain
committed to helping Camden City revitalize housing for low income families.
http://www.house.gov/andrews/archive/121102.html
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